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This dissertation examines the function and relevance of invective in late 4th-
century oratory. I bring together recent approaches to performance, humor, and legal
studies in order to reevaluate the role of character depiction, and especially character
assassination, in forensic rhetoric. Both on the comic stage and in the courts, evoking
derisive laughter from the audience was an important mechanism for effecting social
control. I demonstrate how the orators draw from Old and Middle Comedy to depict
opponents as character types, like braggarts (alazones), flatterers (kolakes), and comic
prostitutes (male hetairai/pornoi). I argue further that speakers do not use invective to
skirt legal issues; rather, they tailor their arguments about character to the legal charge. In
the Athenian system, the concept of legal relevance was broad and subject to
manipulation. The only mechanism of restraint on a speaker was the threat of being
shouted down (thorubos) by the jury. Invective, therefore, was not automatically “out of
vi
bounds”. Moreover, issues of character and morality were of increasing public concern in
4th-century Athens (as evidenced by Xenophon, Middle Comedy, and oratory alike). To
the minds of Athenian jurors, information about character provided important evidence
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˜ fÊsei pçsin ényr√poiw Ípãrxei, t«n m¢n loidori«n ka‹ t«n kathgori«n
ékoÊein ∞d°vw, to›w §painoËsi d' aÍtoÁw êxyesyai…
(Dem. 18.3)
“It is by nature that all people listen with pleasure to slander and invective, but get
annoyed at those who praise themselves…”
In this brief but insightful remark near the opening of On the Crown (OTC),
Demosthenes asserts two intriguing aspects of invective; it produces pleasure for the
listener and it appeals to humankind by nature. His claim thus conveys the importance of
invective for orators; if the jury enjoys listening to it, then the orator can benefit from
using it. Also important is the implicit counterpoint that the orator can suffer from not
using it. Demosthenes’ immediate goal is to argue that he has the harder task—praising
himself, while Aeschines has the easier one—attacking his opponent. Incorporating
invective into a speech, however, is more problematic than Demosthenes suggests here.
Although enjoyable for the listener, invective can also backfire if the speaker does not
introduce it carefully.1 In fact, Demosthenes’ statement is the first step toward preparing
his audience for his own use of invective since, in this case, it is an important part of his
strategy for defending his career.
1 Cf. Cicero De Oratore 2.58.
2Demosthenes’ positive spin on invective provides a striking contrast to the
standard condemnation of it by many modern critics;2 even scholars who do not simply
condemn the use of invective in oratory—finding redeeming qualities in its artistry and
persuasive effects—tend not to see it as evidence in support of arguments based on laws,
but rather as entertaining diversions.3 The use of invective thus forms part of the
continuing debate about whether rhetoric (i.e. composing arguments by whatever means
necessary to win a case) or legal argumentation (i.e. adhering closely to the laws and
evidence) held greater sway in Athenian litigation. A better understanding of how
invective works within the speeches suggests that no such dichotomy exists. Indeed,
although invective is thoroughly rhetorical, it is also a form of legal argumentation, and
like the law itself, it aims at regulating community behavior and effecting social control.4
In societies such as Athens where no police force existed, verbal punishments and
deterrents such as invective take on a primary role in setting standards and enforcing
community norms and regulations.5
Interpretations of invective have not yet benefited from recent studies of oratory’s
role within a performance culture. In particular, although the connection between
invective and comedy is strong, few scholars have explored how invective can be
                                                 
2 See Wayte 1882, xxx; Lipsius 1905-15, vol. II, 646-651; Bruns 1961, 487; Kennedy 1963, 229; Koster
1980, 76.
3 Usher 2000, 227; 272-73; Harding 1994b; Yunis 2005; Voegelin 1943, 168; Rowe 1966; Dyck 1985;
Wankel 1976, 150.
4 Cf. Henderson 1990 who argues that Aristophanic comedy picks up where the law courts leave off, or
sometimes fail, by holding politicians accountable for their actions through scathing attacks on the comic
stage. He does not acknowledge, however, that this phenomenon occurs in the courts as well. Even if a
defendant who is accused of immoral behavior is acquitted, normative community values can be reified
informally by the process of laughing at deviant behavior during the course of the trial.
5 Cf. Hunter 1994, 3-6; 96-119; Ober 1989, 148-51; Cohen 1991, 171-202. Cf. also Corbeill 1996.
3elucidated by Aristophanic and Middle Comic characterizations.6 Since verbal censure
was an important mechanism of social control that crossed the boundaries of comedy and
oratory, a study of comic invective in forensic rhetoric will allow us to focus on
invective’s socio-political, but also legal, function. It is my goal in this dissertation to
reevaluate invective in forensic rhetoric; I do this by examining oratorical strategies for
incorporating invective into speeches while paying attention to its function within
Athenian legal and democratic processes.
I. Oratory as performance
Recent studies of Athens as a performance culture have opened up new avenues
for the interpretation of Attic oratory. Whereas scholars used to examine the speeches
primarily as texts, in the past fifteen years they have begun to emphasize the dramatic
elements of courtroom procedure.7 Hall’s article on “lawcourt dramas” is a brief point-
by-point comparison of aspects of the dramatic stages with various aspects of the
courtroom scene: characters, plot, tragedy, comedy, and staging.8 The staging of trials is
also illuminated by Blanchard’s recent article on the creation of law court setting as a
performance space.9 Duncan and Easterling have investigated the role of acting as taken
                                                 
6 Koster (1980, 76-77), for example sees oratorical invective carrying on the tradition of what Aristotle
calls fiambikÆ fid°a but connects it to Homeric and tragic poetry because of the shared conduit of the speech.
But see Rosen 1988 who discusses fiambikÆ fid°a and demonstrates the continuity of iambographic poetry in
Old Comedy with Cratinus as the primary conduit. See also Rowe 1966 and Harding 1994b for brief but
useful discussions of comic elements in oratory.
7 See Ober 1989, 152-55.
8 Hall 1995, 39-58.
9 Blanchard 2004, 11-31.
4up by Aeschines and Demosthenes: Easterling concentrates on the orator’s voice and
posturing, and Duncan elucidates the conflict between acting and sincerity.10 They both
shed light on how the orator is by nature an actor, which implies that his performance is
contrived—and yet in a courtroom, he must appear to speak naturally. Wider in its scope
is Goldhill’s introduction to a volume on Athenian performance culture. Goldhill posits
that “the notion of performance will not merely appropriate ancient materials to a
distorting modern framework, but will bring into significant focus a series of related
terms, institutions, attitudes, and practices integral to the society of classical Athens in a
way which will be especially illuminating for the culture of democracy.”11 Performance is
a valuable heuristic tool for understanding Athenian democracy and can, Goldhill argues,
be located in four keys themes: agôn (contest), epideixis (display), schêma (physical
appearance, constitution, way of life, etc.), and theôria (spectating).12 All four occupy
important places in forensic rhetoric.
Most of these studies have been interested in the ways in which oratory resembles
drama. Thus, the connections between oratory and the dramatic genres have been
undeniably established, but the differences have received relatively little attention.
Although oratory has a ‘staginess’ about it (to borrow Scafuro’s term), we cannot assert
the similarity of what happens on the bêma with what happens on the comic and tragic
stages without paying attention to important differences as well.13 As Jerzy Axer has
argued for Roman oratory, the court is not exactly the theater, nor is the tribunal the
                                                 
10 Easterling 1999, 154-66; Duncan 2006, 58-89.
11 Goldhill 1999, 1.
12 Goldhill 1999, 1-29.
13 Scafuro 1997, 8.
5stage: “unlike the playwright, the orator does not invent plots to be presented on stage,
and unlike the actor, the orator represents no one but himself.”14 Axer does recognize that
there are important connections between oratory and theater, but he cautions scholars to
distinguish comic material that is deliberately employed by the orator from the elements
of theatricality that simply occur because of the overlapping nature of the two settings.
His ultimate point is that although the orator uses the model of theater to shape his case
when the comparison is apt, he also draws on other models that include spectators, like
the gladiatorial arena. Thus, we should not seize solely on the theater, but rather examine
whatever type of scenario the orator uses to “model the communication situation” for
persuasive ends.15
Giving due consideration to the performance context is an important step toward a
re-evaluation of the relationship between a trial and the community. Although scholars,
beginning with Aristotle, have been interested in how the orators create bias in favor of
one speaker over another, they have focused on the speeches of opposing litigants as
texts. Only recently have they emphasized the role of the jurors, particularly as that of an
audience at a show. Consideration of the audience’s role in the court case has a
significant effect on our interpretation of any speech. In the words of C. J. Classen, a trial
is a “three-cornered dialogue” between the two litigants and the jurors.16 To disregard the
jury’s role in that dialogue is to misinterpret the trial event. Similarly, Bers has argued
                                                 
14 Axer 1989, 299-311 (here p. 303). Of course self-characterization is still possible. It is also worth
pointing out an important distinction here between the Athenian and Roman orator; often the Athenian
acted solely as logographer in a case and thus would still be creating a character for the speaker to assume
at the time of delivery (see ch. 3 below). Further, Axer’s point only holds for the orator himself; even if an
orator is representing himself, he could characterize his opponent in a variety of ways.
15 Axer 1989.
16 Classen 1991, 195-207.
6that the interaction between audience and speaker, however informal, affects the shape
and scope of an oration.17
It has been amply demonstrated that Cicero drew from comedy to shape his
orations, and therefore, his audience’s expectations. But Attic oratory has yet to benefit
from the same depth of analysis. Axer contends that the imagery of the arena and
gladiator has been overlooked by Ciceronian scholarship because this analogy is
undignified in comparison to that of the theater;18 a similar prejudice may have colored
the study of comic invective in Greek oratory. Tragic elements in speeches have received
more attention because tragedy accords with the gravity of the legal process (to which
even the orators call attention), whereas comic elements, especially the more graphic
elements of Old Comedy, tend to be considered “low” and too undignified for the court
setting. 19 To be sure, the Attic orators drew inspiration from other contexts (such as
religious festivals, Olympic games, military campaigns), but comedy is the most
productive model for understanding oratorical invective, and comic elements in oratory
are in need of further study. Part of the problem seems to be that even when comic
elements are identified, they are downplayed or dismissed because they are seen as a
                                                 
17 Bers 1985, 1-15; cf. Lanni (1997, 183-89) who extends this analysis to the surrounding bystanders.
18 Axer 1989, 310-11: “..the theater is the only analog “dignified” enough in contemporary thought to
encourage comparison with the Roman court of law. It is for this reason that scholars are satisfied with the
term “theater” and with an incomplete understanding of the possibilities of the transformation
phenomenon.”
19 Blanchard (2004, 26-7), in fact, concludes his article with a concentration on the elaborate and serious
ritual of the juror’s experience. His final assessment is that the juror “was steeled for drama, not light
entertainment.” Although his point is not made specifically to discount comedy, his opinion is
representative of the approach to dramatic elements, one that (I think) lies behind the resistance to seeing
the importance of comic invective. I do not claim that the courts were not serious business, but the use of
comedy does not make a trial “light entertainment.” The continuing debate over the “seriousness” of Attic
comedy per se sheds light on the serious role that comedy might be playing in oratory. On this debate see
Henderson 1990 and Hesk 2000, 259.
7threat to the “greatness” of a speech, or as indicative that a speech was never delivered.
Porter, for instance, has argued that Lysias 1 was likely only a literary exercise, based on
his demonstration that Lysias presents the adultery narrative as a typical comic plot.20 Yet
we should not be too quick to dismiss the possibility of comic characterization in
delivered speeches. As Gagarin has shown, storytelling, of the sort in which Lysias
engages, draws on the cultural background of the community; it was, and still is, a
necessary mechanism for presenting evidence in a meaningful way to the jury.21 Each
speaker tells his own story of the events, regularly invoking topoi familiar to his
audience. Scenes and characters from comedy, tragedy, and mythic traditions become
convenient ways of making the people and events in an individual’s situation more
readily understandable to a large, anonymous crowd of jurors, such as the ones that
Athenian litigants faced. The use of comic characterization and comic invective gives an
orator greater assurance that his attacks will resonate with the crowd. Similarly, in
speeches like Cicero’s Pro Caelio, for example, Cicero relied heavily on Roman comedy
by quoting lines from Caecilius and shaping his case in terms of a Plautine plot with
Caelius playing the role of the young lover, Clodia the role of the meretrix
(courtesan/prostitute) and himself, that of the lenient father.22
There is no doubt that Pro Caelio was delivered. We should, therefore, not
assume that, in the case of the Attic orators, extant speeches full of dramatic or literary
                                                 
20 Porter 1997.
21 Gagarin 2003; cf. Schrager 1999.
22 See Geffcken 1973 for this analysis of the speech. Salzman 1982 sees Caelius as Attis and Clodia as
Cybele, and Goldberg (forthcoming) argues that the speech draws, not from comedy, but from mime. It
seems that all three are correct; we should expect that Cicero would draw from as many and varied images
as were suitable for his immediate rhetorical purpose (cf. Axer 1989).
8elements were not presented in court.23 Of course, the courtroom setting did not give a
speaker the same license to use obscenity and other graphic humor for which
Aristophanes was known; too emphatic a use of humor in court would probably be
counterproductive. In many respects, the settings were very different: the spectator at a
comic play would watch with the expectation of laughing and being entertained; he
would know that acting is taking place. The juror, on the other hand, observes a trial with
an awareness of its connection to the "real life” outcome of the case.24 The orator, then,
had to begin his performance with an understanding of his own audience’s expectations.
Certainly he too would want to entertain the jury, but he had to proceed carefully even
when his goal was similar to that of a comic poet (e.g. inveighing against a politician’s
degenerate behavior). Thus, we must be careful not to oversimplify the complexities of
courtroom performance by mapping comic approaches directly onto oratorical ones. Even
so, subtler forms of humor, language, and character portrayal were useful to the Attic
orators (just as they were for Cicero later on) and a study of similarities and differences
between the humor of the comic stage and that of the courtroom reveals important aspects
of each arena as a social and political institution.
II. Invective and Legal Relevance
                                                 
23 We know, for example, that On the Crown was delivered and it is generally agreed to be a literary
masterpiece (see below, chapter one). It should also be noted here that, in regard to private cases in both
Greek and Roman oratory, there is no good reason to envision substantive changes between written and
oral versions; see Riggsby 1999, 178-84. It is particularly unlikely that comic material would have been
added after delivery since it, by design, is meant to appeal to the entire dêmos and not just the elite
audience of the published texts. Further, the published version is written in view of what would be effective
when delivered, so we can assume it is representative of the actual (if not the ideal) oral performance.
24 See below for a discussion of the different mindsets that jurors would have when observing a court case
as opposed to a play.
9Invective is a powerful tool that can be used against an enemy to increase one’s
own social and political prestige. For this reason, scholars readily admit how clever, bold,
or compelling the use of invective can be, but they still tend to view it as a rhetorical
attempt to strengthen a weak case—a heavy dose of artistry (pisteis entechnoi) to combat
a lack of hard facts (pisteis atechnoi). In short, invective is generally considered to be
outside the scope of legal relevance. But, as we shall see, the orators make elaborate
arguments for and against the relevance of invective, and their efforts to justify the use of
invective should not be dismissed too quickly. Further, we must bring into the discussion
recent scholarship that has shown the dikastêria to be a site primarily concerned with
carrying out justice and not just a site for social competition.
Scholars of Athenian law are becoming increasingly interested in the issue of
legal relevance. The usual approach to this issue in the past has been to judge arguments
in an Athenian speech based on what speakers themselves claim is not relevant (exô tou
pragmatos), or in terms of modern notions of judicial relevance. 25 Adriaan Lanni has
recently argued for a different approach. By comparing speeches that were delivered in
the dikastêria with more specialized cases (homicide and dikê emporikê), she
demonstrates that the Athenian concept of relevance was stricter in specialized cases. In
turn, she is able to show that the concept of relevance must have been deliberately
broader for cases in the dikastêria.26 In particular, she finds three areas that “stray” from
                                                 
25 See most recently Rhodes 2004, who follows the orators’ own citations of irrelevant arguments, and in
general, argues that speakers kept these irrelevancies to a minimum.
26 Lanni 2005, 112-28.
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the legal charge to be common components of dikastic speeches: character evidence,
appeals for pity from the jurors, and contextual information about the background of the
dispute.27 Because these topoi appear with enough frequency, we can be confident that
the Athenians did not view them as irrelevant.28 Lanni’s analysis calls for a reevaluation
of all material that has been treated as irrelevant in the past. High on that list is invective
(which she does not specifically address). Invective, by its very nature, has to do with an
attack on someone’s character and thus falls under the rubric of arguments from
character, the most common type of extra-legal argumentation in the extant speeches.29
Demosthenes 36, For Phormio, provides a useful example of how character, legal
argumentation, and comic material intersect. Probability (eikos) arguments are
undoubtedly considered legitimate evidence in the courts (although their persuasive value
may be disputed). In this speech, Demosthenes illustrates succinctly how character
factors into eikos arguments, and also how comic characterization factors into character
portrayal. Toward the end of the speech, Demosthenes juxtaposes the characters of
Phormio and Apollodorus. He argues that if Apollodorus has always shown himself to be
a wicked prosecuting nuisance, and Phormio has always shown himself to be voluntarily
                                                 
27 Lanni 2005, 114.
28 Even so, the ancient/ modern dichotomy has been exaggerated. See Riggsby (2004, 178) who, in
comparison with Roman attitudes toward character evidence, argues the following about modern Texan
courts: “Character evidence, then, is not to be used to make inferences as to the central question of whether
the defendant committed the crime or not, but it may be used to judge subordinate issues. And in fact, it
may be used to decide that central question if the defence raises the issue first. Character evidence is not
simply considered irrelevant. If this were so, it would not be admitted in so many circumstances.” Here too
we should keep in mind his explanation of ancient views on the fixity of character as it relates to evidence;
it is because the jurors viewed character as fixed that they believed past actions were a good predictor of
character/behavior at the time of an incident (179). Throughout this dissertation, I use “characterization” to
refer to the act of turning an individual into a stereotype.
29 Lanni 2003 and 2005. Riggsby (1999 and 2004, 176-80) has demonstrated at length for Ciceronian
oratory how Cicero connects supposedly irrelevant arguments to the legal charge.
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helpful to others, then it is not likely that in this one instance Phormio is wronging
Apollodorus and Apollodorus is lawfully proceeding with a case.
Both the Greeks and Romans believed in the notion of fixed character, a notion
that is essential for understanding why arguments from character were persuasive.30
Character fixity would mean that once an orator successfully established the character of
his opponent, this would be reliable information for interpreting past actions, but also for
predicting future ones.  Important to this argument is the depiction of Apollodorus as a
paradigmatic alazôn (a self-interested man who pretends to more knowledge or power
than he actually has).31 The figure of alazôn is useful since Demosthenes is attempting to
expose the gap between Apollodorus’ claims of probity and the ‘reality’ of his deceptive,
sycophantic background. It is not always the case, however, that the orators make such
direct connections between arguments from character and probability. In this case, a
paragraphê preempting Apollodorus’ claim to inheritance, motive is a central issue and
each man’s character bears directly on that issue. As we will see, characterization often
plays a role that is subordinate to the main issues, but it is still introduced as valid
evidence for determining a verdict.
Important mechanisms existed within the legal process itself that directly affected
an orator’s ability to incorporate invective into a speech. First, no judge or other authority
monitored the relevance of the arguments introduced. In fact, the only active control over
30 Athenian speakers appeal to the audience regarding arguments from character in the same manner as
Riggsby 2004 shows for Cicero. Cf. Dover (1974, 74-160; esp. 74-83 and 144-160) who discusses
numerous aspects affecting moral character, but does not address the capacity for character to change (or
not) over time.
31 alazoneusetai occurs in 36.41; for a detailed discussion of alazoneia, see ch. 1; and for its use in this
speech in particular, see ch. 4. On alazoneia in general, see Aristotle, NE 4.8; Whitman, 1964, 26-27.
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a speaker’s line of argumentation was the threat of dikastic thorubos (uproar) by the
jury.32 With only the jury to answer to, an orator could theoretically say whatever he
wanted, no matter how far afield from the issues of the case. The orator, however, would
not necessarily find such an approach productive or persuasive, and certainly risked being
“shouted down” by an angry crowd.
Secondly, a speaker could widen the scope of the case considerably based on what
he included in the charge in a private case (enklêma), or in a public one (graphê). Each
contained a list of the specific accusations of the prosecutor against the defendant. A
herald would read out the enklêma or graphê to the jurors before the trial began. It was in
accordance with these charges that the jurors were required by oath to determine a
verdict. The oath, then, acted as a control over the jurors in that they swore to vote in
accordance with the laws and decrees.33 There is no reason to believe that the jury was
not doing just that when they allowed for character evidence to be introduced in court.
From the jury’s perspective, these arguments constituted valid evidence when trying to
reach a decision. And from the speaker’s perspective, it was necessary to make an
identifiable connection between character argumentation and the legal charge to
minimize any risk of seeming to steer the jury off topic.
As Thür shows, Demosthenes’ speech Against Pantaenetus (Dem. 37) is useful
for understanding the role of the enklêma as a mechanism for formally broadening a
case.34 The case deals with the ownership and lease of property regarding a mining
                                                 
32 See Bers 1985.
33 See Rhodes 2004 for a useful discussion of the oath in connection with legal relevance; cf. Tangri 2004.
34 See Thür (forthcoming).
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business and is the only extant speech that includes direct quotations of the enklêma. The
speaker Nicobulus chooses as part of his strategy to quote and respond to each of the six
charges (21-33) that Pantaenetus has made against him. The first five of the charges deal
with the workshop and workmen specifically. The sixth charge, however, shows a
conscious maneuver on Pantaenetus’ part to include a wide variety of accusations that
extend beyond the immediate issue of financial damages. The accusations of, and
response to, this last charge are as follows (33):
“Here he accuses me of many seriously dreadful things all at the same
time, including battery (aikeia) and outrage (hubris) and acts of violence
(biaiôn) and injustices against heiresses (pros epiklêrous adikêmata). But
there are separate dikai for each of these and they are not brought to the
same official, nor do they have the same penalties. Rather, battery and acts
of violence are brought to the Forty, charges of hubris to the
Thesmothetai, and anything against heiresses to the Archon. And the laws
even allow paragraphai to be lodged in response for cases that are
inadmissible [i.e. brought to the wrong magistrate].”
According to Nicobulus, Pantaenetus adds in these four types of charges that are
irrelevant, and three could be the cause for pursuing a paragraphê, since they are formal
accusations for cases that should not be brought to the Thesmothetai (where Pantaenetus
brought his case). Nicobulus even makes a point of claiming that he mentioned this
formally when he lodged his paragraphê, but somehow (he implies foul play) it had been
lost from the record (34). This interchange concerning procedure is indicative of the ways
in which litigants attempted to bring potentially irrelevant information into their case
formally so that the jurors would not reject these arguments outright. They swore on oath
to judge in accordance with the laws and facts of the case, and the reading of the
indictment at the opening of the trial would provide them with a framework to
14
accomplish this goal. We later learn from Nicobulus that Pantaenetus used this same
tactic and the same accusations in his mining case against Euergus (45):
“In addition to everything else, this man accused Euergus of going out to
his property and barging in on the heiresses and his own mother, and he
brought the laws about heiresses with him into the dikasterion.”
Nicobulus attributes the victory specifically to the anger (orgê) Pantaenetus aroused from
the jurors against Euergus for these offenses and claims that Euergus was taken aback at
the introduction of these accusations because he had no idea he would have to confront
slander in a mining case (47):
“…in a mining case (metallikê dikê), it was difficult to respond to this
slander (diabolê) on the spot regarding matters that he did not think he’d
be accused of.”
It is difficult to determine here if Nicobulus is singling out metallikê dikê as types of
cases that focus narrowly on the main issue in favor of admitting character evidence, or if
he trying to depict legitimate accusations against Euergus’ character as slander. Certainly
Nicobulus is biased since he is attempting to defend himself now from the same charge
that Euergus faced. Of course, we cannot know the reason why the jurors voted against
Euergus. But since Nicobulus does not say that the jurors dismissed these accusations
outright as baseless slander, it is possible that the jury found Pantaenetus’ inclusion of
them in the enklêma, and discussion of them in his speech, to provide relevant
information. Again, from Pantaenetus’ perspective, working these “extraneous”
accusations into the list of charges itself puts him on firmer ground for convincing the
jury of their legal relevance.
15
The last aspect of Athenian judicial procedure that is important to this discussion
is the intricacy of the jury allotment system.35 The Athenians were clearly concerned with
the potential problem of corruption. As a way of ensuring fairness in a trial, the jury was
selected by an elaborate process on the day of the trial itself so that it was virtually
impossible to corrupt a jury prior to a case. This process also meant that the jury on any
given day could be vastly different in composition from a previous jury. Thus, the
speaker had to shape his case on the assumption that the jury was anonymous. But the
issue of anonymity ran in both directions; in other words, the orator could not expect that
the jury would have any knowledge of his client, if he were not already famous within the
city.36 It is for this reason that Lanni connects the “highly contextualized and
individualized” presentation of each case with the need to supply background and
character information. For a jury unfamiliar with the speaker, this information would not
be irrelevant; rather, it could be most important for reaching a verdict that they believed
was just.
Scholars of Greek oratory have yet to recognize the utility of comedy for
“contextualizing” a case. Comedy provides a convenient language of communication; the
orator could count on the jurors to recognize character types and steer the jurors’
response based on this characterization. A speaker may use comic characterization as a
way of overcoming the problem of anonymity in a case against someone unknown, but
these depictions tend to aim less at humor and more at description. Of course, comic
depictions are still effective when the speaker is known to the jurors. In addition to
                                                 
35 See Boegehold 1991; cf. Thür (forthcoming).
36 Here I follow Ober (1989, 31-35) who argues that Athens was not a face-to-face society.
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overcoming anonymity, comic characterization can be a very effective method of
reshaping the jurors’ previous views of a famous individual, as in the case of Aeschines,
Timarchus, and Demosthenes for example.
III. Invective, Humor, Comedy
To understand the function of invective, we must look at how an orator justifies
its relevance and how he creates individualized character attacks. I attempt to do the latter
by turning to humor and contemporary comedy, since oratory is largely absorbing
invective from the Athenian comic tradition. Viewing oratory through the lens of comic
invective introduces three areas, any two of which (and sometimes all three) intersect at
different points: humor, comedy, and invective. I argue in part that the joining of these
three potentially distinct fields is not random and, therefore, can tell us much about
Athenian oratory and society.
This approach raises a number of complex issues, starting with the identification
of what is humorous. Naturally one cannot assume that a passage considered humorous
by a modern reader was also humorous to an Athenian audience and vice versa, or at least
not for the same reason. We can turn to humor theory first to identify principles of humor
that are useful for understanding aspects of humor that Athenian orators used in the
courts.
To determine and explain how the orators attempt to get the jurors to laugh (or
sometimes even not to laugh), I draw from several theories that address humor from
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different angles. The basic comic premises of ‘incongruity’ and ‘superiority’ go a long
way toward explaining most humor in the courtroom.37 Since I will discuss superiority
theory below in specific connection with laughter, let us turn first to incongruity.
Mary Douglas’ work (following Freud) is a good starting point: she describes the
joke as “a play upon form” in which a dominant pattern is challenged by a subordinate
one.38 It is the incongruity between the subordinate structure (the joke) and the dominant
one (‘reality’) that makes us laugh. Critchley offers a useful explanation of this
phenomenon in terms of a ‘social contract’ in which the joke teller and listener
participate. He rightly emphasizes that a shared belief system must exist if the joke is to
work. In his words, “no social congruity, no comic incongruity.”39 This understanding of
incongruity can be usefully supplemented by the work of Thomas Veatch who has
recently put forth a general theory that tries to account for and explain the mechanisms
behind all varieties of humor from linguistic jokes such as puns, to obscenity, incongruity
and absurdity.40 His basic premise is that, in order for humor to occur, there must be a
confluence between a “normal” situation, defined as “subjective moral principle,” and a
violation of it. In his words, “humor occurs when it seems that things are normal (N)
while at the same time something seems wrong (V).” He too, then, puts incongruity at the
heart of any humorous scenario. One major advantage of his theory is that it accounts for
                                                 
37 Critchley (2002, 2-6) synthesizes most major comic theories into three categories that include these two,
incongruity and superiority, with ‘relief’ (best known from Freud’s work on jokes) being the third. Since
the comic process of relieving pent up energy through laughter is least useful for our purposes, I will not
discuss it directly. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these three concepts do not exist in isolation of each
other and we should therefore not be surprised to find overlap among them.
38 Douglas 1975, 90-114.
39 Critchley 2002, 4.
40 Veatch 1998.
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the perception of the listener (hence the “subjective” of “subjective moral principle”). He
identifies three possible outcomes for the same potentially humorous joke or situation
depending on the level of commitment on the part of the listener: if the listener is not at
all committed to what is being violated, then s/he does not get the joke, and is therefore
neither offended nor finds it humorous. If, however, the listener is somewhat committed
to the principle that is violated, then s/he gets the joke but is not offended and therefore
finds it humorous. The third possibility is that s/he is very committed and therefore finds
the violation offensive and not at all funny.
Although in most cases we cannot know the reaction of the jury to any argument
that an orator makes, humorous ones included, we can identify comic potential by
looking at the orator’s manipulation of concepts to which we can expect the jury (as the
dêmos) to have some commitment. In some instances, the orators attempt to frame
situations in ways that the jury will find funny by weakening their commitment to some
principles, but they also attempt to make potentially humorous situations offensive to the
jury by trying to strengthen their commitment. This sliding-scale phenomenon is a useful
tool for social-historical analysis insofar as it acts as a litmus test for understanding
normative democratic views on (im)moral behavior.
Determining what is potentially ‘funny’ in the speeches is the first step toward
understanding the humor of invective and the laughter that results from it. Laughter plays
a key role in many speeches, but one that is not always explicit, which can obscure its
importance within a speech. To understand how the orators manipulate laughter, I follow
Halliwell’s model of ‘playful’ versus ‘consequential’ laughter in Greek culture. ‘Playful’
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laughter refers to the laughter of youth and embodies innocence. ‘Consequential’
laughter, on the other hand, is the laughter of one’s enemies; it is meant to hurt and is
closely linked with concepts of honor and shame. ‘Playful’ laughter brings us all
together, whereas the ‘consequential’ brings us together by excluding an individual or a
group. In this sense, ‘playful’ laughter can be viewed as ‘inclusionary’ insofar as it results
from the audience laughing with the person making a joke, thereby aligning itself with
that person. ‘Consequential’ laughter is ‘exclusionary’ in that it seeks out a target to
exclude from the group; the group laughs at the individual as the butt of the joke, rather
than as its creator, thereby reinforcing group values at the expense of an individual.41
What Halliwell calls ‘consequential’ laughter ties in with Hobbes’ theory of
laughing from the sudden realization of one’s own superiority over another.42 Laughter
directed at someone else’s shortcoming provides a kind of moral training for an
individual or group. This type of comparison of self to other can be further explained by
the mechanics of the comic process. As Hubbard notes, many theories of humor relate in
some way to the issue of self-knowledge.43 He uses Plato’s discussion of comedy in the
Philebus to demonstrate the ancient view that the laughable is defined as the opposite of
self-knowledge. An opponent or comic character is laughable when there is a gap
                                                 
41 It could be argued that ‘playful’ and ‘consequential’ are not diametrically opposed since, in both
instances, a target still exists, only that target is more obvious in the ‘consequential’ mode of laughter.
However, there is still a tangible difference in the jovial vs. aggressive nature of the laughter elicited, which
is important for how it would be expected to affect a jury’s response.
42 Hobbes 1839, 46.
43 Hubbard 1990, 2: “The idea that Comedy and humor are basically functions of self-perception is one that
recurs throughout the history of critical theory on the comic.”
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between his pretensions and his “actual” self.44 When an orator, like a comedian, exposes
that gap, he produces something laughable. The jury or audience, in their desire not to
identify with the person laughed at, direct their laughter at the opponent as a way of
distancing themselves and asserting their superiority.45 ‘Consequential’ laughter thus has
the ability to ‘control’, as described by Corbeill in his work on Ciceronian invective,
because it reifies normative values. Since invective is by nature aggressive, the dynamic
of exposing deviant behavior by laughing at the deviant is a key component to any
discussion of invective, especially high-stakes political invective.46 But, as I will show, it
can be linked to the strategy of prosecution more generally. Moreover, ‘playful’ or
‘inclusionary’ laughter is particularly suited (although not limited) to the strategy of
defense.47
We have yet to distinguish between what is ‘funny’ and what is ‘comic’—two
phenomena that overlap a great deal but are distinct.  By looking to parallels with Old,
Middle, and New Comedy, we can tell what is ‘comic’ in oratory, in the sense that it is
linked to the comic genre. Since the ‘funny’ and the ‘comic’ are not the same, they can be
dissociated especially when removed from their comic context. The orators did not
always use characters or plots that would be funny on the comic stage to evoke laughter;
rather, such material could be used for serious effect. For example, Porter shows how
                                                 
44 I will discuss the clear connection between this understanding of the laughable and the figure of the
alazôn in the next chapter.
45 See also Hubbard’s discussion of modern comic theory’s focus on the person laughing, rather than the
person laughed at (1990, 8-11).
46 See also Powell 1977, 53-55.
47 Of course, the lines between prosecution and defense are sometimes blurred in Greek oratory, such as in
Lys. 1 or Dem. 18. Nonetheless, the consequential/prosecution and playful/defense opposition can be seen
as clearly informing localized strategies within a given speech.
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Lysias uses a comic plot as a structuring device for his narrative, but does not suggest
that he is trying to make the audience laugh.48 In such instances, the orators are drawing
on generic comic elements which are presumed to be common knowledge and which
facilitate communication with the audience. Similarly, turning an opponent into a comic
character type aims at getting a certain response from the jurors that has been shaped by
prior conditioning from the comic stage. Conversely, the orators often use wit and humor
in a way that has no identifiable connection to comedy as a genre. 49
Although there is no necessary connection between invective and comedy,
invective utilizes characterization that can best be explained by turning to what we know
from comedy.50 The rise of Old Comedy in the 5th century (and its continuation as Middle
Comedy in the 4th) is significant in that its aggressive and obscene attacks against
officials became an acceptable form of public speech. This provides a necessary
background for understanding juror response to oratorical invective in the 4th century.
Both genres participate in a similar practice of policing immorality, often by using humor
to provoke derisive laughter.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to tell whether oratory is taking directly or explicitly
from comedy, a fact that was noticed by Webster: “Some of the violence of Aristophanic
comedy seems to have spilled over into political eloquence; but comedy also could still
                                                 
48 Porter 1997.
49 An example of this phenomenon would be Demosthenes’ use of the satiric mode in the Philippics (as
discussed by Rowe 1968). Here, Demosthenes is using wit and sarcasm throughout the speeches, but
nothing in it points specifically to Old or Middle Comic humor. On the Crown, on the other hand, would
represent the latter phenomenon since it contains elements that are identifiably Old (and Middle) Comic,
such as repeated usage of Aristophanic language, neologisms, oxymorons, comic characterization, etc. See
Chapter 1 below.
50 Importantly, Old Comedy grew out of the invective tradition of archaic lyric poetry as represented by
Archilochus and Hipponax; see Rosen 1988.
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be political and it is not always easy to decide whether a comic poet is borrowing from an
orator or an orator from a comic poet.”51 Even ancient scholars recognized that the
vocabulary of comedy and of oratory overlaps to a great extent because both draw
heavily on the common language of the people.52 For this reason, it has been easier to
identify an orator’s appropriation of tragic or epic material, because a clear shift toward
lofty language, or often even a quote, is quite hard to miss. And unlike Cicero who cites
comedy explicitly and even quotes lines from comic poets, the Attic orators make subtler
use of comic language, themes, and characterization. When discussing connections with
comedy, I will focus on speeches, or sections of speeches, in which the use of comic
characters and scenarios play a key role in the orator’s attempt to negatively characterize
an individual. I am particularly interested in depictions (sometimes humorous and
sometimes not) of an opponent as an alazôn (braggart), kolax (flatterer), dyskolos
(misanthrope), bômolochos (buffoon) or male/female hetaira/pornê
(courtesan/prostitute). Similarly, I will discuss the use of broader comic strategies as
framing devices, such as the mundus perversus, and comic techniques like nicknaming
and comparisons with animals.
Still, it is not always clear in what direction influence is occurring, nor should it
matter. In most instances, then, I do not argue that the orators are borrowing directly from
comedy; rather, I maintain only that they have a shared interest in themes and stereotypes
so that looking to comedy can be useful for explicating an orator’s strategy. It is
important to recognize the likelihood of parallel development on both the comic and
                                                 
51 Webster 1956, 47.
52 See e.g. Horace Satires 1.4.45-48.
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oratorical stages (particularly when dealing with contemporary Middle Comedy). Often, a
kind of back-and-forth appropriation of material is occurring, as we would suspect since
oratory and comedy shared in the same performance culture. Direct influence need not be
proven in order to discuss how trends in comic development might be affecting trends in
oratory. Ultimately, any interaction between oratory and comedy highlights concerns that
are more pervasive in the Athenian democratic imaginary than if they existed only within
the immediate oratorical context. We can see this interaction best by looking ahead in
time to the “stock” character of New Comedy and including a discussion of
Theophrastus’ Characters. The fact that stock character types surfaced just following the
decline of Attic Oratory as we know it implies that their development must have been in
place over the course of the 4th century. Oratory, like comedy, was borrowing from and
contributing to this development through its increased concern with the “moral values” of
the community.
If we are to make use of comedy as representing Athenian social reality in some
way, we still need to reconcile the fact that Greek comedy, in particular Old Comedy as
represented by Aristophanes first and foremost, is often viewed as the complete inversion
of reality. Scholars of Greek comedy have turned to Bahktin’s discussion of
carnivalesque inversion (what I will call the mundus perversus throughout) to explain
Aristophanic humor.53 The mundus perversus is a comic mode characterized by the
overturning of the normal day-to-day world. Indeed, most of Aristophanes’ comic heroes
exemplify this phenomenon, whether it is an Athenian wife like Lysistrata or Praxagora
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Edwards 1993 and Platter 1993.
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taking over the political sphere, or an everyday farmer like Dikaeopolis contracting peace
treaties with Sparta, or an over-masculinized Father-in-Law pretending to be a woman.
The reversal of roles for comic effect, such as between master and slave, or man and
woman, is a common feature of Old Comedy and thus inversion is applicable in this
respect.54 Still, even in these most exaggerated instances, there is a connection to reality,
since some notion of the normal world must exist if it is to be overturned. Henderson’s
view of Aristophanic humor sums it up nicely:
“The world depicted in political comedy was the world of the spectators in
their civic roles. We see the demos in its various capacities; we see the
competitors for its favor; we listen to formal debate on current issues,
including its characteristic invective; we get a decision, complete with a
winner and loser; we see the outcome of that decision. But there is
something strange about the depiction, like seeing yourself in a fun-house
mirror. Everything is grotesquely exaggerated and caricatured, the image
is all backwards and seems to reflect things that aren’t there and omit
things that are. But you must admit that your presence in front of the
mirror is the cause of the image in it.”55
Henderson thus argues against viewing Athenian comedy as carnivalesque because it
does not enjoy the same kind of autonomy as Carnival. Carnival is characterized by not
having any division between actors and spectators. Thus, it enjoyed a real separation
from the official world in a way that Athenian festivals did not. There is no doubt that, at
Athens, a play was demarcated as a space for acting to be viewed by spectators. Still,
topsy-turviness is a useful concept for explaining humor based on inversion (a form of
                                                 
54 The concept of inversion has been handled at length separately by Bahktin 1984 and Segal 1987 (in his
discussion of Saturnalia).
55 Henderson 1990, 308.
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incongruity) within the world of an Aristophanic play. Accordingly, comic playwrights
had greater freedom of expression than orators, even if poets too were subject to penalties
for obscenity or slander.56 I therefore will speak of comedy as enjoying separation from
the real world in a way that litigation does not. In other respects, I follow Henderson in
viewing Athenian comedy as integrated with Athenian society and therefore parallel,
rather than in opposition, to the official world.57 This view of Old Comedy applies to our
discussion of Middle Comedy as well (see below ch. 2).
The difference in context between oratory and comedy demands explanation of
how context affects the use and reception of similar types of humor. The fact that a juror
would begin his task in all seriousness, whereas a spectator of a comedy would expect to
laugh from the start, means that the orator had to approach the use of humor differently
than a poet. This difference in the expectations of spectators at each event can be
explained by Manell’s theory on the serious versus playful ‘judgmental sets’. Manell has
demonstrated that an audience is more likely to find events, even violent ones, humorous
if they approach a subject from their playful ‘judgmental set’, rather than their serious
one.58 The playful ‘judgmental set’ refers to “a temporary ‘suspension’ of the observer’s
                                                 
56 See Wallace 1993 and 2005, and Sommerstein 2004.
57 Henderson 1990, 273-75.
58 See Manell 1977, 273-76. Manell’s study used two different techniques to demonstrate a significant
difference in amusement toward injustice and interpersonal aggression cartoons depending on whether or
not the viewers had adopted a playful judgmental set. See also Apter & Smith 1977, who discuss a similar
phenomenon in terms of a telic or paratelic mental state; in the telic state, one’s actions are chosen for the
purpose of achieving a goal (a requirement of the self or society), whereas in the paratelic state, goals are
chosen to justify behavior. These two states fall along one axis, while state of arousal falls along another
axis. If arousal is low in the telic state, the outcome will be relaxation, but in the paratelic state, it will be
boredom. On the other hand, if arousal is high, the telic state produces anxiety whereas the paratelic state
produces excitement. We can draw a connection between the serious judgmental set and the telic state,
likewise between playful and paratelic as another way of showing the relationship between the jurors’
mindset and their response to an orator’s presentation of material.
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attitudes, concerning depicted behaviours normally defined as socially unacceptable or
unjust, as a ‘standard of comparison’.”59 The fact that jurors would retain their serious
‘judgmental set’ means that the orator’s task of getting the jury to laugh is a more
challenging one, but it also means that he can benefit in different ways from using the
same comic techniques as a poet. For example, the orator can frame an accusation in
terms of Aristophanic (or Saturnalian) inversion and expect that the jurors will not view
this behavior as funny, but rather as harmful to society, because they are viewing it from
their serious and not their playful ‘judgmental set’. And even if the orator’s goal is to get
the jurors to laugh, the jurors are nonetheless reminded by the end of the speech of the
seriousness of their task, which demands that they return to their serious ‘judgmental set’
by the end of a speech. Thus, comic strategies (both humorous and not) always demand
that the jury see the insidious nature of behavior that would be funny on the comic stage,
precisely because a comedy invites a ‘temporary suspension of the observer’s attitude’,
but the court does not.
IV. Strategies of Invective
The numerous factors affecting our interpretation of invective in oratory can be
usefully illustrated by turning briefly to a paradigm in a specifically Greek performance
context: the famous Thersites scene in the second book of the Iliad (211-77). The scene
begins with the comically deformed character Thersites standing up to rail against King
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Agamemnon. From start to finish, he verbally assaults Agamemnon’s greed and
selfishness for risking soldiers’ lives and then hoarding the lion’s share of booty gained
by their labors. Thersites’ alleged goal is to persuade the soldiers to give up their mission,
flee to the ships, and set sail for home—a goal that Odysseus attributes to Thersites’ own
cowardly desire to flee. Since Thersites’ view shares much in common with Achilles’
complaints thus far, Odysseus’ reading of Thersites is not the only viable one. But,
Homer consciously steers the listener/reader to Odysseus’ side by the end of the episode.
In particular, we learn detailed information about Thersites’ appearance even before
Thersites begins his attack; he is bow-legged, club-footed, hunchbacked, and pointy-
headed with scraggly patches of hair (217-19). Homer also tells us that he is the
aischistos anêr (most disgraceful man) of all men who went to Troy and echthistos (most
hated) by the Achaean troops. The negative superlatives indicate Thersites’ strained
relationship with his audience; we would expect, then, that the crowd would be opposed
to Thersites when he began to speak, rather than in solidarity with him.60 We also learn
that his motive for abusing kings is to provoke laughter (éll' ˜ti ofl e‡saito gelo¤Ûon
'Arge¤oisin ¶mmenai, 2.215-16). Since he proceeds to abuse Agamemnon verbally, a
direct connection between invective and laughter is acknowledged explicitly; the
intended response to invective is laughter.
                                                 
60 Thersites’ social status is also important here. Scholars have debated whether or not he is of the same
rank as the other leaders or a commoner like the soldiers. The latter would give us some cause to believe
the soldiers might be more sympathetic to Thersites’ accusations. However, most recently it has been
argued by Marks (2005) that Thersites most likely was from the elite. Marks’ position makes sense given
the crowd’s hostility toward him and rightly shifts us away from viewing the scene as an agôn between
ranks, and rather as a contest between Odysseus and Thersites for control.
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In the end, Thersites does provide the troops with laughter, but as the object of
their laughter and not the agent (as he wished). After Odysseus responds with harsh
invective of his own, he threatens to strip Thersites naked (exposing even his genitals)
and whip him senseless. He then hits him with his scepter, reducing him to tears. In
response, the soldiers laugh gladly (∞dÁ g°lassan) and single out this one event as
Odysseus’ best achievement on behalf of the men (tÒde m°g' êriston §n 'Arge¤oisin).
Odysseus, recognizing Thersites’ skill as a speaker (the only positive trait Homer
attributes to him is “clear-voiced”), one-upped Thersites by escalating the agôn to
physical abuse and not just verbal. 61 Since Odysseus does not maintain the boundary
between verbal and physical assault, the laughter he creates is a response to both actions.
Whether or not we wish to see the audience’s laughter in response as mostly the result of
the beating, the context of the scene makes clear that invective is meant to be funny. It
produces pleasure for the listeners, as Demosthenes pointed out much later.62
Because this episode is embedded within epic narrative, we are privy to Thersites'
relationship with his audience and his opponents, Agamemnon and Odysseus. Using
humorous invective backfires on Thersites because he does not get the audience on his
side; they are in fact actively against him and in support of his opponents. Perhaps, in
part, this is because he includes a slight against the very men he is trying to persuade;
                                                 
61 The Greeks viewed abuse on a continuum that started with verbal assault and ended with homicide. In
between these two was physical violence. See Dem. 54 where Demosthenes gives a detailed account of
how each step leads to the next in order to show the danger of words and the need to regulate them by law;
Cf. Phillips (2000, 1-3; 258), gives an interesting discussion of this passage, which he names
“Demosthenes’ ladder”.
62 Demosthenes tries to make a universal claim at the opening of OTC (quoted at the start of this
dissertation), which may or may not be true. More importantly, this scene highlights the continuously
prominent role that invective played in the Greek world from Homeric times, through archaic poetry, Attic
comedy and then oratory; cf. Dobson 2003.
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after calling the troops the sons of Achaeans, he “corrects” himself by calling them the
daughters (Achaiides). His attempt to persuade his audience by attacking Agamemnon
through derisive language only serves to alienate him from them even more. If the
soldiers were never brought over to Thersites’ side during his speech, it makes sense that
Odysseus is able to stand up and rail against him from the start. The soldiers want to see
Thersites put in his place, and when Odysseus does just that, laughter emerges that unites
the troops even more firmly with their leaders. Thus, a sensus communis (the shared
world that humor creates) is achieved, but it is at the expense of Thersites, an obvious
victim of ‘consequential’ laughter.63
The Thersites scene also reminds us that invective is not ipso facto pleasurable (as
Demosthenes claims), since it can also be annoying or offensive. Thersites, in some
respect, offers us an object lesson in how not to use invective. We see that invective can
easily backfire if the speaker has not first established a sufficiently firm alliance with the
audience against an opponent. Whereas in most 4th-century court cases it is difficult to
know the audience’s view of a speaker at the outset of a speech, the speaker’s
relationship with the audience during the speech is crucial to the success or failure of
invective. An orator must tread carefully and build up to a harsh attack in order to avoid
alienating his audience. For this reason, it is common to start out humbly by seeking the
goodwill of the jurors and only to attack an opponent in the harshest terms toward the end
                                                 
63 See Critchley (2002, 18-19) for a discussion of sensus communis. Although Critchley recognizes the
phenomenon of laughing at others, he has a personal aversion to it and thus privileges laughing at oneself.
In the Greek world, most laughing that occurs is at others; if laughter is directed toward the self, it is
generally in a collective sense rather than individually (see Henderson’s quote above), although there are
some exceptions.
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of a speech, an approach Thersites did not take.64 This concept of speaker-audience
solidarity is an important addition to Veatch’s model, which concentrates more on the
content of the joke itself. The orator must build up his alliance with the crowd before
feeling confident that they will laugh. The speaker will then either succeed at creating a
laugh or will offend, based on how he presents that humor. Their response in the form of
laughter demonstrates agreement with his argument, whereas their scorn further
strengthens their alliance with his opponent instead. Invective (and even humor more
generally) is a double-edged sword; in any given situation, the speaker could theoretically
succeed or fail. He is constantly at risk of overstepping the boundaries of the ‘social
contract’ between himself and the jury, and thereby increasing the risk that they find the
violation in the humor offensive and not funny. The flip side is that if the speaker can
wield the unruly sword effectively, the jury’s laughter is practically tantamount to
victory.
It will help here to introduce the concept of risk and reward as a general reading
strategy that goes a long way toward explaining how the orators justify the relevance of
specific arguments to the charge, and likewise, try to convince the jurors of the
irrelevance of an opponent’s claim. Starting a speech cautiously and working up to harsh
attacks is one way to minimize risk. Another is addressing the audience directly by
seeking their approval vocally. Audience response determines just how far the orator can
                                                 
64 We should not, therefore, discount invective as decorative or additional just because it is placed at the
end a speech. MacDowell (2000, 22-30), e.g. in his commentary on On the False Embassy, believes that the
speech as we have it is too long to have been delivered in its entirety. He thinks that the second half was
expendable since it is full of invective, whereas the first deals more closely with the issues. Once we
acknowledge that working up to invective is a necessary part of the strategy, then its later placement is an
invalid criterion by which to judge its expendability.
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push the limits of harsh language or reproach. It is also the case that the orators are
likeliest to use humor when making the harshest attacks. They do so because humor
softens the blow; it is difficult for the jurors to get angry with a speaker for using harsh
language if they are laughing. 65 Humor thus affects the speaker’s self-characterization,
since the speaker comes across as jovial even while making a derogatory attack. The
orator’s decision to make jokes at his own expense plays into this strategy as well; by not
sparing himself from time to time, he ingratiates himself further with his audience while
reaping the benefits of directing their laughter primarily at his opponent. Further, it acts
as a preemptive defense by stealing a potential attack away from an opponent. Even so,
these techniques for reducing risk would not work if the judicial process did not allow for
it.
V. Exposing Deception: Invective and ‘Truth’
As Henderson’s assessment of Aristophanic humor (quoted above) makes clear,
there is a connection between comedy, humor, and “reality”. It is this connection that
helps explain the potency of laughter as an oratorical tool. An audience can recognize
humor only in a form (whether it be satire, farce, mime, a comic play or a simple joke)
that reflects their social reality in some way. This tie to “reality,” in part, provides a basis
for the common belief that only the truth is funny. Veatch has sought to qualify the
                                                 
65 Cf. Henderson 1991, 10-11 (with n.23): “…the pleasure derived by the third party from our joke makes
him disinclined to examine the grounds of our aggressiveness dispassionately and in general disarms
serious or critical thought. The presence of a joke also modifies the appearance of aggressiveness and thus
makes it easier and less potentially dangerous to laugh at someone else’s expense.”
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concept of “truth” in humor, and has argued that “truth” is best explained as “personal
experience.”66 Thus, what rings true with any given individual is affirmed as the “truth.”
Not surprisingly, collective experience creates the notion of “truth” even more strongly.
In Critchley’s view, jokes are “acts of ‘everyday anamnesis’, that remind us of what we
already know in a new way. Humour lights up what Schutz calls the ‘stock of knowledge’
that we all share.”67 It is precisely because all comedy is based on this reality of collective
experience (sensus communis) or ‘stock of knowledge’ that the orators can use comic or
humorous material (and subsequent laughter) as supporting evidence for their arguments.
When the jurors laugh at the claims of an orator against an opponent, that laughter is a
confirmation of the “truth” of those claims. What is more, it is very difficult to counteract
the effect of laughter since it is a visceral reaction not necessarily based on logic. Humor
can thus be used to make an argument seem “true” to the jury, but it is also useful for
counteracting rhetorical trickery. Since the Athenians were suspicious of rhetoric’s ability
to deceive, speakers routinely accuse each other of using crafty rhetoric to mask the
‘truth’ of a situation. The orator is able to use the “truth” of humor and comedy as a way
of exposing an opponent’s deception.68 As we shall see, the orators appropriate the
                                                 
66 Veatch 1998, 185.
67 Critchley 2002, 86.
68 Cf. Hesk (2000, 202-241; 258-273) and Schrager (1999, 174-209) on truth and deception. Even now,
comic news is thought by viewers to offer a version of events closer to the “truth” than the one obscured by
the spin of the (supposedly accurate) media. A series of articles in the New York Times tracked the
likelihood that viewers would believe comic news instead of serious news. Viewers thought that, although
distorted, Jon Stewart’s Daily Show version better represented reality than the view put forth by the
politically constrained media. The media, of course, is supposed to offer outside, objective criticism.
However, many think that this is no longer the case. Comedians have always occupied an important outside
position, hence the greater freedom to take on political and social issues more directly, and to expose the
“reality” of a situation in a graphic, even obscene, manner. This observation applies to Athens. I agree with
Henderson 1990 who argues convincingly that comedy was very much a civic and democratic institution
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connection between comedy and truth as a type of “rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” intended to
make themselves appear trustworthy, and their opponents untrustworthy, to the jury.
Comedy draws on a long history of exposure by insult and the orators recognized
this as a useful mechanism for attaining a similar goal. According to Hesk, however,
comedy only pretends to show the truth. Since comedy too is putting on an act, it has no
greater hold on the truth than any other genre. But the comic form (as his discussion of
Acharnians makes clear), by the very workings of the play (i.e. parody of rhetorical
trickery), claims to expose the deception occurring in the Assembly or courts. It therefore
does not matter whether or not a comedy is just as steeped in rhetorical deception as
oratory. Because comedy postures as the genre that can reveal truth, any oratorical
attempt to take up the comic mode implies that the orator is trying to get from comedy
what comedy claims to do (not what it actually does). Comedy and oratory thus share the
goal of exposing deception, even if they both use deceptive rhetoric to do so.69
Overview of Chapters:
In the first chapter, I reevaluate Demosthenes’ characterization of Aeschines in
On the Crown. Because this speech in particular is considered perhaps the “greatest”
speech in all of Greek oratory and because it makes use of invective arguably more than
any other, I attempt to connect these two factors rather than divorce them. Further, by
                                                                                                                                                  
not at all outside of the world of politics where it would have had no real influence. But, this does not mean
that Aristophanes did not have greater license as a poet to put forth his social commentary.
69 For a discussion of the Greek connection between tragedy and deception, and comedy’s exposure of
truth, see below ch. 1.
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integrating Demosthenes’ use of invective into his overall strategy and reevaluating its
connection to the legal charge, I demonstrate why it is so important to Demosthenes to
depict Aeschines consistently as an alazôn and why this strategy works. Because scholars
have recognized comic elements in On the Crown more than in other speeches, I use this
speech as a starting point for understanding the role of Old Comic influence in oratory
more broadly. This chapter thus highlights the role that comedy can play in the orator’s
use of invective.
In Chapter Two, I go back to the beginning of the Aeschines/Demosthenes contest
in order to show how Aeschines makes use of humor in his speech Against Timarchus.
As opposed to Demosthenes, Aeschines relies primarily on Middle Comedy, for which
our sources are scanty. I demonstrate how extensively Aeschines interacts with
contemporary comedy to inform his presentation of events and his characterization of
Timarchus as a pornos, but also how he depicts Demosthenes as an alazôn. Aeschines
relies on humor and laughter as direct confirmation of the truth of his arguments. For
Aeschines, humor provides an antidote to rhetorical trickery, bluntly exposing the truth
that his opponents are trying to conceal. This chapter highlights the role of humor in the
use of invective.
In the third chapter, I shift to a discussion of invective against lesser-known
politicians. Here I demonstrate the role of comic invective and characterization as a
necessary component of democratic parrêsia where the issue of personal animosity
between speakers does not cloud the issue (as between Aeschines and Demosthenes). In
particular, I re-evaluate the speeches Against Androtion and Against Aristogeiton, both
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delivered by sunêgoroi (co-speakers). The former offers evidence of how the
characterization of Androtion as pornos is not irrelevant to the graphê paranomôn
brought against him for proposing a crown for the Council. And the latter offers a most
interesting example of a politician depicted systematically as one of the characters from
Theophrastus. By focusing on the role of sunêgoria in two speeches that are notoriously
condemned for irrelevant and scurrilous attacks, this chapter underscores that invective is
an impersonal tool of the trade.
The fourth and final chapter investigates how social status and visibility within
the community affect the use of comic invective against opponents. By focusing on cases
that involve slaves, freedmen, and low-profile members of the community, I show how
comic elements are portable as descriptive features for private individuals. Speakers who
are not politicians can effectively cast opponents as alazones, kolakes, dyskoloi, or
bomolochoi, or make use of comic plots and strategies generally. Whereas derisive
laughter against an opponent was often the goal of high-profile politicians, low-profile
speakers do not aim at open laughter, but still attempt to stir up comic pthonos (scorn) on
the part of the jurors. A study of invective in speeches involving low-profile individuals
reveals that the difference in use of invective between politicians and private citizens is
one of degree and not kind.
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Chapter 1
The Crowned Thersites: Comic Invective in On the Crown
ka‹ efi m°n tiw t«n tragik«n poiht«n t«n metå taËta
§peisagÒnt«n poi¨seien §n tragƒd¤ai tÚn Yers¤thn ÍpÚ t«n
ÑEll¨nvn stefanoÊmenon, oÈde‹w ín Ím«n Ípome¤neien, ˜ti
fhs‹n ÜOmhrow ênandron aÈtÚn e‰nai ka‹ sukofãnthn: aÈto‹
d' ˜tan tÚn toioËton ênyrvpvn stefan«te, oÈk <ín> o‡esye
§n ta›w t«n ÑEll¨nvn dÒjaiw sur¤ttesyai;
And if any of the tragic poets performing afterward should portray
Thersites being crowned by the Greeks in a tragedy, none of you
would endure it since Homer says that he is a coward and
sycophant; so when you crown such a man as this [Demosthenes],
do you not think, in the opinion of the Greeks, that you are being
heckled? (Aes. 3.231)
Almost every general work on Demosthenic rhetoric culminates in a study of On
The Crown. As Usher recently put it: “Though it is neither the last nor the longest of his
orations, this is the only possible work with which to end an examination of
Demosthenes’ oratory, since it encompasses the whole of his art, transcending genre and
defining his position in both literature and history.”1 In fact, ancient and modern critics
alike are practically unanimous in their assessment of this speech as the greatest work by
any Greek orator, not just Demosthenes.
General studies of invective also end with a discussion of this speech. Bruns,
Wankel, and Harding all claim that Demosthenes reached heights of invective never
before seen.2 And Koster, in his book on invective in Greece and Rome, explains the
Aeschines/Demosthenes confrontation as the highpoint of invective in Greek oratory,
                                                 
1 Usher 1999, 270.
2 Bruns 1961, 570-73; Wankel 1976, 59; Harding 1994b, 214.
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discussing in detail the attacks they made against each other.3 Surprisingly, though, few
scholars have been willing to connect their assessment of the speech as superior with its
unsurpassed incorporation of invective.4 Even though recent commentators, such as
Usher and Yunis, are less subjective and more practical in their assessment, most
consider On The Crown a great work of oratory, despite the invective, not because of it.5
But the central role that invective plays within the speech cannot simply be dismissed; we
must account for it if we are to understand how it is that the Athenians chose
overwhelmingly to crown Demosthenes, despite Aeschines’ protest that they would be
“crowning Thersites”.
In this chapter, I will first show how Demosthenes skillfully integrates invective
into the legal argument by justifying its use as a necessary response to Aeschines’
accusations. It is Aeschines first, and Demosthenes only subsequently, who makes the
issue of character directly relevant to the charge. The link that Demosthenes is able to
forge between invective and the indictment thus argues against dismissing the comic
passages as irrelevant. Secondly, I will show how Demosthenes creates an alliance with
his audience when using invective to entertain them, in part, by drawing on its comic
roots; by encouraging the jury to laugh at Aeschines, he seeks to reduce the appearance of
speaking inappropriately while belittling his opponent.
                                                 
3 Koster 1980, 78.
4 Bruns (1961, 570-78), for example, criticizes Demosthenes for his unfair and implausible attacks on
Aeschines, as opposed to Aeschines’ criticisms in Against Ctesiphon, which he sees as grounded in truth.
Goodwin (1901, 129) considers Demosthenes’ sudden shift from his “impassioned patriotic eloquence” in
defense of his own policies (192-208) to base attacks against Aeschines (209) to be “depressing”.
5 Usher 1993; Yunis 2001. Dyck (1985, 43) notes that previous scholars assess the invective as
“inconsistent,” “wished unwritten,” “unmatched in vileness,” and consisting of “several digressions.” He
points out the problem with praising Demosthenes’ self-presentation but assailing his depiction of
Aeschines.
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One of the few interpretations of invective in On the Crown that focuses on its
function is a brief discussion by Rowe on the characterization of Aeschines as an alazôn
(braggart).6 Rowe sees the passages of invective within the broader context of
Demosthenes’ strategy of pitting tragedy against comedy, with Demosthenes casting
himself as the tragic hero and Athens as his supporting chorus, while Aeschines plays the
comic alazôn, and Philip, the force of fate.7 I expand on Rowe’s line of reasoning by
situating Demosthenes’ comic depiction of Aeschines within a broader discussion of
what it means to be an alazôn in the 4th century.8 In particular, I address the utility (and
significance) of the deliberate portrayal of Aeschines as alazôn, but I also acknowledge
that other characterizations come into play.9 Whereas Rowe sees Demosthenes’
characterization as effective but legally irrelevant, I argue that alazoneia is an important
part of his strategy to make his invective against Aeschines relevant to the charges; by
justifying his invective, he successfully puts Aeschines through a paratragic (i.e. comic)
transformation and thereby denies him tragic grandeur.10
                                                 
6 Rowe 1966, 397-406.
7 Reactions to Rowe’s analysis have been mixed; the main objector is Dyck (1985) who bases his
opposition to seeing Aeschines as alazôn on four points: the depiction of Aeschines as hireling is not
comic; the comparison of Aeschines with a doctor is to condemn disloyalty not to depict a quack; the
tritagonist is not an alazôn character; and if Aeschines had been caricatured as a harmless impostor, the
jurors would not have seen him as a real threat. On the other hand, Harding (1994b, 214-18) claims that it is
hard to improve on Rowe’s assessment and therefore closely follows suit; he does not take account of
Dyck’s objections. Duncan (2006, 58-89) also agrees with Rowe’s analysis, but since her work is
concerned with tragic actors and acting more broadly, she does not discuss comic elements.
8 As we shall see, it is not just in this speech that the concept of alazoneia is useful to the orator.
9 Multiple depictions can be at work simultaneously; cf. Introduction, p. 8, n.22. Pearson (1976, 80-81), for
example, is right to argue that Demosthenes characterizes Aeschines in terms of apeirokalia (lack of
refinement). This aspect of his character does not discount, but rather contributes to, the (larger) theme of
alazoneia.
10 Demosthenes’ aim of achieving tragic grandeur is undisputed and therefore need not be proven again
here; see most recently Yunis 2004; cf. Kennedy 1963, 234-35; Rowe 1966; Dyck 1985; Wilson 1996;
Duncan 2006, 58-89.
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From the start and throughout, the success of Demosthenes’ invective rests on his
presentation of it so as to create a close connection with the jury during his speech. In
sections 10-11, where Demosthenes addresses Aeschines’ slanderous charges more
specifically, he highlights the reciprocal nature of his relationship with the audience:
Per‹ m¢n dØ t«n fid¤vn ˜sa loidoroÊmenow beblasf¨mhken per‹
§moË, yeãsasy' …w èplç ka‹ d¤kaia l°gv. efi m¢n ‡ste me toioËton
oÂon oÓtow ºtiçto (oÈ gãr êlloyi pou beb¤vk' µ par' Ím›n), mhd¢
fvnØn énãsxhsye, mhd' efi pãnta tå koinå Íp°reu pepol¤teumai,
éll' énastãntew katachf¤sasy' ±dh:
Regarding the abuse he has hurled at my private life when he slandered
me, observe how simply and justly I respond. If you all know me to be the
kind of man that this man claimed (for nowhere else have I lived than
among you), then do not endure the sound of my voice, not even if I have
handled public affairs superbly, rather rise up and condemn me
straightaway (10).
Pearson comments here that Demosthenes “adopted a personal approach to the jury that
only an adept and self-confident politician would dare attempt.”11 In other words,
Demosthenes’ current fame within the community allows him to assume a tone of
confidence and trust. Demosthenes tells the jury here to oppose him openly (anastantes;
katapsêphisasthe) and prevent him from speaking (mêde phônên anaschêsthe) if they
believe Aeschines’ portrayal of him in Against Ctesiphon to be true. Since the jurors did
not do so, we imagine that he, like Thersites, began his speech with a connection to his
audience, but unlike Thersites, it was a positive one. If the jurors had not already had
some respect for Demosthenes, then they might have stopped him right then.12 Thus, his
                                                 
11 Pearson 1976, 180.
12 Cf. the opening of Dem. 45 where Apollodorus claims that Phormio’s speech colored the jurors
impression of him to such an extent that the jurors would not even let him speak a word on his own behalf.
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reliance on eunoia (good will) from the people is, at least in part, actual and not just a
rhetorical maneuver; he can therefore build off pre-existing eunoia as he shifts his
discussion to an attack on Aeschines.13 It makes sense that Demosthenes did have the
upper hand at the outset and that this was an important factor in his ability to push the
limits of invective. Aeschines’ handling of Demosthenes in a more serious and truthful
tone—the very reason that scholars such as Bruns have praised Aeschines’ speech—is, in
effect, indicative of his weaker position within the community. In general, solidarity
between speaker and audience is key to the success of using invective. In this speech in
particular, Demosthenes is able to strengthen an already firm bond with the jury by
getting the jurors to exclude his opponent through laughter.
Demosthenes makes clear that invective will play a prominent role in the speech
from the opening. His tight construction of the prologue (1-8) has been admired as a
brilliant synopsis of the main themes that resonate throughout. As often noted, it begins
and ends with a prayer, and peaks in the middle (3-4) with his mention of praise and
blame.14 At this point, Demosthenes makes two statements that are crucial to his use of
invective; first, men love to hear slander by nature, but hate to hear self-praise; 15 and
                                                 
13 Both Aeschines and Demosthenes had a long history in public life and therefore both would surely have
still had a considerable amount of goodwill to call on. Still, most scholars think that Demosthenes was
politically more popular than Aeschines by the time of this trial (see e.g. Harris 1995, 152; Usher 1993, 13-
14).
14 Usher 1993, 169.
15 This is not the only way that the use of praise and blame can be presented; Cicero, for example, at the
opening of his second Phillip, considers it a beneficium to be able to speak both on behalf of himself and
against Antony: “An decertare mecum voluit contentione dicendi? Hoc quidem est beneficium. Quid enim
plenius, quid uberius quam mihi et pro me et contra Antonium dicere?” (“Or did he want to engage me in a
contest of speaking? Well this is a blessing indeed! For what topic could be more plentiful or more
abundant than for me to speak on my own behalf and against Antony?”) (2); cf. also section 11, where
Cicero makes clear the Senate’s pleasure of listening to invective. Thus, Cicero and Demosthenes seem to
differ here only on the question of self-praise.
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second, because Aeschines started this fight, he should rightly be blamed for the praise
Demosthenes affords himself (18.3-4):
˜ fÊsei pçsin ényr√poiw Ípãrxei, t«n m¢n loidori«n ka‹ t«n
kathgori«n ékoÊein ∞d°vw, to›w §painoËsi d' aÍtoÁw êxyesyai:
toÊtvn to¤nun ˘ m°n §sti prÚw ∞don¨n, toÊtƒ d°dotai, ˘ d¢ pçsin
…w ¶pow efipe›n §noxle›, loipÚn §mo¤. kín m¢n eÈlaboÊmenow toËto mØ
l°gv tå pepragm°n' §maut“, oÈk ¶xein épolÊsasyai tå
kathgorhm°na dÒjv, oÈd' §f' oÂw éji« timçsyai deiknÊnai: §ån d' §f'
ì ka‹ pepo¤hka ka‹ pepol¤teumai bad¤zv, pollãkiw l°gein
énagkasy¨somai per‹ §mautoË. peirãsomai m¢n oÔn …w metri√tata
toËto poie›n: ˜ ti d' ín tÚ prçgma aÎt' énagkãzhi, toÊtou tØn
afit¤an oÓtÒw §sti d¤kaiow ¶xein ı toioËton ég«n' §nsthsãmenow.
It is by nature that all people listen with pleasure to slander and invective,
but get annoyed at those who praise themselves; the former produces
pleasure and is given to this man [Aeschines], but the latter annoys almost
everyone and is left for me. And yet if I am cautious about this and do not
talk about what I’ve accomplished, I’ll seem not to be able to defend
myself against the accusations, nor will I be able to show that I am worthy
of being honored for my deeds; and if I approach the topic of what I’ve
done and accomplished as a politician, I will be forced to speak about
myself often. I will try, then, to do this as moderately as possible; but
whatever achievement I’m forced to mention, the blame for this rightly
falls on this man who started such a contest.
 The complexities of using invective and praise as tools of persuasion, as
Demosthenes has presented them here, reveal his deliberate emphasis on shaping his
alliance with the audience. By structuring the traditional praise/blame dichotomy in terms
of invective receiving a positive response, and praise receiving a negative response,
Demosthenes attempts to harness as much positive response as possible from the jury for
himself, while directing all negativity toward Aeschines.16 He acknowledges their
enjoyment in listening to abuse and justifies it as a natural human phenomenon to mollify
                                                 
16 Demosthenes remains true to his word here throughout the speech by speaking minimally and very
modestly when discussing himself and then ridiculing Aeschines at length.
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them further. His concern for justification can also be seen later when he blames
Aeschines for using invective first and thus forcing him to respond to it—a point to
which Demosthenes returns both times he embarks on a lengthy attack (126, on slander;
252, on fortune). In the opening sections, then, Demosthenes is preparing the audience
for his self-praise and his invective against Aeschines; his goal is to strip Aeschines at the
outset of any positive response that he acquired from vilifying Demosthenes.
The central importance of this strategy is reinforced in the next eight sections (9-
16) where Demosthenes openly states the real subject of the trial; the case is not about
Ctesiphon, it is a battle between Aeschines and Demosthenes.17 But because
Demosthenes is technically speaking in response to the indictment of Ctesiphon, he must
make explicit that a discussion focusing primarily on himself and on Aeschines is
relevant. He is able to do so by referring specifically to the charges in the indictment.
Aeschines gave three reasons why Ctesiphon’s decree was illegal (paranomôs): first,
because Ctesiphon crowned Demosthenes before Demosthenes underwent audit; second,
because the ceremony was performed in the theater instead of the Assembly (which was
against the law); third, because Ctesiphon made false claims in his proposal by stating
that Demosthenes spoke and acted in the best interests of the people. This last charge
allows Demosthenes to open up the case far beyond the first two narrowly legal charges,
just as Aeschines had.18 The general nature of the charge grants both sides considerable
                                                 
17 Usher 1993, 172-3; cf. also p. 270 (on the epilogue) where he draws attention to the fact that the laws
governing Ctesiphon’s indictment are not mentioned in the recapitulation.
18 See Aes. 3.49-50, where Aeschines argues that Ctesiphon’s decree makes false claims; Aeschines
discusses this point for approximately half of his speech (49-176), whereas he handled the first two charges
in under 40 sections (9-48).
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leeway to include material about context and character that might otherwise be irrelevant
to the case.
In section 9, Demosthenes makes his first claim that he would have addressed
only relevant issues if Aeschines had stuck to the charges (per‹ œn §d¤vke mÒnon
kathgÒrhsen) but instead, Aeschines engaged in irrelevant arguments (to›w ¶jvyen
lÒgoiw) to prejudice the jury against Demosthenes. Here he is speaking about Aeschines’
personal attacks against him. Both speakers try to convince the jury that their opponents
engage in irrelevant argumentation, but both make the most of the third and broadest
charge of Aeschines’ graphê: Demosthenes’ public career. Thus, it is not Demosthenes
who chooses to emphasize his own political career, since Aeschines had already focused
explicitly on the third part of the indictment as his primary concern (Aes. 3.49):
¶sti d¢ ÍpÒloipÒn moi m°row tÆw kathgor¤aw §f' ⁄ mãlista spoudãzv:
toËto d° §stin ∞ prÒfasiw di' ¥n aÈtÚn éjio› stefanoËsyai. l°gei går
oÏtvw §n t“ chf¤smati: "ka‹ tÚn k¨ruka énagoreÊein §n t“ yeãtrƒ
prÚw toÁw ÜEllhnaw ˜ti stefano› aÈtÚn ı dÆmow ı ÉAyhna¤vn éretÆw
ßneka ka‹ éndragay¤aw," ka‹ tÚ m°giston: "˜ti diatele› ka‹ l°gvn ka‹
prãttvn tå êrista t“ d¨mƒ."
The remaining part of the accusation is the one that I’m most serious about
(spoudazô); this is the reason why he [Ctesiphon] thought it worthy for that
man [Demosthenes] to be crowned. For he says this in the decree: “let the
herald announce in the theater to the Greeks that the people of Athens crown
this man for his virtue and uprightness,” and the most important part (to
megiston), “since by speaking and through his actions, he accomplished the
best things for the people”.
By placing emphasis on the third charge as the most important, Aeschines makes it clear
that this is the point on which he wants the case to be determined. Demosthenes, then,
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can hardly be said to stray from the point when he devotes only ten sections to the first
two charges and spends the rest of his speech addressing whether or not he spoke and
acted in the people’s best interest. 19 Certainly Demosthenes welcomes the chance to treat
this case on a broader scale than the first two charges alone would require. But his
discussion of his political career must been seen as relevant to the third charge and
therefore part of the legal argument. In section 59, he addresses this issue of relevance
and the charge directly:
ka‹ me mhde‹w épartçn Ípolãbhi tÚn lÒgon tÆw grafÆw, §ån efiw
ÑEllhnikåw prãjeiw ka‹ lÒgouw §mp°sv: ı går di√kvn toË
chf¤smatow tÚ l°gein ka‹ prãttein tå êristã me ka‹ gegramm°now
taËy' …w oÈk élhyÆ, oÓtÒw §stin ı toÁw per‹ èpãntvn t«n §mo‹
pepoliteum°nvn lÒgouw ofike¤ouw ka‹ énagka¤ouw tÆi grafÆi
pepoik√w. e‰ta ka‹ poll«n proair°sevn oÈs«n tÆw polite¤aw tØn
per‹ tåw ÑEllhnikåw prãjeiw efllÒmhn §g√, Àste ka‹ tåw épode¤jeiw
§k toÊtvn d¤kaiÒw efimi poie›syai.
And let no one think that I am distancing my argument from the legal
charge (graphê) if I bring up the deeds and debates pertaining to Greece;
for since he goes after the decree’s statement that I said and did the best
things, charging that this claim is not true, it is this man who has made the
arguments about all of my political involvement appropriate (oikeious)
and necessary (anankaious) to the charge (graphê). And then, since there
are many opportunities for public involvement and I chose that which
concerns Greek affairs, I can rightly (dikaios) draw my examples from
these.
By focusing on the first two charges, scholars have tended to view Demosthenes’
discussion about his political involvement as extra-legal.20 But, as we see in the two
                                                 
19 Cf. Usher (1993, 14-19) who discusses Demosthenes’ use of the Ordo Homericus, sandwiching his
response to the first two charges between his expansive and more persuasive response to the third.
20 See Gwatkin 1957 and Harris 1994. Gwatkin, like most scholars, believes that Aeschines had the stronger
legal case, whereas Harris argues that Demosthenes’ was stronger. Both sides, however, focus too intensely
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passages quoted above, both Aeschines and Demosthenes view his political career as
legally relevant, as would an Athenian jury.
The claims that Demosthenes makes about relevance are common in oratory.21
They reveal that Athenian speakers recognized a distinction between relevant and
irrelevant arguments in relation to the specific charges brought in a case. But the
exchange between Aeschines and Demosthenes also shows that the notion of legal
relevance could be manipulated, especially when dealing with invective. Invective per se
might be considered irrelevant in the sense that it does not directly address the charges
specified in most indictments (from what we can tell). It is this potential irrelevance that
the orators guard against when they engage in character denigration. Since arguments
about character were considered valid forms of evidence for numerous types of charges
that would be included in indictments (as we saw in the introduction), any speaker could
quite easily make invective relevant if he justified it properly.22 Failure to give
justification for using invective, however, could result in it backfiring.23
                                                                                                                                                  
on the two narrowly legal charges, not recognizng that the “political” charge was also, in fact, a legal
dispute as Demosthenes points out here.
21 Cf. Rhodes 2004.
22 A comparable use of this technique is when Demosthenes talks about poverty (252); he first points out
his understanding that poverty itself is not something shameful before he attacks Aeschines for his
impoverished upbringing. Had he not included this preface, he may have been viewed as speaking
inappropriately since the Athenians did not view poverty as a mark of disrepute.
23 A good example can be found in the Embassy debate between Aeschines and Demosthenes. According to
Aeschines (2.4, 153), when Demosthenes viciously attacked him for abusing an Olynthian woman in his
previous speech against Aeschines (On the False Embassy, 19.196-98), the jurors did in fact shout
Demosthenes down: “I was shocked and disturbed by the charge when he accused me of drunken hubris
against a free woman, an Olynthian by birth—but I was pleased when you drove him off the topic
(exeballete) as he was making this accusation (Aes. 2.4)”; “Examine the indiscretion and crudeness of this
man who fabricated so great a lie against me about the Olynthian woman that he was rejected (exerriphê)
by you in mid-speech! (Aes. 2.153)”.
46
Demosthenes handles the delicate issue of verbal abuse by a strategic response to
the arguments that Aeschines first made in his speech. As speakers commonly do,
Demothenes blames Aeschines for setting the terms of the debate so low. As the second
speaker, Demosthenes capitalizes on his position by repeatedly pointing the finger at
Aeschines for starting a contest of slander. But he does this cautiously by referring back
to specific attacks made by Aeschines and then expanding on the same themes, often
much more harshly, in his rebuttal.
It is worth examining how Aeschines, in fact, first made Demosthenes’ character
a legitimate part of the trial by incorporating it into the third charge (Aes. 3.168):
na¤, éllå dhmotikÒw §stin. ín m¢n to¤nun prÚw tØn eÈfhm¤an aÈtoË
t«n lÒgvn épobl°phte, §japathy¨sesye, Àsper ka‹ prÒteron,
§ån d' efiw tØn fÊsin ka‹ tØn él¨yeian, oÈk §japathy¨sesye. §ke¤nvw
d¢ épolãbete par' aÈtoË lÒgon. §gƒ m¢n mey' Ím«n logioËmai ì de›
Ípãrjai §n tÆi fÊsei t“ dhmotik“ éndr‹ ka‹ s√froni, ka‹ éntiy¨sv
po›Òn tina efikÒw §stin e‰nai tÚn ÙligarxikÚn ênyrvpon ka‹ faËlon:
Íme›w d' éntiy°ntew •kãtera toÊtvn yevr¨sat' aÈtÒn, mØ ıpot°rou
toË lÒgou, éll' ıpot°rou toË b¤ou §stin.
So, he’s a man of the people (dêmotikos) is he?! If in fact you are focusing
on the melody of his words, you will be deceived (exapatêthêsesthe), just
as before. But if you look to his nature (phusis) and the truth (alêtheia),
you won’t be deceived (exapatêthêsesthe). In that way, hold him
accountable. I, on the one hand, along with you, will count up the things
that a democratic (dêmotikos) and temperate (sôphron) man must possess
by nature. And I will contrast what sort of person is likely to be an
oligarchic (oligarchikos) and petty (phaulos) man; you, on the other,
juxtapose each of these, and observe which group he belongs to, not
according to his word, but his life.24
According to Aeschines’ argument, Demosthenes could not have acted in the people’s
                                                 
24 Cf. 3.248-53.
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best interest because he is oligarchic (oligarchikos) by nature (phusis) and not at all
democratic (dêmotikos). Aeschines thus links his attack on Demosthenes’ character
directly to the third charge in his indictment of Ctesiphon. Further, the jurors would likely
see Aeschines’ point as a valid argument since the Athenians believed in the notion of
fixed character. If the jurors accept Aeschines’ argument that Demosthenes was
oligarchikos by nature, then they would likewise believe that he could not have acted in
their interests. Demosthenes’ response, a defense of his own character, is therefore
justified because Aeschines connected it to the charge first. Demosthenes, in fact, refers
specifically to Aeschines’ discussion of the democratic man before embarking on his
rebuttal (18.122). Moreover, in both of his lengthy attacks (18.126-59; 252-96),
Demosthenes refers back to Aeschines’ discussion of his family and fortune (3.171-76;
see below) before giving his own version.25
Demosthenes’ attack on Aeschines in return may not appear to be technically
relevant (since Aeschines’ conduct is not part of the indictment), but Demosthenes is able
to justify it as necessary for defending himself, in large part because Demosthenes’
benefits on Athens’ behalf stand out by contrast with Aeschines’ bad deeds and
inactivity. Although the connection with the legal charge is tenuous, Demosthenes is still
able to make invective against Aeschines relevant to the case for the jury. By tying his
response so carefully to Aeschines’ original arguments, Demosthenes significantly
                                                 
25 Of further interest is Aeschines’ emphasis on deception (apatê) in this passage. Here, and throughout the
speech, he attempts to prejudice the jurors against Demosthenes’ responses by claiming that he will deceive
them with logos. Demosthenes responds in kind by trying to uncover Aeschines as the deceptive one.
Exposing an opponent’s deception is essential for both men in their characterization of each other (see
below).
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reduces any risk of his invective seeming irrelevant and possibly angering his audience.
He goes on to maximize the reward by turning Aeschines into a comic buffoon worthy of
the jury’s derisive laughter.
We have seen a conscious effort on Demosthenes’ part to make his attack on
Aeschines’ character relevant. Similarly, he is just as deliberate about casting his
opponent’s invective as negatively as possible by drawing a sharp distinction between
Aeschines’ invective and his own. The term that he uses to characterize Aeschines’
invective is pompeia, a term that refers specifically to processional language. This is an
unusual choice of words when we compare it to those used more commonly in regard to
abusive language in oratory, such as loidoria, diabolê, and kakêgoria. As Yunis and
Usher both point out, the purpose of using pompeia is to conjure up associations with
ritual abuse (aischrologia).26 Demosthenes wants to create a certain image of the kind of
language that Aeschines is prone to use—primary obscenities including sexual and
scatological terms—language that launches Aeschines onto a higher level of
inappropriate speaking. The point is certainly that Aeschines is out of line when he
engages in profanity reserved for specific times and places.
By exaggerating the tone of Aeschines’ language, Demosthenes covertly gives
himself the green light; he claims that he will only address Aeschines’ ribaldry
(pompe¤aw) if the jury is so inclined (ín boulom°noiw µi toutois¤).  Unless the jury
raises open opposition (presumably in the form of dikastic thorubos) to his harsh
                                                 
26 Yunis 2001, 114 and 181; Usher 1993, 174 and 212-13.
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invective, they are colluding in the attack.27 This move allows Demosthenes greater
leeway to attack Aeschines forcefully when responding, but still appear more moderate
because the audience will be measuring Demosthenes’ words against Aeschines’
supposed “cart language”. Although Demosthenes claims it is Aeschines who used such
language, pompeia actually foreshadows the kinds of attacks Demosthenes will make
against Aeschines when discussing his family and upbringing.28
Demosthenes links Aeschines’ reliance on scurrility specifically to his
background as a tragic actor. He hopes to expose Aeschines’ oration as a tragic
performance (nËn §trag–dei) that avoids just proofs in favor of slander [fugƒn toÁw
parÉ aÈtå tå prãgmatÉ §l°gxouw (13)….afit¤aw ka‹ sk√mmata ka¤ loidor¤aw
sumfor¨saw Ípokr¤netai (15)]. He builds off of these initial associations by repeatedly
calling him a tritagônistês (third-part actor) later in the speech (129, 209, 262, 265,
                                                 
27 On thorubos, see Bers 1985. See also section 52, where Demosthenes encourages vocal support from the
jurors by asking them whether they consider Aeschines to be a friend or hireling of Philip. His summation
(“you hear what they say”) indicates that Demosthenes gets the reaction he is seeking and that he is on solid
ground from early on in the speech. Such interaction between speaker and audience is a good litmus test for
how far the speaker can push his attacks on an opponent. For further discussion, see Moore (1998, 8-49),
who explores the comic actor’s use of rhetorical monologues and asides for creating rapport between
speaker and audience in Plautine comedy.
28 Here is one of the many places where we can see how tightly connected the themes of the prologue are to
the rest of the speech. Pompeia looks forward to sections 122-124, cf. comments by Yunis and Usher ad
loc. Yunis claims that the mention of the “speakable and unspeakable words, like from a cart” refers to the
Anthesteria (festival of Dionysus) where men attacked each other verbally. Usher, on the other hand, thinks
the phrase refers to women’s behavior during the Eleusinian Mysteries. Because Demosthenes gives no
specific reference himself, it is possible (but not likely in my opinion) that the attack is also against
Aeschines’ masculinity if he is understood to be using “women’s words.” It is more important to note that
aischrologia was a prevalent feature of numerous religious festivals, both women’s and men’s, and
therefore Demosthenes is drawing from a specific cultural phenomenon that adds to the plausibility of his
later attacks on Aeschines for his involvement in initiation ceremonies (259). Cf. McClure 1999, 47-51 and
Halliwell 2004, 115-44.
50
267).29 Aeschines’ previous career as a tragic actor presumably would make him suspect
in the eyes of the jury since tragedy in particular was thought to be steeped in deception.30
If Demosthenes can strip Aeschines of his attempt at a tragic performance in
Against Ctesiphon by exposing it as such, then he renders Aeschines untrustworthy to his
audience. The way to do this is with comedy.31 Scholars are in agreement that the
language of Demosthenes’ invective against Aeschines is comic.32 Where they part ways
is in the form and function of the comic abuse; specifically, there is no consensus on
whether Demosthenes deliberately cast Aeschines as an alazôn or simply ridiculed his
opponent with a variety of comic motifs. In order to argue convincingly that
Demosthenes did depict his opponent as an alazôn, it will help to clarify what we mean
by alazoneia specifically in 4th-century comedy and oratory.
Few scholars have seen a connection between alazoneia in oratory and comedy,
although alazôn and related terminology appear with some frequency in oratory.33
                                                 
29 Cf. also 19.246 and 19.337, as cited by Todd 1938, 35. Todd argues that Demosthenes did not invent the
term tritagônistês, and that it implies third-rank, not third-rate. That Antiphanes has a play entitled
Tritagônistês argues in favor of the term being used by Demosthenes for comic effect.
30According to Gorgias (82.23 [D-K]), tragedy operates by means of the following principle: ˜ t'
épat¨saw dikaiÒterow toË mØ épat¨santow ka‹ ı épathye‹w sof√terow toË mØ épathy°ntow
(The deceiver is more just than the non-deceiver, and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived).
Gorgias, of course, is idiosyncratic, but the understanding of tragic deception that he proposes here is
mocked by Aristophanes’ reworking of tragic themes in several plays, most notably Frogs and
Thesmophoriazusae. Cf. Hesk 2000, 258-73; although Hesk does not see the deception that takes place in
Acharnians as tragic, his observations on comic exposure are still applicable for our purposes.
31 Cf. Gorgias [82.12 D-K]: “One must defeat an opponent’s seriousness with laughter and laughter with
seriousness.”
32 Wankel 1976, 60; Dyck 1985, 44. See especially Blass (1893, vol. 3: 92-93) and Rowe 1966 for a
discussion of Aristophanic language in the speech; see also Harding (1994b, 214-18) for further
commentary on the comic elements. Since the language of the attack itself has already been studied at
length and convincingly connected to Old Comedy, I will focus more on the issue of the coherency of
Demosthenes’ depiction and how it fits into his overall strategy.
33 Part of the problem is that there has been no thorough study of comic elements in oratory. Yunis (2000),
for example, is a recent and influential piece explaining Demosthenes’ implementation of the  “tragic mode
of thinking” in this speech. He shows how Demosthenes subtly incorporates elements familiar to all
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MacDowell’s brief study is the only one that addresses specifically the meaning of the
term in 5th and 4th-century literature. He argues that “an alazôn in Old Comedy is a man
who holds an unofficial position or professes expertise which, he claims, makes him
superior to other men; he exploits it, normally in speech, to obtain profit, power, or
reputation; but what he says is actually false or useless.”34 This definition, according to
MacDowell, is generally true of the term throughout 5th-century literature; in the 4th
century, however, alazôn and all related terminology come to mean nothing more than
“liar” by what MacDowell calls “linguistic degeneration”.35 The concept of alazoneia and
the terminology itself, however, can be shown to retain its more specialized 5th-century
meaning in oratory. As MacDowell himself makes clear, the term is not consistent even
within the plays of Aristophanes. This is perhaps because Aristophanic alazones come in
many forms; the alazôn is sometimes considered a comic hero and sometimes the
opponent of the hero.
Whitman’s assessment in his work on the Aristophanic hero can help. Whitman
takes issue with the Aristotelian distinction between eirôn and alazôn.36 While both
                                                                                                                                                  
Athenians from the tragic stage as a way of interpreting his policy and their decision to fight at Chaeroneia
as the right decision despite the outcome. He thereby propels the reality of a disaster into tragic and noble
proportions. Yunis is not interested in explaining the speech, as Rowe attempted to, as an interplay of
tragedy and comedy, nor does he once mention comic elements. His approach is illustrative of a continuing
tendency in scholarship to focus on the “noble” tragic parts to the exclusion of the presumably “ignoble”
comic sections since they are viewed as detracting from the grandeur of the work. Hesk (2000, 163-78;
202-241) too, in his discussion of deception and lying in oratory, keeps his discussion of comedy and
oratory separate, although he sees the orators as depicting each other as deceptive character types (the
sophist, logographer, magician).
34 MacDowell 1990, 289.
35 MacDowell 1990, 291.
36 Aristotle (NE 1108a25) defines the eirôn as a man who pretends to less power or knowledge than he has,
and the alazôn as one who pretends to more. The context in which Aristotle mentions these two types of
men is telling; they are illustrations of extremes in relation to the (ideal) man who falls in between the two,
and is defined as someone truthful (tis alêthês). This is the only category in this part of Aristotle’s
52
concepts are important for understanding the hero’s antics, Whitman argues that
Aristophanic characters do not fall neatly into one category or the other: “The irony of
the comic hero, from one point of view, is merely a means to a greater and more inclusive
alazoneia, impostorship; so that one might say that there is no real eiron, but only a
variety of alazones, and the biggest fraud wins, on the theory that if the fraud be carried
far enough, into the limitless, it becomes a template of a higher truth.”37 Thus, in the
Aristophanic world, a Demos or a Dikaeopolis is a man of the people in whom the dêmos
can delight as he uses trickery to surpass all in his way (even the gods). The ability to rise
to the top through boasting and trickery is what makes such characters alazones,
according to Whitman.38 In these instances, the audience is directed by the actions of
these characters to laugh with them and not at them. They stand in contrast, then, to the
alazones to be deflated, such as the ambassadors in Acharnians, or the sophists in Clouds.
Demosthenes taps into this latter comic phenomenon to expose ‘boastful’ politicians like
Aeschines.39
Demosthenes does not call Aeschines an alazôn explicitly, nor does he represent
him as a one-dimensional alazôn from start to finish, but this should not trouble us. Some
of Aristophanes’ most famous alazones, such as the general Lamachus from Acharnians,
                                                                                                                                                  
discussion that deals with truth as a virtue. Since alazoneia is conceived of specifically as a distortion of
“truth”, we can readily understand why it would be an effective rhetorical strategy to depict an opponent as
an alazôn. On the opposition to alazoneia and alêtheia, see Aes. 3.98-99, where Aeschines vigorously
accuses Demosthenes of lying, being an alazôn, and mimicking those who speak the truth; cf. Hesk 2000,
231-33, for a discussion of this passage (although he does not discuss Aristotle).
37 Whitman 1964, 27. Cf. Duncan 2006, 91-101.
38 Whitman 1964, 21-58.
39 We might also note that Theophrastus’ alazôn (which also dates to the late 4th century) is characterized
primarily by boasting of more wealth and connections than he has, rather than simply “lying” (note that
MacDowell [1990, 292] himself acknowledges the more complex characterization occurring here). See
Diggle 2004, 130-33; 431.
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are never explicitly named by the term.40 Further, we cannot expect Demosthenes to
create a fictional character in the way that a playwright would. But as we have seen, he
can draw from comic characters to color his depiction of his opponent.41 It may not be
obvious how Aeschines the tragic actor equates to Aeschines the comic alazôn, but the
fact that Aeschines was a tragic actor does not preclude the possibility of a comic
portrayal.42 In Aristophanes (such as the elaborate parody of Euripidean and Aeschylean
language in Frogs, or of Euripides’ Helen in Thesm. 849-943) and throughout Middle
Comedy, turning the tragic into the comic was a familiar topos of the comic stage.43
Thus far, we have seen how the prologue sets the stage for the comic abuse to
come and the jurors’ willing participation in it. Demosthenes does not engage in his first
major attack until sections 121-159 (with the harshest insults concentrated in 121-31).
Here, he shifts away from a long defense of his own policy-making to Aeschines’
background by picking up on the memorable image of ritual abuse he first mentioned in
                                                 
40 Cf. MacDowell (1990, 288): “Modern writers sometimes regard Lamakhos in this play as the prototype
of the élaz√n in comedy; it is therefore worth emphasizing that Aristophanes never calls him so (except to
the extent that he is among the DiomeialazÒnew in 605).”
41 See ch. 2 for a discussion of Aeschines’ depiction of Demosthenes as an alazôn first; Aeschines does
explicitly call Demosthenes by the term, which is in itself strong evidence for interpreting Demosthenes’
depiction of Aeschines as such. Scholars have often noted that Demosthenes tends to use Aeschines’ own
techniques against him; it is quite likely that Demosthenes was “showing up” Aeschines here by
characterizing him as an alazôn with elaborate imagery rather than simply labeling him an alazôn outright.
42 Dyck (1985, 44) claims outright that Demosthenes “surely pursued no general strategy of presenting
Aeschines as a comic alazôn”. Cf. MacDowell 1990, 291, who argues that, by the 4th century, the term had
degenerated to the generic sense of “liar” and no longer retained its more precise 5th century meaning of
“charlatan” (which he defines as a specialist claiming superiority over others). Duncan (2006, 58-89) and
Easterling 1999 discuss Demosthenes’ use of tragedy to handle Aeschines, but neither addresses the
paratragic transformation which is ultimately more comic than tragic in nature.
43 See Nesselrath 1990, 188-241; Cf. also my discussion of Orestautocleides (parodying Orestes) in chapter
2. It is important to note that parodying tragedy was also a main function of the satyr play and not just the
property of the comic genre; see Sutton 1980. We should not, therefore, interpret Demosthenes’ strategy as
necessarily drawing directly from comedy, but rather as taking up a parodic mode that was shared by, and
best known from, comedy.
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the prologue.44 He recalls Aeschines’ supposed proclivity for all out abuse (pompeuein)
and juxtaposes it with his own respectable character; whereas Aeschines utters offensive
lies, Demosthenes will speak the truth.45 To prove that he is the one telling the truth, he
must undermine not just Aeschines’ rhetoric, but also his character, and to do this he uses
his acting background against him. Demosthenes begins with his (now famous) mockery
of the concluding line of Aeschines’ speech:
efi går AfiakÚw µ ÑRadãmanyuw µ M¤nvw µn ı kathgor«n, éllå mØ
spermolÒgow, per¤trimm' égorçw, ˆleyrow grammateÊw, oÈk ín
aÈtÚn o‰mai taËt' efipe›n oÈd' ín oÏtvw §paxye›w lÒgouw por¤sasyai,
Àsper §n tragƒd¤ai bo«nta "Œ gÆ ka‹ ¥lie ka‹ éretØ" ka‹ pãlin
"sÊnesin ka‹ paide¤an" §pikaloÊmenon, "¡ tå kalå ka‹ tå afisxrå
diagign√sketai:
For if perhaps an Aeacus or a Rhadamanthus or a Minos had been my
accuser, and not a scrap-gatherer (spermologos), deadbeat of the agora
(peritrimm’ agoras), and a damned secretary (olethros grammateus), I
don’t believe he would have said such things or endured to bring in
language in this way, shouting as if in a tragic play: ‘Oh Earth and Sun
and Virtue’ and then invoking ‘Intelligence and Education, by which the
honorable is distinguished from the shameful (127).46
Demosthenes implies that Aeschines laid claim to the authority of notably wise men by
deifying concepts such as intelligence and education. He then undercuts this claim by
pointing out aspects of Aeschines’ ‘actual’ station: he has been nothing more than a
gatherer of scraps, deadbeat of the agora, and a damned secretary. By contrasting three
men legendarily known for wisdom with three lowly aspects of Aeschines’ (alleged)
                                                 
44 See n. 28.
45 Cf. Duncan (2006, 58-89) and Hesk (2000, 231-241) who discuss how Demosthenes engages Aeschines
in a contest of sincerity of speech. Cf. Johnstone 1999, 70-92.
46 Ribbeck (1882, 54 with n.43), citing Eustathius and Photius, maintains that the term spermologos can be
connected with alazoneia.
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background, Demosthenes exposes Aeschines as an alazôn; Aeschines boasts of expertise
that he does not have and thereby pretends to more than he actually is.47 In addition to the
comic names that Demosthenes creates to label Aeschines, Demosthenes’ mockery of
Aeschines’ tragic delivery (tragƒd¤ai bo«nta) is also a comic maneuver since
Demosthenes’ redelivery would be paratragic. This is one instance, then, in which
Aeschines’ tragic acting is reconfigured for comic purposes.
This paratragic representation of Aeschines has a clear parallel in Frogs where
Euripides depicts Aeschylus, the grand tragic poet, as an alazôn (908-910):
Eu: toËton d¢ pr«t' §l°gjv,
…w µn élazƒn ka‹ f°naj oÂoiw te toÁw yeatåw
§jhpãta m√rouw labƒn parå Frun¤xƒ traf°ntaw.
Eu: First, I’ll prove that this man
was an alazôn and a cheat (phenax), and how he deceived the spectators,
taking over the fools trained by Phrynicus.48
In this passage, Aeschylus is representative of tragedy’s ability to deceive the people.
Aristophanes attempts to expose this deception and thus deflate Aeschylus by making
him the object of laughter. Specifically, he mocks Aeschylus’ tragic diction:
Eu: kêpeit' §peidØ taËta lhr¨seie ka‹ tÚ drçma
±dh meso¤h, =¨matÉ ín bÒeia d√dek' e‰pen,
ÙfrËw ¶xonta ka‹ lÒfrouw, de¤n' êtta mormorvpã,
êgnvta to›w yevm°noiw.
                                                 
47 Cf. Koster, 1980, 85: “Die Diskrepanz der Synkrisis wird in eine neue Diskrepanz zwischen Sein und
Schein der Redeweise gebracht…”
48 Phrynicus was an older contemporary of Aeschylus. Cf. also 919 where Euripides mentions Aeschylus’
alazoneia as the reason why he made the audience sit there and wait for Niobe to speak (Íp' élazone¤aw,
·n' ı yeatØw prosdok«n kayªto, ıpÒy' ∞ NiÒbh ti fy°gjetai).
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Eu: And then, after he engaged in such foolishness and the play was
half-finished, he would speak twelve oxhide phrases, with eye-
brows and crests of a helmet, some dreadful monster-faced things,
unrecognizable to the spectators (923-26).
Euripides offers a few more examples such as these in his critique of Aeschylus’ lofty-
worded poetry, summing up his language as “huge cliffs of words (=¨may' flppÒkrhmna)
that were not easy to understand” (929-30).49 Euripides hereby offers proof of his
accusation that Aeschylus is an alazôn who deceived his audience into thinking that he
was providing good advice to the city. Euripides states plainly that poets should be
admired for “skillfulness (dexiotêtos) and advice (nouthesias), and because we make the
people in the city better men (beltious)” (1009-10).50 Since Aeschylus’ plays are
unintelligible, he is incapable of achieving these goals and therefore cannot be the best
tragic poet. Aristophanes (from Euripides’ perspective) thus exposes Aeschylus’
unjustified claim to wisdom, just as Demosthenes has attempted to do with Aeschines—a
tragic actor and politician who openly uses pompous tragic language in his pretense of
intelligent advice.51
Like Aristophanes’ audience, the jury is invited to laugh scornfully at Aeschines
and his attempt to be serious. Aeschines’ alazoneia is further exposed when Demosthenes
denies Aeschines’ access to education: only those who are not educated, but shamelessly
pretend (prospoioumenois) to be, would even mention how well educated they are (128).
                                                 
49 Cf. also 1056-58: “If then you speak to us with words the size of Lycabettus or Parnassus, you think this
is what’s useful for teaching? Shouldn’t you speak like a human?”
50 See Dem. 18.277 where Demosthenes asserts that Aeschines never used his cleverness to benefit the city.
51 Cf. also section 267 where he quotes in mockery two tragic lines that Aeschines apparently delivered
poorly.This type of parody is paralleled in Frogs (302-304) where Xanthias recites Hegelochus’ butchering
of a somber line from Orestes (279); “I see the calm (galêna) again,” was mispronounced by Hegelochus,
resulting in “I see a polecat (galên) again.”
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Demosthenes, then, is not implying that Aeschines is simply a liar; he is communicating
to the jury that Aeschines had laid claim to expertise that he does not have and a station
in life from which he is far removed. He is a charlatan.
Another example where Aeschines is specifically depicted as a charlatan is in
242. Demosthenes here contrasts the soundness of his own policies with Aeschines’ to
remind the jurors of Aeschines’ uselessness by comparison:
ponhrÒn, êndrew ÉAyhna›oi, ponhrÚn ı sukofãnthw ée‹ ka‹
pantaxÒyen bãskanon ka‹ fila¤tion: toËto d¢ ka‹ fÊsei k¤nadow
tényr√piÒn §stin, oÈd¢n §j érxÆw Ígi¢w pepoihkÚw oÈd' §leÊyeron,
aÈtotragikÚw p¤yhkow, éroura›ow OfinÒmaow, parasÆmow =¨tvr. t¤
går ∞ sØ deinÒthw efiw ˆnhsin ¥kei tª patr¤di; nËn ∞m›n l°geiw per‹
t«n parelhluyÒtvn; Àsper ín e‡ tiw fiatrÚw ésyenoËsi m¢n to›w
kãmnousin efisiƒn mØ l°goi mhd¢ deiknÊoi diÉ œn épofeÊjontai tØn
nÒson, §peidØ d¢ teleut¨sei° tiw aÈt«n ka‹ tå nomizÒmen' aÈt“
f°roito, ékolouy«n §p‹ tÚ mnÆma diej¤oi "efi tÚ ka‹ tÚ §po¤hsen
ënyrvpow oÍtos¤, oÈk ên ép°yanen." §mbrÒnthte, e‰ta nËn l°geiw;
Wicked, men of Athens, always and in every way a sycophant is wicked,
deceptive, and eager to accuse; and this little man (anthrôpion) is by
nature like a fox (kinados), since he has done nothing sound or noble from
the beginning, this self-tragic ape (autotragikos pithêkos), this boorish
(arouraios) Oenomaus, this fake (parasêmos) orator! For how has your
cleverness brought any benefit to our fatherland? And now you are telling
us about what happened? As if you were some doctor (iatros) making your
rounds to the weak and injured but not saying or showing them any way to
escape their illness, and only when one of them dies and the rites are being
carried out for him, do you, following him to his tomb, then explain “if
this man had only done this or that, he wouldn’t have died.” Dumbstruck
fool (embrontête), do you speak now?!
Demosthenes’ use of oxymoron, neologism and animal imagery is at its peak in this
passage, but his quack doctor simile is especially striking since it is more elaborate than
the name-calling that leads up to it. This depiction adds to the variety of ways in which
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Demosthenes characterizes Aeschines, but is complementary, not contradictory, to his
central theme. The quack doctor was a concern of the developing field of medicine in
Greece at the time. As Dean-Jones argues, the rise of the charlatan doctor took place in
the 4th-century because there was a transition from oral to literary culture occurring at
that time. 52 Many calling themselves iatroi were now book-trained only and therefore not
sound practitioners. The fact that we know of four plays that were titled Iatros beginning
in the Middle Comic period suggests that mockery of these figures regularly appeared on
the comic stage around the same time.53 Demosthenes’ mockery of Aeschines in this
passage strongly invokes the image of the quack doctor who boasts of professional
expertise that he does not have. The variation in descriptive techniques that Demosthenes
employs in no way detracts from his broader strategy of depicting Aeschines as alazôn;
rather, it reinforces this aim in a highly comic and imaginative way, one that would
entertain the jurors while directing them to the same conclusion.
The two main passages of invective, however, do not specifically depict
Aeschines as an alazôn, in part because the first (126-59) deals primarily with his parents
and not with him. The second passage (252-96) focuses more on Aeschines, but again
does not aim to depict him as an alazôn locally. We must recall that the themes of each
set-piece respond specifically to the attacks that Aeschines first made against
Demosthenes’ family and fortune respectively. Demosthenes therefore limits himself in
terms of content because he is being particularly cautious to justify his use of invective in
                                                 
52 See Dean-Jones 2003.
53 Three come from Middle Comedy and one from New Comedy; see Edmonds 2.654, 3.1218 (as cited by
Rowe 1966, 400 n.10).
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these two elaborate and extreme attacks. When we consider both passages within his
broader strategy, however, the connection with alazoneia becomes clear.
It is in support of the claim that Aeschines does not have “intelligence and
education” that Demosthenes turns to Aeschines’ parentage. We must recall here,
however, that Aeschines first brought Demosthenes’ parentage into the discussion (3.171-
72).54 The following attack by Aeschines on Demosthenes’ family (particularly his
mother) is what opened the door for Demosthenes to retaliate in kind:55
And he [Demosthenes’ maternal grandfather] married a wealthy woman,
by Zeus, one who brought him a lot of gold with her dowry, but who was
Scythian by birth. And from her he had two daughters whom he sent here
with a lot of money; he set one of them up in a marriage with someone-or-
other (I don’t want to anger too many men), but the other one,
Demosthenes of Paeania married disregarding the laws of the city. From
this woman, the meddler (periergos) and sycophant (sukophantês) came to
you. So then, from his grandfather he would be an enemy of the people,
since you condemned his ancestors to death. And from his mother’s side,
he is a Scythian—a barbarian who sounds Greek; from there also comes
his wickedness, which is not native (3.172).
Demosthenes is careful to point to this part of Aeschines’ argument before launching into
his version of Aeschines’ family history.56 What might otherwise appear as an
                                                 
54 Aeschines immediately transitions from his discussion of Demosthenes’ parentage to an attack on
Demosthenes’ fortune (3.173): per‹ d¢ tØn kay' ∞m°ran d¤aitan t¤w §stin; (And what kind of man is he
in regard to his daily habits?). He responds to his own question with a review of Demosthenes’ previous
career activities, greed, mishandling of his patrimony, and cowardice (3.173-76).
55 Aeschines connects his attack on Demosthenes’ parents with his argument about Demosthenes’ character,
namely that he was not dêmotikos. He thereby makes it relevant to the charge since he argues that one can
only be dêmotikos if both of one’s parents are freeborn (eleutheros) (3.169).
56 “It is necessary for me, so it seems, although I am not a lover of slander (philoloidoron), to tell you the
most essential facts themselves (auta anankaiotata) about this man instead of his numerous lies, because of
the insults (blasphêmias) voiced by him, and to show you who he is and the type of parents he came from
that led him to undertake malicious speech so easily and mock certain words of mine, when he himself has
said things that any man of restraint would shrink from uttering (126).”
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unnecessary and inappropriate distortion of Aeschines’ heritage on Demosthenes’ part is
perfectly justifiable, since it is delivered in accordance with Aeschines’ own line of
argument. Demosthenes’ lengthy response follows Aeschines’ theme, but is clearly more
scathing and humorous in language and tone (129-30):
I’m not at a loss for what I should say about you and your family, I’m at a
loss for what I should mention first—either that your father, Tromes, with
his thick shackles and wooden collar, was a servant (edouleue) for Elpias
when that man taught grammar next to the Theseum? or that your mother,
who enjoyed “marriages” in the middle of the day in the tent next to
Hero’s splint shop, raised you to be a fine little statue (ton kalon
andrianta) and top actor of third parts (tritagônistên akron)? (of course
everyone knows these things, even if I don’t say them). Or that Phormio, a
slave of Dion from Phrearrioi, who played the pipe on a ship, lifted her out
of this noble trade (tês kalês ergasias)? But by Zeus and the Gods, if I say
things about you that are fitting, I’m afraid I’ll seem to voice words that
are unfit for me. [130] These things, then, I’ll pass over and I’ll begin
instead from the things he has experienced in his own life; for he was not
born from nobility, rather he comes from those whom the dêmos
condemns. Recently then—did I say recently? Yesterday it was, or even
the day before, that he became both an Athenian and a politician. And
after adding two syllables, he made his father into “Atrometus” instead of
“Tromes,” and his mother became the all-revered “Glaucothea,” she
whom everyone knows is called “Empousa”. It is clear that she obtained
this title from doing, enduring, and becoming all things—where else could
it have come from?
First, the point of attacking Aeschines’ family is to discredit his status, not to slander his
parentage per se. He wishes to show that Aeschines was neither born of high station nor
raised as a proper elite youth. By using his parents as a vehicle for the attack,
Demosthenes is on safe ground because he is referring back to the time of Aeschines’
birth and childhood, a topic on which no one in the audience is an expert. Secondly,
scholars have noted the comic nature of his accusations—that his father was a slave and
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his mother a prostitute—but most disregard them as baseless slander.57 That the
accusations are fabricated is hardly of import. What is significant is how Demosthenes is
able to make such outrageous claims plausible. His characterizations are effective
because he has some factual basis on which he can build and embellish: Aeschines’
history of menial jobs.58
But beyond plausibility, his attacks are clearly meant to provoke derisive laughter
from the audience. This aim is immediately apparent from Demosthenes’ choice to
belittle both Aeschines’ father and mother by referring to them with nicknames: Tromes
(“the Trembler”) and Empousa.59 Aeschines, by contrast, referred to Demosthenes’ father
in a respectable manner (giving his name and demotic), and never named his mother.
Demosthenes’ use of nicknames alone is a comic maneuver since they are most prevalent
in comedy. Normally the Greeks followed strict rules governing the proper naming of
both men and women. The concepts that each name invokes—cowardice and prostitution
respectively—are also subjects that regularly appear in Middle Comedy.60 Whether
Atrometus was brave or cowardly is a judgment about action and therefore more easily
manipulated than the facts themselves—that Atrometus was a soldier and teacher. His
                                                 
57 Harding 1994b is certain; he sees the comic stage as expanding the scope of diabolê for the orators,
which is an important insight, but he does not see the potential problems with complete fabrication.
58 On invective and plausibility, cf. Corbeill 2000.
59 Usher suggests that he may have acquired the nickname “Tromes” from fellow comrades as a joke
because he was actually a courageous fighter. Compare the modern nickname “Tiny” for a very large man.
Cf. section 180, where Demosthenes brings up his own nickname “Batallus” and uses it against Aeschines:
“And yet how would you like me to characterize you, Aeschines, on that day, and how myself? Shall I call
myself Battalus, as you would by way of insult and abuse, and you not indeed a hero of the common kind,
but one of those upon the stage, a Cresphontes or a Creon, or that Oenamaus you wretchedly murdered
once at Collytus? Well, on that historic day I, the Battalus of Paeania, was seen to be worth more to his
country than you, the Oenamaus of Cothocidae. You were of no use at any stage; I did everything that a
good citizen should. Read me the decree.”
60 On names and nicknames for prostitutes (including mythical names), see McClure 2003, 59-78 with
Appendix III, 183-97. On cowardice in battle as a topos of ridicule, see Süss 1910, 254.
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claim that Atrometus engaged in menial tasks sets a precedent for his later accusation that
Aeschines did these same tasks for his father (258). He thereby creates continuity from
father to son of servile behavior, even if neither of the two were ever slaves. The
description, then, is a comic way of highlighting one important aspect of Aeschines’
character that marks him as incapable of political leadership. Whether or not Aeschines
or his father were actually slaves sinks into the background and the more important point
that they did menial work comes to the fore.
Similarly, Demosthenes attempts to demean Aeschines’ phusis by insinuating that
his mother is a prostitute (although he does not explicitly claim that Aeschines was born
from one of her “daytime marriages”). Rather than calling her a hetaira or pornê, he uses
comic descriptions to “reveal” her status. He creates a high-low opposition between
Glaucothea (an epithet of Athena further heightened by the addition of panu semnôs) and
Empousa, a mythical female monster that changed form at will.61 In Frogs (285-308),
Empousa’s protean capabilities frighten Xanthias and Dionysius, where she is called a
beast (thêrion) and changes forms repeatedly from a cow to a mule, then a beautiful
woman, and finally a dog.62 The act of mentioning his mother by first name and
nickname draws her status into question;63 a freeborn citizen woman would customarily
and properly be referred to as the wife of her husband or by patronymic, not by name.
Since the jurors would be familiar with first names and nicknames in reference to
                                                 
61 Her ability to “do, suffer, and become” everything is reminiscent of Apollodorus’ heated attack against
the courtesan Neaira for how and where she plied her trade ([Dem.] 59.108). Apollodorus similarly
attempted to cast doubt on Stephanus’ children by demonstrating that their mother was a prostitute.
62 See Brown 1991.
63 Cf. McClure (2003, 60-74) for a discussion of Athenian naming practices for women, especially hetairai
(p.69): “such names [i.e. nicknames] converted them into objects of sympotic and comic mockery and fixed
their place in the social order.”
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prostitutes only, Demosthenes is able to demean her, even if he fabricated the name itself.
Demosthenes’ choice of “Empousa”, incongruously juxtaposed with “Glaucothea”,
suggests that he was drawing from the jurors’ knowledge of and response to comic
courtesans. Throughout the 4th century, the jury was entertained by the antics of these
characters; Demosthenes thus creates comic potential by turning Aeschines’ “noble”
mother into a comic prostitute.
We cannot say for sure that the jury erupted in laughter at Demosthenes’
depiction, but we can say confidently that derisive laughter was one of Demosthenes’
goals. When we consider this scene within Veatch’s model of audience commitment, we
can conjecture that the audience was likely to laugh, since the jurors were not from the
elite class and therefore were not too committed when jokes were made at the expense of
the elite (as Old and Middle Comedy makes abundantly clear). Thus, when Demosthenes,
like Aristophanes or others, ridicules a politician in comic language, we can reasonably
assume that laughter was the intended, and even likely, response.
The humor of the passage reinforces Demosthenes’ aim of connecting Glaucothea
(like Atrometus) with service work.64 At Athens, prostitution itself was not considered
disgraceful if one was a metic or slave, but it was discgraceful for a citizen, since the
profession involved subordination. Demosthenes is therefore again able to show
continuity of servility from mother to son when he later depicts Aeschines assisting her in
                                                 
64 On Athenian aristocratic disdain for banausic professions, see Dover 1974, 32-33; also Wolff 1968, who
discusses how orators, such as Isocrates and Demosthenes, desired to get away from their role as
logographer since it was by nature a subordinate occupation. Cf. Acharnians 454 where Aristophanes
derides Euripides’ mother for being a greengrocer, and Aristophanes’ treatment of Cleon in Knights, where
the humor in large part rests on Cleon being trumped politically by a Sausage-Seller and ending up a
sausage-seller himself.
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carrying out the rites of Sabazius (259-60). The pointed use of comic ridicule invites the
audience to laugh at Aeschines and his family, thus asserting their superiority over him
and, inevitably, their support for Demosthenes. That the intended response was laughter
is clear from both the comic language and the incongruity that Demosthenes creates for
his audience by juxtaposing Aeschines’ family against the implied expectation of a true
elite family.
The entire attack builds up to Aeschines’ lack of appreciation for what the state
has done for him; instead of expressing charis, he has gone against the state as the
hireling of Philip:
[131] Nevertheless, you are so ungrateful and wicked by nature that
although you went from slave to free, and from poor to rich thanks to
these men here, you not only lack gratitude toward them, but you also
hired yourself out (misy√saw sautÚn) when you conducted public affairs
against their interest. Regarding situations in which someone might
contest whether or not he spoke on the city’s behalf, I’ll pass these over.
But, regarding those affairs in which he has clearly been shown to have
acted on behalf of the enemy, I will remind you of these.
It is true that here and throughout the speech there are many attacks on Aeschines as
hireling that are more serious in tone (148, 284, 307). But since Demosthenes is
specifically using Aeschines’ background as another proof that he was in fact a hireling,
we should interpret the decidedly comic attack and his more extensive one in section
252ff. as working alongside these serious accusations.65 In both sections, his comic abuse
                                                 
65 Harding 1994b, e.g., sees the comic and the serious interacting, but this nod does not accord well with his
overall argument that comic invective in oratory is entirely for humor (unlike comedy and iambography
where it was meant to be hurtful). His assessment oversimplifies the function of invective, since he does
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transitions back to serious accusations. Thus, the invective gives the jurors further
evidence of how Aeschines ended up where he did and why he turned out this way.
In both passages, Demosthenes exploits the connection of public and private to
show that his opponent has engaged in activities in his private life that do not reflect the
appropriate behaviors for involvement in politics. By his ancestry, he is predisposed to
selling himself to the enemy. By the time he reaches manhood, he continues his servile
and grasping trend. Now that Aeschines is a man, Demosthenes can describe his activities
as a matter of choice rather than compulsion. Thus, in 261, he sarcastically juxtaposes
high and low by claiming that Aeschines “chose the noblest of duties, that of secretary
and assistant to our petty officials (tÚ kãlliston §jel°jv t«n ¶rgvn, grammateÊein
ka‹ Íphrete›n to›w érxid¤oiw).” The clear message is that Aeschines’ family always did
service work for others, he himself grew up working for others, and therefore it is no
surprise that as an adult he continued his servile behavior by choosing not just to assist
others, but to serve Philip as a hireling.66 Demosthenes makes clear in his last extended
attack on Aeschines the actor how his acting career directly reflected and reified his
servility (262):
You hired yourself out (misy√saw sautÚn) to those actors nicknamed the
Heavy Groaners, Simukkas and Socrates, you played the third-parts
(§tritagvn¤steiw), collecting figs, grapes, and olives like a fruiterer from
other people’s farms, getting more profit from these than from the plays in
which you acted at the peril of your lives. 67
                                                                                                                                                  
not take into account the shared didactic purpose, or the fact that it can simultaneously be hurtful and
humorous.
66 The point is recognized by Dyck 1985, 45 and Easterling 1999, 155.
67 See Usher 1993, ad loc. for a discussion of this passage in connection with Doric mime. Note too that
here again Demosthenes connects Aeschines with food, an obsession of contemporary comedy not
normally found in “high” literature; cf. Wilkins (1997, 251) who subjects his subheading “Food in
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Aeschines’ hired himself out as an actor, just as he hired himself out as a politician.
By calling attention to Aeschines’ acting career, Demosthenes highlights the
aspects of performance inherent in oratory.68 For both acting and public speaking, a
performance is supposed to come across as natural even if it is rehearsed. Yet at a play,
the audience retains the knowledge that acting is taking place, whereas in the courtroom,
this perception is altered; the jury would consider the “real life” situation and therefore
not be conscious of oratorical “acting”. Aeschines’ shortcomings as an actor give
Demosthenes a way to neutralize the advantage that Aeschines has from being a naturally
gifted public speaker. More importantly, Demosthenes offers Aeschines’ acting as an
analogy for understanding Aeschines the politician. Demosthenes’ exposure of Aeschines
as a ‘bad actor’ on stage is useful for revealing how bad he is at acting as a politician in
real life. Here and elsewhere, Demosthenes slips back and forth between Aeschines’
acting and his “real life”. Thus, the point of Demosthenes’ ridicule is not that Aeschines
was actually a terrible actor despite boasting of how great he was, rather that he pretends
to be a good politician when in fact he has been a repeated failure.69
As I have been arguing throughout, Demosthenes’ comic invective does not
contradict, but rather reinforces, the serious accusations against Aeschines. Scholars have
resisted seeing the comic nature of Demosthenes’ invective since they believe that the
                                                                                                                                                  
Comedy: A ‘Low’ Form of Culture in a ‘Low’ Form of Drama” to scrutiny. The depiction of Aeschines as
grasping at scraps of food mimics Aeschines’ grasping at bribes, but in a particularly comic way.
68 Cf. Axer 1989, who argues that the overlapping nature of performance on stage and in court is precisely
why scholars lean toward theatrical metaphors and explanations for the speaker’s courtroom practice.
69 Pace Dyck (1985, 44) who argues that Aeschines cannot be an alazôn because he never claimed to be a
good actor.
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comic would undermine the serious. In particular, they do not find the portrait of
Aeschines to be convincing, since he cannot be both an “ineffectual bluff” and a “sinister
threat”.70 An Athenian jury, however, would see a definite connection between these two
traits; a man who is an alazôn and in a position of authority can indeed be dangerous.71
This is, in fact, precisely the point that Xenophon’s Socrates makes in Mem. 1.7, where
Socrates discusses alazoneia as a shameful way of life that should be avoided. He first
takes up the example of a aulos-player before addressing the role of general or captain in
order to emphasize that the unexposed alazôn in a powerful position poses a real danger.
Socrates describes the exposed aulos -player as laughable (geloios; katagelastôs) since he
is shown to be both a bad aulos -player and as an imposter (anthrôpos alazôn). But the
man who pretends to be a general or captain is much worse, since he will not only
disgrace himself, he will inevitably destroy others. Just so for the rich man, brave man
and strong man. The passage culminates with the statement that the worst alazôn is the
man who pretends to be able to run the state (1.7.5):
épate«na d' §kãlei oÈ mikrÚn m¢n oÈd' e‡ tiw érgÊrion µ skeËow
parã tou peiyo› labƒn épostero¤h, polÁ d¢ m°giston ˜stiw
mhdenÚw êjiow Ãn §jhpat¨koi pe¤yvn …w flkanÚw e‡h tÆw pÒlevw
∞ge›syai.
                                                 
70 The terms are used by Rowe (1966, 403). The objection was first made by Bruns (1961, 572) who
considered Demosthenes’ characterization implausible because of his portrayal of Aeschines as both stupid
and dangerous. Dyck’s answer to Bruns is unsatisfying: he claims that Demosthenes can get away with this
contradiction because he was taking advantage of the immediate effect that oral delivery offered him (1985,
46).
71 A modern parallel can be found in Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 911”, where he uses humor to depict
President Bush as a buffoon in a position of authority. Moore attempts to expose President Bush as
incapable of leadership by demonstrating comically how his idiocy led to bad decision-making that
ultimately resulted in a very dangerous situation in Iraq. The humor does not discount the seriousness of the
subject or his allegations.
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He called that man a deceiver (apateôna), and not a small one, whoever
should deprive another man by taking away his money or equipment
through persuasion (peithoi); but by far the greatest cheat would be the
man who deceptively convinces (exêpatêkoi peithôn) others that he is
capable of leading the state, when he is actually worthless (mêdenos
axios).72
This is precisely Demosthenes’ point; the actor/politician analogy that he constructs
throughout the speech is right in line with Socrates’ aulos -player/leader analogy. In each
instance we are given an example of the alazôn in a more trivial occupation as a way of
understanding his role in a more serious one. Although the one is laughable (because his
actions affect only himself), and the other dangerous (because they affect all of Athens),
the difference is one of degree and not kind. Demosthenes thus depicts Aeschines as an
alazôn but needs the jury to deflate him with their laughter and their vote so that he
becomes relegated to the role of comic impostor, rather than remain a serious threat to the
city. His account of Aeschines’ past behavior is a comic demonstration of how and why
he should be seen as dangerous. According to Demosthenes, there is only the façade
hiding Aeschines’ inferior birth and upbringing, his less-than-stellar professional career,
his stupidity and his deceptiveness. If Aeschines continues to hold public office because
he, as Xenophon’s Socrates warns, can persuade people into thinking that he is capable,
when in fact he is a fake, then the state will ultimately suffer at his hands (as it has in the
past).
It is clear that Demosthenes’ main goal in the speech is to present Aeschines as
the political hireling of Philip. All of his invective against Aeschines is in the service of
                                                 
72 Cf. 2.2.12 of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia for a similar discussion of the alazôn as dangerous.
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proving this point, even if it is varied and seems on the surface contradictory. The comic
depictions of Aeschines as bad actor, quack doctor, initiate, slave, and imbecile are used
to build up his case for exposing him to the audience as a hireling and not a well-
educated, elite, patriotic and useful politician. The comic and the serious work
reciprocally: the more Demosthenes can show that Aeschines is ripe for bribery and
treachery through humorous depictions of his past experiences, the more weight he gives
to the charge that Aeschines was the hired hand of Philip. Likewise, the more credible his
serious description of Aeschines as hired hand, the more believable his outrageous
attacks become.
Demosthenes chooses to depict Aeschines as alazôn because Aeschines stands out
as a prominent politician with support from the Athenians for many years now. As a
rhetorical strategy, Demosthenes knows that if he can point to real aspects of Aeschines’
background—a worker in the school, an initiator, an actor, and an under secretary—he
can build a coherent and believable picture of Aeschines ‘born to serve others’ instead of
Aeschines ‘born to lead’. This development of characterization is summarized perfectly
in his antithetical synopsis at 265-66: “You taught reading; I was a student. You
conducted initiations; I was initiated. You were an assembly-clerk; I was a speaker. You
acted third parts; I was in the audience. You broke down; I hissed. You have always
served our enemies’ interests in politics; I those of our country.”
 Thus, Aeschines becomes a man who has spent his whole life grasping at paltry
sums for the shameful tasks that he performs, so it is only natural that he should find it
easy to receive pay from Philip for betraying the state. This much is clear. But when
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Demosthenes gives a description of the ‘real’ Aeschines as the traitor/hireling/servant, he
is contrasting it with Aeschines’ presentation of himself as the all-wise political
statesman, who boldly proclaims superiority over Demosthenes in knowing what is best
for Athens. Demosthenes thus exposes Aeschines as a comic alazôn.
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Chapter 2
Comic Strategies in Against Timarchus
In recent years, the speech Against Timarchus has enjoyed considerable attention
from scholars, mostly as a result of increased interest in ancient sexuality. It has become
a primary source for, as well as the stimulus of much debate about, the political,
economic, and social interpretation of male same-sex practices in ancient Athens.
Because of this very specific focus, other aspects of the speech have not received much
attention; among these is Aeschines’ sustained use of comic strategies to make his case.1
Harding, for example, in his essay on Comedy and Rhetoric, does not discuss Aeschines
at all; and most works dealing with comic invective that do include a discussion of
Aeschines go straight to Against Ctesiphon—but they likely do so only because it is the
counterpart to On the Crown.2 Hall touches briefly on comedy in Against Timarchus, in
her discussion of the dramatic nature of legal procedure, and suggests that “[Timarchus’]
forensic portrayal as a failed prostitute may owe much to comic characterization,” but she
goes no further. 3
As we will see, Hall is right to look to comedy for influence on Aeschines’
depiction of Timarchus. Moreover, Aeschines relies heavily on humor and laughter not
                                                 
1 Certainly there has been some interest in the speech for its literary or performance elements, but it has
been focused on Aeschines’ extensive quotations of epic and tragic poetry (see Ford 1999 and Perlman
1964).
2 See e.g. Koster 1980, 76-90.
3 Hall, 1995: 57; her section on comedy is the briefest and is meant to do no more than scratch the surface.
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only as an overarching strategy for his case against Timarchus, but also for his
characterization of Timarchus’ defender, Demosthenes. The explication of Aeschines’
use of humor is thus essential to our interpretation of this speech, and indeed, more
generally to our understanding of mechanisms for policing deviancy and morality in
fourth-century Athenian society.
As we might expect, Aeschines characterizes his two opponents differently by
attacking Timarchus as a pornos and Demosthenes as an alazôn. Reputation plays an
obvious role in his attack on Timarchus, but it also affects his depiction of Demosthenes.
Demosthenes, of course, did not have a reputation for involving himself with numerous
men in the community. But since he was a prominent politician well known for his
rhetorical skill, the characterization as a swindling alazôn is apt. In both cases, Aeschines
aims at invoking derisive laughter from the audience.
Aeschines’ portrayal of Demosthenes’ alazoneia is important to his argument that
Demosthenes has a proclivity toward irrelevant argumentation.4 Although Aeschines
drags Demosthenes into his attacks on Timarchus whenever possible, he steers his
discussion entirely against Demosthenes at one point late in the speech (170-76). In these
sections, he argues vigorously that the jurors must not listen to the irrelevant attacks that
Demosthenes will put forth against Aeschines in an effort to divert attention away from
Timarchus’ prostitution. He homes in specifically on Demosthenes’ skills as a teacher of
                                                 
4 I discuss Aeschines’ portrayal of Demosthenes first, since it is less elaborate than his portrayal of
Timarchus, but also because is consistent with the argument in Chapter 1 that Demosthenes depicts
Aeschines as a comic alazôn in On the Crown. Scholars often comment on Demosthenes’ tendency to beat
Aeschines at his own game. Aeschines’ treatment of Demosthenes as an alazôn here and in Against
Ctesiphon would be another example of this tendency. At the very least, we must acknowledge that
Aeschines was the first to use this type of argumentation against Demosthenes in Against Timarchus, which
means that Demosthenes’ response in this particular debate should be viewed as a reaction.
73
rhetoric, which he describes as deceptive sophistry. The exposure of Demosthenes as an
alazôn is therefore different in some ways from what we saw with Demosthenes’
treatment of Aeschines. Rather than attacking Demosthenes’ citizen status to show that
he is an impostor politician, Aeschines here draws on notions of the charlatan
philosopher, best known to us from Aristophanes’ Clouds.
A main component to Aeschines’ strategy is to stir up anger from the jurors
against Demosthenes for abusing the people, democracy, and specifically in this case, the
jurors. According to Aeschines, Demosthenes invited students to the court essentially to
use this case as an example of how to make the weaker argument the stronger. Aeschines
frames his concern in terms of ridicule; he warns the jurors not to become laughable
(g°lvta) to Demosthenes, the sophist (t“ sofistª), by allowing him to abuse the
democratic process and make money at the jurors’ expense. Just as Aristophanes puts
Socrates on stage to expose his activities as a (supposed) sophist, Aeschines too attempts
to get the jury to laugh at Demosthenes, rather than be laughed at by him. To do so, he
emphasizes visualization (Ípolambãney' ırçn), preferring direct speech to paint a vivid
portrait of Demosthenes’ haughty scheme (175):
... éll' Ípolambãney' ırçn efiselhluyÒta épÚ toË dikasthr¤ou
o‡kade ka‹ semnunÒmenon §n tª t«n meirak¤vn diatribª, ka‹
diejiÒnta, …w eÔ tÚ prçgma Ífe¤leto t«n dikast«n* "ÉApagagƒn
går aÈtoÁw épÚ t«n per‹ T¤marxon afiti«n, §p°sthsa f°rvn §p‹
tÚn kat¨goron ka‹ F¤lippon ka‹ Fvk°aw, ka‹ fÒbouw §p¨rthsa to›w
ékrovm°noiw, Àsy' ı m¢n feÊgvn kathgÒrei, ı d¢ kathgor«n
§kr¤neto, ofl d¢ dikasta¤, œn m¢n µsan krita¤, §pelãyonto, œn d' oÈk
µsan, per‹ toÊtvn ±kouon.
…but imagine that you see him, once he has returned home from the
court, boasting (semnumenon) during his lecture to his students as he
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explains how well he stole the case out from under the jurors: “I led them
all astray from the charges against Timarchus, and focused them instead
on the prosecutor, and Philip, and the Phocians. And I struck fear into the
audience, so that the defendant turned prosecutor and the prosecutor,
defendant! Thus, the jurors forgot about what they were judging and
listened instead to these other things they weren’t supposed to judge.
The participle semnunomenon marks pomposity and is one indication of his aim to depict
Demosthenes as a braggart. Near the conclusion of Aeschines’ discussion of irrelevance,
Aeschines connects Demosthenes’ boasting more directly with apatê (deceit) and
alazoneumata (boastful speech) (178):
§n d¢ ta›w §kklhs¤aiw ka‹ to›w dikasthr¤oiw pollãkiw éf°menoi t«n
efiw aÈtÚ tÚ prçgma lÒgvn, ÍpÚ tÆw épãthw ka‹ t«n
élazoneumãtvn Ípãgesye...
In the assembly and in the courts, you are often led astray by deceit
(apatê) and boastful tricks (alazoneumatôn), forgetting the arguments on
the matter at hand.
More telling than his terminology, however, is the comparison he draws between
Demosthenes and Socrates. His discussion began with mention of Demosthenes’
corruption of youth (170-2) and progressed to an explicit comparison with Socrates, also
called a sophist (173).5 If we consider Aeschines’ characterization of how Demosthenes
expects to swindle the jury in the context of Aristophanes’ depiction of Socrates in
Clouds, the force of alazoneia in Aeschines’ depiction becomes clear. In Clouds,
                                                 
5 “Given that you put to death Socrates, the sophist (sophistên), because he was shown to have educated
Critias, one of the Thirty who destroyed the democracy, should Demosthenes then select companions from
among you, exacting such horrific penalties from private and public men for their freedom of speech?”
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Socrates is depicted as a sophist who directs a Thinkery (phrontisterion) where he trains
students in deceptive rhetoric, just as Aeschines claims that Demosthenes is doing here.
Aeschines creates a topsy-turvy scenario in which Demosthenes overturns justice through
unjust argumentation, which recalls Socrates’ alleged ability to teach others how to make
the weaker argument the stronger. That Aristophanes is specifically characterizing
Socrates as a braggart is made clear throughout the play by juxtaposing his persona as a
brilliant thinker and the thoughts he expounds, which are of the least significance (such
as measuring how far fleas jump or explicating how gnats hum). Further, Strepsiades’
son, Pheidippides, is able to identify Socrates explicitly as an alazôn when Strepsiades
first recommends that he study with the men at the Thinkery (101-104):
PH: Who are these men?
ST: I don’t know what you call them exactly. Excessively careful thinkers
(merimnophrontistai), noble men!
PH: Ack! Wicked men (ponêroi)! I know them—it’s the boasters
(alazonas), the pale-faced and barefoot men, that you are talking about!
Men like that wretched Socrates and Chairephon.
Socrates, then, is marked as a sophist and alazôn. By making the comparison between
Demosthenes and Socrates, Aeschines invites the audience to laugh at Demosthenes as a
comic alazôn in the same way that Aristophanes set up Socrates for ridicule in Clouds. 6
                                                 
6 This is a tactic that Aeschines used again in his speech Against Ctesiphon, referring to Demosthenes five
times (and Ctesiphon twice) as engaging in alazoneia; 3.99 (twice), 101, 218, 237, 238, 256. The
accusation against Demosthenes in section 98-99 is most telling: “For the man (Demosthenes) does this one
thing that is specific to him and not common to others—the rest of the braggarts (alazones), whenever they
lie, try to say things that are undefined and unclear, fearing that they will be tested; but Demosthenes,
whenever he boasts (alazoneuêtai), first lies under oath, invoking destruction on himself, and secondly, for
things that he knows well will never happen, he dares to give an exact date, and for people he’s never seen,
he mentions them by name, thus hoodwinking his listeners and mimicking those who speak the truth. And
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Like Demosthenes’ depiction of Aeschines in On the Crown, Aeschines’
characterization of Demosthenes as alazôn can be linked to comic strategies known to us
from Old Comedy. Many of the tactics that Aeschines employs in his treatment of
Timarchus as comic prostitute, however, can only be understood by turning to fourth-
century Middle Comedy, which is much less familiar to us because so little survives.7
Unlike Old Comedy where entire plays are extant, for the most part only fragments
remain from the Middle Comic poets, and these typically lack context. The exception
comes from Aristophanes himself; his later plays Ecclesiazusae and Plutus date to the
beginning of the Middle Comic period (393/1 and 388 respectively). Still, we have
enough Middle Comedy to see at least some of the ways in which much of Aeschines’
speech draws on the more personal and private elements that distinguish the lesser-known
Middle-Comic tradition.8
Also problematic is that scholars have posited an exaggerated distinction between
Old and Middle Comedy with the former characterized by humor that is primarily
political and obscene, and the latter by humor that is subtler and domestic. In accordance
with this interpretation, Middle Comedy has tended to get lumped together with New
Comedy (if not ignored altogether). Recently, however, scholars have begun to re-
evaluate the nature of Middle Comedy. Nesselrath’s volume on Middle Comedy and his
                                                                                                                                                  
for this, he really deserves to be hated because, although he’s wicked (ponêros), he abolishes the signs
(sêmeia) that differentiate honorable men (chrêstôn).”
7 Thus Harding (1994b, 196) on his approach to comedy in oratory claims: “To all intents and purposes,
this will mean the influence of so-called Old Comedy, since Middle Comedy is little more than a
concept…”.
8 Cf. Bruns 1961, 552 who argues that the orators also shift focus in the mid-fourth century at which point
personal elements play a much greater role. The fact that this is occurring on both the comic stage and in
the courts highlights the need for an analysis of the speeches that takes account of what is happening on the
comic stage.
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important essay in Dobrov’s volume on the city as comedy have altered the earlier view
considerably.9 He argues that Middle Comedy retains the political nature of Old Comedy
to a much greater extent than previously believed, but that there is a shift in focus to the
personal habits, i.e. the eating, drinking and sexual practices, of politicians and
prostitutes.10
An examination of the fragments supports Nesselrath’s argument. Famous
members of the community, namely politicians and courtesans, appear with astonishing
regularity. To be sure, the prevalence of courtesans as main characters on the stage marks
a separation between Middle Comedy and Old Comedy, since the Aristophanic world
was almost completely disinterested in prostitution. The subject matter can be explained
in part by the fact that Athenaeus is responsible for preserving many of the fragments and
prostitutes were a topic of interest to him. Yet, we cannot dismiss the fact that he finds so
many examples from Middle Comedy and so few references in Old Comedy.11 In
numerous fragments, hetairai whom we know existed from other sources (including court
cases) not only appear, but are the subjects of entire plays.12 Similarly, politicians are
                                                 
9 Nesselrath 1990 and 1997. Referring to the continuity of interest in politics, he concludes: “…there is
between 380 and 320 no real sign that mentionings [sic] of politics and politicians in the fragments are
decreasing. If anything, one might even observe a sort of increase of “political” fragments right up to the
end of the life and times of Demosthenes (1997, 275).”
10 Cf. Hubbard (2003, 86-88) who likewise argues for continuity between Old and Middle Comedy, citing
numerous examples from Middle Comic fragments that ridicule politicians for being effeminate or
engaging in pederasty; cf. also his earlier work (Hubbard 1991, 3) where he makes the claim that the
distinction between Old and Middle Comedy has been exaggerated.
11 In fact, in all of Aristophanes, there are no clear examples of hetairai or pornai as main characters. See
Nesselrath 1997, 278; cf. Stroup 2004, 42, although she argues that Aristophanes is “hetairizing” the wives
in Lysistrata.
12 We have many titles that are simply the names of famous courtesans. For example, both Timocles (25-26
K-A) and Philemon (49 K-A) have plays entitled Neaira; Timocles also wrote the Sappho (a courtesan
from Eresus; 32 K-A see further below); Epicrates wrote a Lais (3 K-A); see further McClure 2003,
Appendix III: 183-97.
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frequent comic objects, sometimes because of their relationships with courtesans; but just
as often they are ridiculed on their own for political or oratorical activity.13 Aeschines,
Demosthenes, and Timarchus make their appearances, while other politicians show up
frequently, such as Callistratus who is abused in a rather Aristophanic style for his
effeminacy.14 Despite its fragmentary nature then, we can be certain that Middle Comedy
in no way abandoned interest in real members of the community.
The fact that politicians and courtesans are prominent subjects of Middle
Comedy, which is increasingly interested in exploiting their private lives for comic effect,
provides the starting point for my investigation of its relationship to the speech Against
Timarchus. It makes sense that Aeschines, an actor himself with a great sense of humor,
would exploit the comic possibilities when accusing a prominent politician of being an
indulgent male whore. Certainly it was popular with the people at the time or the poets
would not have repeatedly produced comedies that focused on the decadent habits of
politicians and prostitutes. This type of approach helps explain Aeschines’ strategy,
which most scholars have judged as “bold”; scholars are astonished at his total disregard
for types of proof that are common in oratory (such as witnesses and documents, or even
circumstantial evidence) and his daring plan to rely on rumor instead.15 And particularly
shocking to scholars is that Aeschines actually won the case. On the traditional
                                                 
13 Cf. Nesselrath (1997, 272) who notes that more than twenty politicians are mentioned in the fragments.
See also Hubbard see also McClure (2003, Appendix IV, 199-201) for a list of hetairai and their lovers
(many of whom are politicians).
14 See below n. 51 for the citation of Eubulus’ Carion Sphinx where Callistratus is equated with the ass
(prôktos). And in Eubulus’ Antiope (10 K-A), he is said to have a nice, big ass (pugên megalên kai kalên).
Cf. also Anaxandrides (41 K-A), where he is mocked for having his feet rubbed with expensive Egyptian
perfume, and Antiphanes (293 K-A), where he is ridiculed for gluttony.
15 In regard to Timarchus’ sexual history, Carey (2000, 21), e.g. claims that Aeschines is “boldly tackling
head-on the fact that he has not a shred of solid evidence against Timarchus.”
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assumption that Athenian law should (like our law) adhere to a narrow concept of
relevance, Aeschines’ case seems to make an implicit argument against the entire justice
system. At more than one point in the speech, he asks the jury outright to rely on past
knowledge of Timarchus as stronger proof than anything they hear in the courtroom that
day. His justification is that, what they know already represents the truth, whereas what
they will encounter in court will be an attempt by the defendants to deceive them (92-3).16
It is true that his strategy in some regards stands apart from the norm, but the
particular nature of Aeschines’ accusation and the type of case that he is bringing,
dokimasia tôn rhêtorôn, allows him to engage in a full scrutiny of Timarchus’ life.
Perhaps his strategy is not as outrageous as we might think when we consider that, in
accordance with Athenian notions of justice, an important element in the juror’s
assessment of the case is their view of the overall character of the litigant. And this would
be particularly true in a case whose specific purpose was to scrutinize a speaker’s past to
ensure that he is worthy of engaging in political activities on the state’s behalf.17 Within
this framework, Aeschines can legitimately call upon past knowledge and reputation as
relevant evidence.18 Aeschines is quite open about the novelty of his strategy. But, as we
will see, he does not actually disregard procedural regulations or a concern for justice,
                                                 
16 Cf. Usher (1999, 282) who calls him a “rebel against conventional forensic oratory,” and points out that
criticizing the “soundness” of his case is less important than looking at the position he takes up.
17 Cf. Rhodes 2004, 139.
18 Cf. Intro, p. 12-13 on Dem. 36. In that speech and this one, the speakers make the argument that past
character predicts future character. But whereas Demosthenes comes to this conclusion after rebutting the
specific charges and therefore uses an eikos argument about character supplementarily, Aeschines makes
this point the backbone of his case.
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nor does he engage in full-scale fabrication; rather, he turns to alternate methods of
revealing the “truth” of his accusations to the jury.19
First, Aeschines in general relies heavily on narrative, which (among other things)
allows him to create an elaborate plot that incorporates humor throughout. Unlike a
playwright, however, he must rely on the power of description alone. Aeschines’ basic
strategy is to present Timarchus’ life within a mundus perversus by examining his
reversal of proper roles in society. Aeschines makes the most of topsy-turviness in
relation to Timarchus’ status (citizen/slave) and gender (man/woman). These role
reversals in which Timarchus engages (according to Aeschines) are also typical elements
of Athenian comedy.20 As part of his broader strategy, Aeschines draws on specific
characteristics from contemporary comic depictions of prostitutes. Aeschines certainly
goes beyond the typical comments in both Old and Middle Comedy about pathic
politicians, inviting the jury to see Timarchus in the role of female hetaira by tracking his
“long-term” relationships (see below). But since it is important to Aeschines’ strategy
that the audience view Timarchus as a pornos and not male hetaira (cf. section 54),
Aeschines emphasizes Timarchus’ failure as a hetaira, as Hall suggests, and his descent
to the even lower level of pornos. This characterization is necessary to create the widest
gap between proper behavior in accordance with his actual status as citizen, and his
                                                 
19 Contra the standard view that Aeschines engages in irrelevant argumentation; Harris 1995, 103: “The
narrative portion of Aeschines’ speech is a masterpiece of sophistic pleading. Without a shred of relevant
evidence, Aeschines ruthlessly attacks Timarchus as a consummate debauchee.”; also Carey 2000, 19:
“Despite the factual (though not rhetorical) weakness of the speech, which is ultimately no more than a
sustained attempt to throw sand in the eyes of the jurors, Aeschines won the case and Timarchus was
disfranchised.”
20 There are numerous examples for both. Regarding status, an example would be Xanthias and Dionysus
trading places in Frogs, and regarding gender, Thesmophoriazusae and Ecclesiazusae derive much of their
humor from the crossing of gender boundaries.
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chosen degenerate lifestyle.21 As a debauched pornos, Timarchus is a person who, by
Athenian standards, belongs on the bottom rung of the social and political ladder, yet
instead, he avails himself of the greatest privileges of citizenship: speaking in the
Assembly, making proposals, and going on embassies. Timarchus is alternately a male
whore exploiting elite privilege, and an elite citizen plunging to the depths of debauchery.
In both cases, the role and reality are out of line. Aeschines highlights this incongruity for
comic effect to entertain the audience in court with topsy-turvy intrigues similar to what
they would see on the comic stage. But, just as in the comic world, there must be a return
to order at the end of the performance. In the law court, it is the job of the jurors to
restore order with their vote. In this case in particular, they must condemn Timarchus in
order to keep him out of the political sphere and to make a negative example of him to
the other citizens.
Aeschines goes through an elaborate build up of the gravitas of the laws
governing the upbringing of youths as a framework for viewing Timarchus’ immoral
behavior. In so doing, he not only aligns himself with the laws and morality, but he
purposefully widens the gap between the nobility of the Athenian legal system and
Timarchus. Aeschines aims for comic effect by juxtaposing behavior that is socially
respectable with Timarchus’ total violation of it. He states explicitly in section 8 that he is
performing a contrast of the laws with Timarchus’ character, but he retains a serious tone.
                                                 
21 The tension that this creates is not problematic; Aeschines can alternately make use of the female hetaira
trope and the typical pathic male politician trope when it suits his needs. As I have been arguing, we should
not expect an orator simply to create “stock” characters out of real life figures; rather, they draw from
comedy by shaping the particular nature of an individual in terms of stock characterization to trigger a
reaction from the jury similar to that at a comic play.
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Only after 25 sections of reciting and interpreting laws, as well as praising the lawgivers,
in a serious and reverent tone, Aeschines makes a sudden shift to comic ridicule in
section 26 when he returns the discussion to Timarchus:
Examine now, men of Athens, how much Solon and those men I just
mentioned differ from Timarchus; whereas they were ashamed to speak
even with their hands outside of their cloaks, this man, not long
ago—rather, just the other day—ripped off his cloak and jumped around
naked, as if he were a pankratiast, in the assembly (gumnÚw
§pagkrat¤azen §n tª §kklhs¤ai)!
The descriptive terms Aeschines chooses for Timarchus in no way accord with the
Assembly setting that follows; Athens has traded in wise lawgivers of the past for a
naked athlete as their current adviser. This type of high-low opposition is characteristic of
Aeschines’ strategy throughout the speech. Like Demosthenes in On the Crown,
Aeschines fluctuates between serious discussion and comic depictions, only not in the
highly structured way that Demosthenes preferred. Aeschines goes back and forth
frequently throughout the speech, sometimes with long sections of serious and comic
material back to back, but he also often prefers to intersperse the two in short space.
It is with this introduction of the mundus perversus that Aeschines sets out to
describe Timarchus’ life. Although he does not begin from Timarchus’ birth as
Demosthenes did with Aeschines in On the Crown, Aeschines too relies heavily on a
chronological narrative. He relates two stories charting Timarchus’ love affairs, both of
which should be interpreted with Middle Comic depictions in mind. The first tale is about
Timarchus’ affair with Misgolas, and the second describes his involvement with
Hegesander after a brief stint with Pittalacus, a public slave. When Aeschines introduces
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Misgolas, the very first thing he describes about him is his peculiar interest in lyre-
players (41):
There is a certain Misgolas, son of Naukrates, men of Athens, of the deme
of Collytus, a noble man in many respects and in no way subject to blame,
except in this one matter in which he has been fanatically eager: he
habitually has lyre-singers (kiyarƒdoÁw) and lyre-players (kiyaristãw)
around him.
Three Middle Comic fragments mention Misgolas’ predilections. Timocles 32 (K-A), a
fragment from his play Sappho, that is just two lines long, and the least specific: ı
MisgÒlaw oÈ prosi°nai soi fa¤netai ényoËsi to›w n°oisin ±reyism°now (“Misgolas
clearly isn’t interested in you, even though he’s excited by youth in their prime”). In his
play Agônis or The Colt (3 K-A), Alexis is more precise about the type of youth Misgolas
prefers: Œ mÆter, flketeÊv se, mØ 'p¤sei° moi tÚn MisgÒlan: oÈ går kiyarƒdÒw efim'
§g√ (“Mother, I beg you, don’t set Misgolas upon me, for I am not a lyre-singer!”). The
longest reference to Misgolas we have comes from Antiphanes’ Fisherwoman (27 K-A)
and provides greater context since the fragment itself is quite long. It gives a list of
courtesans and politicians who are depicted as different types of fish. It is in contrast to
other well-known men who like varieties of female fish that Misgolas is mentioned:
MisgÒlaw går oÈ pãnu toÊtvn §dest¨w, éllå k¤yarow oÍtos¤, ˜n ín ‡dhi tåw
xe›raw oÈk éf°jetai. ka‹ mØn élhy«w to›w kiyarƒdo›w …w sfÒdra ëpasin oÏtow
§pipefukƒw lanyãnei. (“Misgolas won’t eat these [i.e. female fish] at all; rather, this
lyre-fish here, that’s one he won’t be able to keep his hands off of when he sees it. In
truth, he does not hide how he’s completely stuck on all lyre-singers”).
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All three mentions of Misgolas point out his obsession with youth, and two out of
the three mention lyre-singers specifically (using both terms that Aeschines used). None
of these fragments can be dated with certainty, and therefore, we cannot say for sure
whether Aeschines was drawing on Misgolas’ reputation as presented on the comic stage,
or the comedians picked up on Aeschines’ representation of Misgolas in the courtroom.22
However, the likelihood of Aeschines seizing on a characterization already spread around
by the poets is far greater. To begin with, the fact that Aeschines introduces Misgolas to
the jury by pointing to his love of lyre-players suggests that he is using this fact to
identify him. If Misgolas was mentioned frequently during comedies and always for the
same reason, as seems to be the case, then Aeschines can begin his argument with an
expectation of the jurors’ knowledge of Misgolas as a connoisseur of male youth,
especially lyre-players. It seems that Aeschines is trying to start from common ground
with the jurors, and presumably, such a statement would come as no surprise. It is less
likely that various comic poets would have seized on this one claim from Aeschines’
speech and made it a focal point, when Misgolas is not the main character of the speech,
and moreover, this aspect of his character is not even the focus of Aeschines’ attack on
him; rather, he is far more interested in getting to the details of Misgolas’ relationship
specifically with Timarchus.23
                                                 
22 To use an eikos argument, odds alone suggest that at least one of the three came before Aeschines’
speech.
23 The one other alternative is that both Aeschines and the poets are independently picking up on a well-
known rumor or reputation of Misgolas in the community. While this possibility exists, it seems to me
unlikely. In any case, there is no denying the overlap and shared interest of the two genres.
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Regardless of the direction of influence, the appearance of Misgolas demonstrates
the shared interest of comedy and oratory in the private life of public figures. This
interaction is fundamental to Aeschines’ general strategy of drawing on the jury’s
knowledge of issues regularly on display at comedies as evidence in court. Aeschines, in
fact, references contemporary comedy directly to convince the jury of how the
community knows something to be true. In section 157, for example, he argues that
everyone knows Timarchus is a whore because when the comic actor Parmenon
mentioned pÒrnouw megãlouw Timarx√deiw (big Timarchian whores), no one thought
of the innocent youth also named Timarchus: only one Timarchus came to mind.
Aeschines’ preface to this point is telling. He gives the following statement as context:
“the other day (pr√hn) when the comedies were taking place at the rural Dionysia in
Collytus….”. Aeschines, then, is not only relying on what the comedians are saying as
proof of his argument, but he describes this portrayal as a current one.24 It is quite likely
that he is doing something similar in the case of Misgolas. Aeschines justifies his
introduction of Misgolas as a lyre-player enthusiast to the jurors by claiming that his
point is to make clear what sort of person Misgolas is. The invocation of his general
reputation as an avid pursuer of youth is meant to color the jurors’ interpretation of his
interactions specifically with Timarchus. The reference, then, supports Aeschines’
argument that Misgolas paid good money to be the active older male vis-à-vis Timarchus
(41).
                                                 
24 Scholars are unsure of the precise meaning of pr√hn in section 157 and therefore debate over how
current the comedies actually were (see Fisher 2001, 7). Whether or not Aeschines is referring to an event
that took place a few days ago, or up to a year ago, this depiction is presented as one that the jurors would
recognize as current.
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Aeschines’ mention of Autocleides in 52 functions similarly. In the passage that
he uses as a transition to Timarchus’ next long-term affair, Aeschines names three
notorious pederasts, Autocleides, Thersandrus and Cedonides, in a telling use of
praeteritio. Aeschines gives us only their names, the adjective agrios, and the reason he
supposedly is not discussing them: Timarchus did not have long-term relations with these
men. Aeschines cleverly insinuates that he was very briefly involved with them, thus
supporting the argument here that Timarchus was a pornos and not just a male hetaira.
Just as with his first mention of Misgolas, Aeschines tells the audience one aspect
about these men that acts as an identifying feature. They are agrioi, the comic term for
“wild men” that connotes insatiable sexuality including a pederastic fetish.25 This
praeteritio would have little rhetorical force if the audience had no idea who these men
were or to what agrioi referred. Once again, Aeschines is drawing on knowledge about
the community that the audience has learned from the comic stage. Although we do not
have references to Cedonides and Thersandrus, Autocleides is the star of at least one
comedy by Timocles entitled Orestautocleides.
From what remains, the wretched Autocleides is surrounded by a group of eleven
old and angry sleeping hetairai. The title indicates that the play recasts the role of Orestes
with Autocleides as the star. Edmonds posits that the hetairai have pursued Autocleides
furiously, probably because he is their competition for the same resource, namely young
                                                 
25 See Fisher (2001, 183-84) who gives a very thorough discussion of the comic use of the term in a variety
of sources. He also points out the criminal element associated with being agrios. The term succinctly draws
together both sexual and criminal aspects that Aeschines is trying to impress onto Timarchus’ image.
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men.26 Lucian’s Dialogue of the Courtesans 10 offers a striking parallel; two hetairai,
Drosis and Chelidonium, are angry with a pederastic philosopher who has successfully
lured in Drosis’ young man with his sophistic diatribes. The youth has lost interest in
Drosis and, as a result, she is suffering considerably. It is possible then, that Autocleides,
as a pederast, shares a similar interest in young boys with the hetairai and they are
haunting him like the Furies since he is their competition.
As the protagonist, Autocleides must certainly have been a figure well-known to
the public. Aeschines presumes that the mention of his name would link Timarchus into a
world of criminal pederasty. Here, even more so than in the case of Misgolas, there is no
good reason to believe that the poets took Aeschines’ praeteritio as the inspiration for an
entire play. Aeschines likely expects to benefit from the characterization of the “wild
men” already shaped by Timocles’ play (and others like it).27
The next sordid affair that Aeschines narrates in detail involves Pittalacus, a
public slave, and Hegesander, a prominent man involved in politics who is Timarchus’
next serious suitor. After Timarchus abuses Pittalacus’ generosity by overindulging in his
gambling, drinking and cock-fighting habits, he leaves Pittalacus for Hegesander, whom
he supposedly met while gambling with Pittalacus. Aeschines tells us the details of the
messy split that occurs after the brief and exciting relationship that included debauched
submission to the slave. Pittalacus pesters Timarchus and his new man Hegesander until
                                                 
26 Edmonds vol. II, p. 620 with note b. Fisher (2001, 184) points out that the hetairai might simultaneously
be functioning as the Eleven in the play since Autocleides was associated with criminal pederasty.
27 Webster (1970, 59) argues that Timocles’ play dates to a time after the speech based on the description of
the hetairai as “old,” but Fisher (2001, 184) rightly rejects this claim, pointing out that this characterization
is likely a gross exaggeration of their actual ages.
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the two finally get drunk, force their way into Pittalacus’ house, break up his gaming
equipment, kill his fighting birds, and then tie him to a pillar and whip him senseless.
Here again Aeschines relies heavily on narrative to create a dramatic feel to the
story as it unfolds. Part of the drama that Aeschines narrates comes from the pathos
created toward Pittalacus for the treatment he suffered. It is an effective strategy to make
Timarchus appear worse than the slave. Aeschines taps into the emotions of the crowd by
making Pittalacus appear to be wrongfully abandoned, forlorn from losing Timarchus,
and then abused by his ex-lover and another citizen. His possessions, including his birds,
are destroyed and then he is made to suffer humiliation, which Aeschines describes as
undeserved. This aspect of the story is very similar to what we see in Demosthenes’
description of Androtion barging in on two female prostitutes and stealing their furniture
(Dem. 22.59, see ch. 3 below). In both scenarios, male citizens are made to appear
hubristic and abusive of citizen privileges. Since there is no shame in being a slave or a
prostitute per se, the Athenian audience would direct its anger at the male citizens,
Timarchus and Androtion, for not acting in accordance with their citizen status, while
feeling a measure of sympathy for slaves who were mistreated at the hands of violent
men. In both scenarios, the jurors are invited to laugh scornfully at the citizen for his low
behavior, while the slaves are portrayed as better people simply by acting in accordance
with their station and with the laws.
The intrigues into which Timarchus gets himself are certainly of the burlesque
variety since eating, drinking and beating up slaves are staples of “low” humor. They are
also consistent with what we glean from the Middle Comic tales; they primarily involve
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forms of consumption, including over-indulgence in food, wine, and sex. In this way,
Aeschines repeatedly draws attention to Timarchus’ body to highlight his complete lack
of restraint (akolosia).
Although we do not have any extant comic fragments involving Hegesander or
Pittalacus, we do have fragments that involve other characters Aeschines includes in the
story. When mentioning Hegesander, for example, Aeschines frequently also mentions
his brother Hegesippus.  But he does not call him by his real name, rather by his
nickname Crobylus or “Hair Knot,” as he is known in comedy as well.28 Unfortunately,
the fragment by Sotades that mentions him is difficult to interpret; it states only “I am a
side dish for Crobylus, he gnaws on that man, but only nibbles away at me.”29 This
statement, although obscure, likely refers to Crobylus’ sexual preference; references to
food and eating are frequently allegorical for sexual activity, just as we saw above in
Antiphanes’ Fisherwoman where objects of sexual desire are also referred to as kinds of
fish.
Another man involved in the affair between Timarchus, Hegesander and
Pittalacus, is Diopeithes of Sunium. Aeschines cites him as the arbitrator from
Hegesander’s deme, but also as a man with whom Hegesander was involved when he was
younger (63). This Diopeithes can plausibly be connected to two fragments. The more
interesting one for our purposes comes from Antiphanes’ play Sappho (194 K-A):30
                                                 
28 The nickname refers to his oiled and carefully arranged hairstyle, according to Harpocration and the
scholiast to Aeschines.
29 Sotades 3 (K-A) from Wrongly Ransomed.
30 SAPFV: ¶sti fÊsiw y¨leia br°fh s–zous' ÏpÚ kÒlpoiw
aÍtÆw, ˆnta d' êfvna boØn ·sthsi gegvnÚn
ka‹ diå pÒntion o‰dma ka‹ ±pe¤rou diå pãshw
90
Sappho: There’s a female creature, protecting her babies in her bosom,
and even though they are mute, they give a loud shout across the
swell of the sea and the entire land, to whichever mortals they
wish, who, although not present, are able to hear it. They have a
voiceless perception of hearing…
B: The creature you are talking about is the polis, the babies
nourished in it are the orators—they have shrieked across the seas
and drawn plunder from Asia and Thrace, dividing up most of it,
and while they continuously slander each other, the demos sits
there, neither listening nor seeing.
Sappho: Oh father, how could the orator be mute?
B: If he’s been caught three times acting contrary to the laws! I
thought my answer was quite clever. Do tell then.
Sappho: Now, the feminine creature is a letter. The children it carries around in it
are the words. Although they are voiceless, they chatter to whomever they
wish far away, and even if someone else happens to be nearby the one
reading, he will not hear it.31
Edmonds suggests that, because the riddle mentions plundering in Asia and Thrace and
the answer to the riddle is a ‘letter,’ this scenario is plausibly a contemporary reference to
Philip’s letter to the Athenians in 341 complaining of Diopeithes’ activities in
                                                                                                                                                  
oÂw §y°lei ynht«n, to›w d' oÈd¢ paroËsin ékoÊein
¶jestin˚ kvfØn d' ékoÆw a‡syhsin ¶xousin
***
(B:) ∞ m¢n fÊsiw går ¥n l°geiw §st‹n pÒliw,
br°fh d' §n aÍtª diatr°fei toÁw =¨toraw.
oÓtoi kekragÒtew d¢ tå diapÒntia
ték tÆw ÉAs¤aw ka‹ tépÚ Yrñkhw l¨mmata
ßlkousi deËro, nemom°nvn d¢ plhs¤on
aÈt«n kãyhtai loidoroum°nvn t' ée‹
ı dÆmow oÈd¢n oÎt' êkoÊvn oÎy' ır«n.
(SA:) <………..:> p«w går g°noit' ên, Œ pãter,
=¨tvr êfvnow; (B:) µn èl“ tr‹w paranÒmvn;
<………..:> ka‹ mØn ékrib«w ”Òmhn
§gnvk°nai tÚ =hy°n: éllå dØ l°ge.
(SA:) y¨leia m°n nÊn §sti fÊsiw §pistol¨,
br°fh d' §n aÍtª perif°rei tå grãmmata:
êfvna d' ˆnta <taËta> to›w pÒrrv lale›
oÂw boÊley': ßterow d' ín tÊxhi tiw plhs¤on
•stƒw énagign√skontow oÈk ékoÊsetai.
31 It is interesting that Misgolas also showed up in a different play called Sappho, but it is not clear what the
connection could be, if any.
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Macedonia.32 Given these references and the clear intent to satirize politicians, his
conjecture seems likely. Diopeithes is mentioned explicitly in a fragment of the play
Huntress by Philetairus where nine different courtesans are listed and mocked for their
ugliness and excessive old age. One courtesan called Telesis is said to be Diopeithes’
hetaira.33 Since he is here linked to indulgence by his involvement with hetairai, we
should not be surprised that he would be mocked elsewhere for immoral behavior.
Both of these fragments, at the very least, indicate the persistence of comic
interest in ridiculing politicians and orators. Like many of the Middle Comic fragments,
the Huntress fragment focuses on the hetaira with whom Diopeithes is involved. The
other is a more elaborate attack on orators specifically for political corruption and the
people’s ineffectual response to it. In this respect, the content is reminiscent of
Aristophanic humor, but it is couched in the form of a riddle, which is a very popular
comic technique of the Middle Comic period.34 The fact that two men in Aeschines’ story
show up in fragments is further evidence for the overlap between the comic and oratorical
stage. Aeschines is weaving a narrative full of comic texture that steers his audience
toward viewing Timarchus’ world as one to be laughed at derisively.
I have been arguing thus far that Aeschines draws heavily on material that is also
treated by contemporary comic poets, both in terms of content and types of humor. Still,
he cannot entertain his audience without paying attention to the procedural constraints of
                                                 
32 See vol. II (p. 263), ad loc, note h.
33 There is no further information given about this Diopeithes. On name alone, the reference could also be
to the orator from Sphettus mentioned in other speeches by Demosthenes and Hypereides. However,
Diopeithes of Sunium was more famous as the general most known from an attack in a letter by Philip for
his plundering of ships, blackmailing, and ransoming an envoy.
34 Another example which plays more on gender and sexuality is the riddle in Eubulus’ Carion Sphinx; see
n. 51.
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a trial. For this reason, Aeschines (surprisingly) calls Misgolas and Hegesander as
witnesses to support his arguments. But he prefaces the reading out of their testimonies
with the likelihood that they will not tell the truth since they are shameless. Not
surprisingly, both refuse to support Aeschines’ side. The reason why Aeschines has their
hypothetical testimonies read before the court is that they were present at the time of the
trial. He acts as if they could change their minds at that point and tell the truth by
affirming the affidavits.35 He is following standard procedure even though he has no real
witnesses. It would be glaringly obvious if he offered no testimony at all, and therefore,
he does better to offer hypothetical testimony and then argue against the credibility of the
witnesses, and thus discount the validity of their affidavits.
This nod toward respect for procedure on Aeschines’ part is a fascinating example
of how legal constraints can shape a case. Because witness testimony is so important to
every trial, Aeschines cannot let on that he has no witnesses. He continues this façade in
section 53 when he begins to tell the story of a lover named Anticles whom Timarchus
met up with after Misgolas, but claims Anticles is absent in Samos and is therefore off
limits for discussion. Cleverly, Aeschines adds one more name to the list of men with
whom Timarchus has been intimate, while the paraleipsis here makes it seem as though
Aeschines would not discuss an incident that could not be backed by testimony.36
                                                 
35 See Thür 2005, 168-69, who discusses the process of bearing witness from the time of arbitration through
the trial. In particular, he uses the Misgolas and Hegesander testimony as an illustration of how the orators
create false uncertainties about possible testimony. Since testimonies were prepared before the main
hearing, sealed for delivery, and thus could not be changed, any pretense to ignorance of what the witness’
statement will say is solely for rhetorical effect.
36 Rather than seeing his lack of witnesses as a sure indication that his case is fully fabricated, we should
see it as a problem with which he is forced to deal when constructing a difficult case. He himself argues
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Whereas witness testimony is arguably the best form of proof,37 Aeschines must
seek alternate means since he not only successfully problematizes witness testimony in a
case about private sexual acts, but he also argues against his own (unsupportive)
witnesses. Aeschines relies on a few different but related concepts that he argues prove
truth: rumor, Timarchus’ reputation, and laughter. In section 79, Aeschines begins an
argument based on how the jurors would vote at that moment without hearing the
prosecution or defense speeches. He claims that he already knows the jury would convict
Timarchus, explaining this assertion by pointing to humorous public occurrences in the
past that reveal Timarchus’ guilt. Aeschines’ first supporting argument is that the people
could not control their laughter (eÈyuw §boçte ka‹ §gelçte) when Timarchus mentioned
“the construction of walls (teichôn) or a tower (purgou), or said that someone was taken
off somewhere (80).”38 Aeschines then gets more specific by recalling what happened
when he declared a scrutiny against Timarchus for this case. According to Aeschines, a
member of the Areopagites named Autolycus was speaking in the assembly in regard to a
certain proposal by Timarchus about houses on the Pnyx. It is worth quoting the entire
anecdote (82-84):
And when in the course of his speech he said that the Areopagus
disapproved of Timarchus’ proposal, “and on the matter of this deserted
locality and the area of the Pnyx, do not be surprised, men of Athens, if
Timarchus is more familiar with it than the Council of the Areopagus,” at
that point you responded in uproar (éneyorub¨sate), and you said that
                                                                                                                                                  
that there cannot be witnesses to what happens behind closed doors, so that he is forced to seek alternate
forms of proof, rather than admitting nothing happened.
37 So Thür 2005, who argues that it is the only one of the pisteis atechnoi that holds weight on its own
(although his view is not universally accepted by scholars).
38 The references are sexual double-entendres.
94
what Autolycus said was true (élhyÆ l°gein), that this man was familiar
with the place.39 And Autolycus, not understanding the reason for your
uproar (yÒrubon), scowled fiercely and, after a pause, said: “Men of
Athens, we members of the Areopagus neither accuse nor defend (it is not
our traditional practice), but we have some sympathy for Timarchus for
the following reason; he perhaps,” he said, “thought that while things were
so peaceful, the outlay for each of you was small.” Once more at the
mention of quiet and small outlay he met with still greater commotion and
laughter (g°lvtow yÒrubow) from you. When he mentioned foundations
(t«n ofikop°dvn) and cisterns (t«n lãkkvn), you just couldn’t contain
yourselves. At this point Pyrrhander came forward to reproach you and
asked the Assembly if they were not ashamed to be laughing (gel«ntew)
when the Council of the Areopagus was present. But you shouted him
from the platform and replied: “Pyrrhander, we know that we should not
be laughing (gelçn) in their presence. But so strong is the truth (∞
él¨yeia) that it overcomes all human logic (t«n ényrvp¤nvn
logism«n).
Thus concludes Aeschines’ reasoning for how the people have already voted that
Timarchus is guilty of prostitution. There are a number of things at work in this passage
that need explanation. First, the jokes. The jury laughed (gelan) at the mention of
desolate places and small outlays because these refer to locations that were notorious
spots where whores went to turn a trick. Like the walls and tower he mentioned above,
the foundations and cisterns are double-entendres; the terms used here are oikopedôn and
lakkôn. There is a pun on the first term, oikopedôn with orchipedôn which means
“balls”—a term used by Aristophanes, most notably in the Knights when the Sausage-
seller threatens to drag Cleon off by the balls with a meathook into the Cerameicus (772);
                                                 
39 Cf. Cratinus’ Panoptai where Aristodemus, called prôktos and katapugôn, is also accused of doing
unseemly things in the Cimonian ruins (160 K-A); cf. Hubbard 2003, 113.
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and the second term, lakkôn, was frequently used of the anus, like euruprôktos, but with
the sense of insatiable receptacle and gaping from too much anal sex.40
The humor of the original event takes on new force in Aeschines’ framing of the story.
During the actual event, it was the comments themselves that were funny. In Aeschines’
retelling of the story, the context adds another layer to the humor; this jury is asked to
visualize the scene in which Autolycus, whom Aeschines deliberately describes here as
“a man who has lived an honorable life,” unwittingly utters sexual double-entendres
before the people. Similar to Aeschines’ elaborate introduction contrasting the laws with
Timarchus’ character, the contrast here is heightened by Aeschines’ emphasis on the
serious role of the Areopagites. They are the most venerable body of the Athenian legal
system, and yet, a crowd laughing at sexual jokes silences them. The event is described as
devolving into an outright farce, with so honorable a man unable to say anything that
does not somehow recall Timarchus’ gaping ass.
Aeschines here puts particular weight on comic exposure to make his argument.
Because it is so blunt, obscenity is a particularly forceful and effective way to reduce an
opponent.41 Aeschines uses humor as a way of telling a crowd what is actually going on,
although he is constrained by a setting that demands propriety. By using the anecdote as a
                                                 
40 Despite his many claims to reticence when uttering “inappropriate” language throughout the speech,
clearly Aeschines finds value in obscene humor. He knows that his audience will laugh at the words, just as
they do when they are at a comedy. In fact Aeschines, more than any other orator, finds ways to incorporate
obscenity into his speeches (most often by using oratio recta as a distancing device, see further below).
Aeschines, for example, appears to go off on a tangent in his speech On the Embassy when telling the story
of his return with Demosthenes and the other ambassadors. He announces that Demosthenes had taught him
the meanings of a few words: kerkops, the so-called paipalema, and palimbolon. Maxwell-Stuart 1975
translates these as “ass-licking shyster” “wanker” and “slanderous jerk ” and explains his definitions
incorporating both the sexual (coming from Aristophanes) and non-sexual meanings. In both cases,
Aeschines is not being gratuitous; rather, he is using the terms to illustrate a larger argument about
Demosthenes’ character.
41 See Henderson 1991, 6.
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distancing device, he effectively reduces the risk of the humor backfiring on him.
Aeschines himself does not appear to speak inappropriately; rather, he is simply the
conveyor of a true story. He thus benefits from the resultant laughter, which is the
mechanism of agreement on the part of the audience, solidifying their connection to the
speaker who promulgates social norms against the deviant who breaks them.42
The story he relates is steeped in the comic principle of incongruity based on the
violation of social expectation on the part of both the speaker and the audience.43 The
Areopagite himself says dirty words in a public, formal setting, but likewise the crowd is
out of line by not showing proper respect. Aeschines’ audience would presumably find
the crowd’s misbehavior a humorous addition to an already funny situation. Most
importantly, the present audience’s laughter aligns them with the original audience and
demonstrates implicit agreement with Aeschines’ argument. The first audience laughed
because the comments were true, and when this audience laughs as well, their laughter
confirms that the comments were true. In this way, Aeschines uses humor as undeniable
evidence of the “truth” of his claims.
Aeschines here makes a crucial connection between comedy and reality: the
people laughed because the comments made by the unwitting Autolycus were true.
Aeschines is exploiting a slippage between truth and experience;44 he has all along been
asking the jurors to listen to what their own experience tells them about Timarchus’
character. He now connects experience specifically with truth to use it as evidence. If, as
                                                 
42 Cf. Powell 1977.
43 Cf. Cicero De Oratore 2.63: “The most common kind of joke is that in which we expect one thing and
another is said.”
44 For a discussion of the “truth” of humor, see Intro p. 32-34.
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it seems, they did know Timarchus as a megalos pornos by reputation, it would indeed be
difficult for the defense to argue logically against these experiences. The humorous
narrative as told by Aeschines is an important mechanism for getting the jurors to
acknowledge consciously what they know to be “true”.45 Even more important is the
capability of laughter to unify a group and thus convince those who have no previous
knowledge that they still “know”.
Aeschines’ love of the humorous anecdote does not confine itself to real events.
Later in the speech (162-165), Aeschines develops a hypothetical situation in which a
prostitute and then his client alternately come forth in a court of law to have the
agreement they recorded on a contract enforced. Once again, he creates a humorous
scenario for the jury to visualize. That he finds the element of spectacle significant is
clear from how he prefaces the tale in 161: mØ går Íp §moË legÒmenon, éllã
gignÒmenon tÚ prçgma nom¤say' ırçn (“consider the event, not as one told to you by
me, but as one you are watching as it happened”).
In the first situation, Aeschines asks his audience to assume that the client who
hired the prostitute is suing to have his contract enforced. Aeschines puts the following
words in the client’s mouth: “Fellow citizens, I hired Timarchus to serve me as a
prostitute according to the contract that is deposited with Demosthenes”—nothing
prevents him from saying just that—“but he fails to carry out his engagement with me
(163).” Aeschines indulges his scenario further by having the jury imagine this man then
giving the details of his expectations for the encounter. Once again Aeschines makes use
                                                 
45 Critchley’s discussion (2002, 86) of humor as “everyday anamnesis” and the role of sensus communis are
particularly enlightening here; see Intro, p. 32-33.
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of incongruity by juxtaposing the gravity of the law court with base sexual activities. The
humor rests on the stark contrast between the official tone in which his hypothetical client
speaks in a court of law and the low subject matter he utters that is completely
inappropriate to the setting. Although we cannot say for sure that the jury responded in
laughter, we can say that Aeschines deliberately creates comic potential. Further, his
previous discussion of what made the people in the Assembly laugh uncontrollably is a
strong indicator that this crowd too would have found Aeschines’ anecdotes funny.
Of course he does not stop here. Rather, he offers the opposing scenario in which the
prostitute comes forth to prosecute his client. Aeschines again uses direct speech to keep
the scene vivid. He has the hired prostitute state that he has done and continues to do
everything according to the contract, but his client has not kept his part of the deal (164).
The absurdity of this scene is even more extreme than the last; it was bad enough for a
man who hired a prostitute to come into the court and explain in detail how he was
wronged, but to have the hired prostitute do so is sheer farce. This story is a prime
example of humor as a play upon form; the content of the words are in striking contrast to
the dignity of the setting and the tone in which they are spoken.46
Aeschines concludes each situation with the likely response from the jury. He is certain
that the client would be stoned and accused of hubris, while the prostitute would meet
with an uproar because of his brazenness. These conclusions are meant to be advice for
the jurors in his case now. Should not the jury also respond in the same way when
Timarchus, the prostitute, tries to defend himself, or when Demosthenes tries on his
                                                 
46 Cf. Douglas 1975; Freud 1960, 607-13.
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behalf? As we have seen, the story he tells is humorous in its own right, but Aeschines
masterfully intertwines this whole non-event with supposed arguments that will come
from the defense team. The resulting effect is similar to what we saw Demosthenes
discuss at the opening of On the Crown; Aeschines makes great strides in winning over
the jury’s support by entertaining them with attacks against Timarchus and Demosthenes,
and Demosthenes is the one to be blamed for Aeschines’ invective since Demosthenes
started this line of argument.
According to Aeschines, Demosthenes was set to argue for Timarchus’ innocence
based on the lack of documentary evidence. He will contend that there is no record of
Timarchus having paid the tax, a requirement of all registered prostitutes (119). Further,
he will point out that there is no evidence of a contract. It is this argument to which
Aeschines is responding with the hypothetical situation discussed above. First, when the
unknown client is pleading his case, Aeschines chooses Timarchus to be the prostitute
that the client has hired. This maneuver not only implicates Timarchus himself in the
scenario, but Aeschines supports the plausibility of his implication by pointedly
interjecting: oÈd¢n går kvlÊei oÏtvw efirÆsyai (“nothing prevents him [the client]
from saying just that”).
He pushes this rhetorical trick even further in his second scenario by implicating
Demosthenes when he has the prostitute (Timarchus) come forward, as we see in the
preface:
Let him come forth and speak—or, let clever (sofÚw) Batalus speak for
him, so that we know whatever it is he plans to say: “Men of the jury,
someone at some point (ıstisdhpotoËn)”—who it was makes no
difference—“hired me to be his male hetaira for money….”
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In this passage, Aeschines highlights the exaggerated term ıstisdhpotoËn by pausing to
comment on it: “who it was makes no difference”. Just as in the first passage, the
interjection serves the particular rhetorical purpose of derision. He is disparaging
Timarchus, but he is doing so in accordance with the type of argument he has been
making throughout the speech; Timarchus is the lowest form of prostitute (pornos)
because he has sold himself shamelessly and without discrimination to anyone interested.
The direct quotation makes Timarchus himself admit that he is indiscriminate.
In addition to his witty attack on Timarchus, he also slights Demosthenes. By this
point Aeschines has pushed his use of humor to an extreme, but he has done it
strategically; he does not bring in his harshest invective until near the end of the speech
when he likely had the audience laughing and therefore in a more receptive mood. He
invokes Demosthenes by his nickname, Batalus (“anus” or “stutterer”) and sets it up
sarcastically against the adjective sophos.47 He thus links anal sex with deceptive speech
and cleverness of just the sort that he is accusing Timarchus, and to which the people and
the laws are opposed. This jibe against Demosthenes is one of many efforts throughout
the speech to discredit him by association with Timarchus. As we have just seen, for
example, Aeschines uses Demosthenes as the depositary of Timarchus’ hypothetical
prostitution contract.
                                                 
47 The nickname “Batalus” has obscene connotations referring to the anus, but also means “stammerer”—a
pithy way of connecting speech with sexual habits; cf. Worman 2004, 8-9.  Aeschines builds up the image
of Demosthenes as a passive and taps into Athenian hostility toward the debauched man speaking in public.
See McClure 1994 on the connection between passive sex and deceptive speech. His effort to discredit
Demosthenes by association culminates in 181 when he calls him a kinaidos (sexual deviant) outright. As is
typical of the orators, Aeschines works up to the end of the speech before he hurls a direct insult, confident
by now that the audience is on his side; cf. Miner 2003.
101
By characterizing Timarchus as an indiscriminate pornos, and calling
Demosthenes “Batalus”, Aeschines indicates his hope of evoking derisive laughter from
the audience. He thereby secures his alliance with them and comes across as offering a
reasonable reply to Demosthenes’ supposed line of argument. Aeschines essentially
deflates any value of Demosthenes’ demand for documentary evidence by mocking him.
He uses this anecdote to reinforce his initial response: if Timarchus is going to quibble
over petty details like tax collection or a contract, rather than get up on the platform and
deny outright that he has been involved in prostitution at all, then he is convicting
himself.
In both anecdotes, Aeschines makes use of sophisticated comic techniques by
combining different types of humor: he breaks with social propriety and utters comic
sexual vocabulary in court, but he does it through oratio recta so as to distance himself
from any appearance of speaking inappropriately; he aims at absurdity by juxtaposing a
context of dignity with the content of base sexual activity; he incorporates
characterization of individuals that would be familiar to the jurors from comic plays; he
structures much of his case on the principle of topsy-turviness to entertain his audience
but also to expose it as a threat to the everyday world.
This last point reveals the serious purpose of Aeschines’ humor; he exposes
Timarchus and Demosthenes to the jury as objects to be laughed at because laughter acts
as a constraint on Timarchus’ immorality and Demosthenes’ deceptive nature. By
laughing derisively, the jury excludes Timarchus and Demosthenes from acceptance and
reaffirms Athenian normative values. As Corbeill points out for Ciceronian oratory: “The
102
orator conspires with the audience to exclude the third person, his political opponent.”48
Aeschines’ clear goal is get his audience to laugh at both opponents from a position of
superiority. This is made explicit by his interjections, in which he employs a highly
sarcastic tone, but also by his use of katagelan (to laugh at) repeatedly in relation to
Timarchus and Demosthenes.49
The emphasis on both opponents’ sexual passivity in the last two stories returns
us briefly to the mundus perversus that Aeschines is creating. Toward the end of the
speech, Aeschines highlights Timarchus’ transgression of gender by making him the butt
of jokes about being a woman instead of a man. The hetairai whom we know from
Middle Comedies are almost exclusively female, and thus we cannot say that Timarchus
was meant to be viewed just like a character from the comic stage. Nonetheless,
Aeschines does draw on the depictions of these women in shaping his depiction of
Timarchus. He is portrayed as a failed hetaira, in the sense that he was supposed to be the
lover of a few prominent individuals in the community, but he was so debauched that he
disgraced himself further by ending up a pornos (cf. section 54). That he is male is less
troubling; rather, it offers even more comic fodder considering that, ever since
Aristophanes, comedy frequently exploits reversals of gender as a comic topos. In
Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, for example, the women usurp male costuming in order to
penetrate male space (the Assembly) so that they can vote women into power.50
                                                 
48 Here (1996, 4-5) he aptly quotes Freud (1960, 103): “By making our enemy small, inferior, despicable or
comic, we achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming him—to which the third person, who
has made no efforts, bears witness by his laughter.”
49 1.31, 43, 76, 80, 84, 167.
50 Cf. Plato (Comicus) Incertae (201 K-A), where the dêmos is dressed as a woman giving birth and
chooses Agyrrius to lead the state.
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Meanwhile, the men are left at home with only their wives’ nighties and frilly slippers to
wear outside. And in the Thesmophoriazusae, the opposite occurs when Euripides has his
father-in-law dress up as a woman to infiltrate the women’s space at the festival of the
Thesmophoria. Aristophanes also made use of famous figures who crossed gender
boundaries as a source of humor. The character Agathon, Euripides’ first choice for
playing the role of a woman, provides a less-costumed example of a man sliding toward
female gender since he, in his real life, wears female garb and accessories. In a world
where only two genders are recognized as viable and in which there are identifiable
signifiers of what it means to be masculine or feminine, those who do not conform stand
out as gender deviants. In the comic world, a gender deviant like Agathon is funny to his
audience since the audience is directed toward identifying with the masculine norm and
therefore views him as an object to be laughed at.
Aeschines similarly casts Timarchus in the role of gender deviant deserving of
derisive laughter. In section 110, Aeschines is rebutting a potential argument by the
defense that Timarchus is dangerous when holding office alone, but harmless when
associating with others. Aeschines again uses a humorous anecdote to prove the opposite;
namely that Timarchus is even more dangerous when in cahoots with others. According
to Aeschines (110-11), an upright man named Pamphilus came forth at an assembly
meeting to denounce Timarchus, who was on the council, and Hegesander, who was a
treasurer, for stealing money from the temple of the goddess. Again Aeschines employs
direct speech to make the story more vivid for his audience. Pamphilus supposedly
proclaimed: “Men of Athens, a man and a woman are stealing 1,000 drachmae from
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you.” The perplexed crowd then asked how this could be so, and he explained: “The man
is Hegesander right there,” he said, “who was previously Leodamas’ woman, and the
woman is this man Timarchus.” This anecdote is told as a riddle, a type of humor found
commonly in Middle Comedy (see above), with the audience perplexed at the notion of
how someone holding office could be a woman.51 The punchline, as we have seen, is that
Timarchus is the woman, since he is the passive partner of Hegesander. Much like the
story Aeschines told of Autolycus and the double-entendres, this tale would have drawn
laughs from the crowd the first time it happened and then again during its retelling to the
present crowd. Further, the jurors’ laughter at the joke is another mechanism for
confirming the reputation of Timarchus as a “woman” in the community, and therefore
his unsuitability for public office.
Aeschines’ use of humor here is further evidence of one of his main points in the
case; the close link between Timarchus’ private and public corruption. For Aeschines,
this story, which is told as a culmination of how Timarchus has squandered all his
patrimony, is proof of Timarchus’ complete intemperance. His inability to manage his
own money is simply the precursor to the inevitable next step of plundering state funds.
In further support of this connection, Aeschines brings up Timarchus’ confession of guilt
and subsequent conviction for stealing—a case Aeschines describes as “much talked
                                                 
51 Cf. Eubulus’ Carion Sphinx (106 K-A) pertaining to Callistratus (a politician known for debauchery):
Carion: It speaks without a tongue, it’s the same for male and female, keeper of its winds, smooth but
hairy in some places, tells the clever dumb things, drags custom from custom, is one and many and
although pounded (trôsê), remains unwounded (atrôtos). What is it? Are you at a loss?
B: Callistratus?
Carion: No, it’s the ass (prôktos)!
B: You must be joking.
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about” (periboêtôs)—when he was an inspector in Eretria (113). To drive home his point,
he follows this example with another in which Timarchus lied on oath about accepting a
bribe of twenty minae to cease prosecution of a man named Philotades that would have
led to his disenfranchisement. Timarchus then supposedly spent the money he extorted
from Philotades’ brother (the comic actor Parmenon) on a hetaira named Philoxene. This
detail keeps Timarchus’ abuse of the state and other citizens closely linked with his own
licentiousness (akolasia).
In sum, Aeschines takes on two opponents in this speech: Timarchus and
Demosthenes. He handles them in very different ways, but one element that unifies his
approach is his use of comic depictions to make his opponents the objects of the
audience’s laughter. He ridicules Timarchus for his sexual passivity and his obsessive
habits of consumption, just as the Middle Comic poets do to contemporary politicians
like Callistratus and Hypereides.52 Aeschines casts Demosthenes—his personal enemy
and main speaker of the defense team—as an alazôn similar to Socrates in Clouds; he is a
boastful sophist who will undermine the justice system in order to beef up his rhetoric
business.
Aeschines also accuses Demosthenes of trying to avoid the rules of relevance by
putting Aeschines on trial instead of proving that Timarchus never prostituted himself.
He argues that admitting irrelevant arguments has a destructive effect on the city (179):
“The laws are dissolved and the democracy is destroyed and the habit progresses even
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Timocles Dêlos (4 K-A) and Icarian Satyrs (17 K-A) on Hypereides’ excessive fish
consumption.
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further. Sometimes you accept an argument too readily without proof of an honorable life
(chrêstou biou).” Aeschines’ point is to convince the jury that Demosthenes cannot be
trusted to keep to the point. But one could argue that Aeschines’ attack on Demosthenes’
character is no more relevant to the prosecution of Timarchus than Demosthenes’
presumed attack on Aeschines in the defense (Demosthenes likely made this point).
In Athens, a good character is the prerequisite for anyone wishing to engage in
public affairs. Since Aeschines brought Timarchus to court under the dokimasia tôn
rhêtorôn (scrutiny of speakers), he does not seem to speak off topic when pointing out
that Demosthenes, also a public speaker, should be required to have an upstanding
character if he wishes the jury to accept his arguments. Aeschines then tries to link
Demosthenes together with Timarchus, as he does throughout the speech, to reduce the
risk that the jury will consider his own arguments irrelevant. Further, Aeschines is careful
not to turn to Demosthenes until he nears the close of his speech. He then makes a direct
connection between character and speech when concluding his plea to the jury to hold
Demosthenes to the main issue.
And as we saw with Aeschines’ case against Timarchus, he appears to mount an
attack on the justice system by asking the jurors not to listen to the evidence presented in
court, but to go by what they know already. He has no real witnesses. But the fact that the
case is a dokimasia is crucial for understanding why the jurors would not just enjoy, but
would find relevant, a lengthy comic narrative exposing Timarchus’ history of suspicious
activities, even if they were not “provable”. The legal system and the society on the
whole were very concerned with safeguarding against those with debauched characters
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running the state. Aeschines made use of the laws, and similar tactics that the comic poets
used, to show that Timarchus was such a man. Thus, we cannot consider “irrelevant”
what many would by modern standards. The Athenian notion of relevance is broader and
allows for arguments about character that can and do go beyond what we allow. This is
particularly true in a case that, by nature, called for a scrutiny of the person’s life.
Aeschines can therefore be seen as seeking justice within the spirit of the law. He
situates his prosecution within an elaborate explanation of the relevant laws at the
opening, and then returns to an elaborate praise of them at the end. Throughout the
middle, he uses comedy to expose the truth by uncovering “reality”. If the jury believes
Aeschines’ account, then Demosthenes—as defender—comes across as supporting such
disgraceful behavior. To the jurors, Aeschines is doing his civic duty by bringing




Invective, Relevance, and Sunêgoroi
The last two chapters examined the strategies, function, and relevance of comic character
assassination that two famous orators and politicians, Demosthenes and Aeschines, used
against each other in the context of their longstanding rivalry. This chapter will further
address the role of invective in relation to well-known political figures in the community,
namely Androtion and Aristogeiton. The speeches against these two men shed light on
the use of invective and its relevance in a way that the Aeschines-Demosthenes contest
cannot. To begin, both are written for sunêgoroi (supporting speakers); Demosthenes
wrote Against Androtion to be delivered by Diodorus after Euctemon’s opening speech,
and he wrote and may have even delivered Against Aristogeiton himself in support of the
main prosecution by Lycurgus.1 One question that we can ask of these speeches, then, is
to what degree personal hostility against an opponent affected a speaker’s use of
invective. Diodorus openly admits fierce hostility toward Androtion because Androtion
supposedly accused him of patricide (22.2). So, in this instance, we have Demosthenes
composing the speech in the style of a personal enemy, but that hatred is not his own.
And in his speech Against Aristogeiton, the speaker acknowledges no personal enmity
toward Aristogeiton and shows disinterest toward the task of prosecuting him (25.13).
These facts argue in support of seeing invective as a useful but contrived strategy, rather
than the result of a speaker’s true hatred of an opponent (as scholars have believed in the
                                                 
1 I address the question of authenticity below.
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case of Aeschines and Demosthenes).2 This assessment forces us to take invective more
seriously as an important tool of the trade governed by the same rules of composition,
rather than disregarding it as an emotional outbreak that can be chalked up to the orality
of the situation.
Further, our understanding of the issue of relevance in Athenian courts
significantly affects our interpretation of speeches written for sunêgoroi. Sunêgoroi
speeches, if they are not overlooked altogether, receive harsh criticism for allegedly
irrelevant and disjointed argumentation. But it is not normally the job of a sunêgoros in a
trial to focus on the legal points on which the case is brought.3  Rather, it is by design that
sunêgoroi rely heavily on character argumentation or other types of supporting evidence.
Sunêgoroi reiterate some points made by the main prosecutor (katêgoros), but generally
avoid redundancy by contributing arguments that have not yet been made.4 In many
cases, the speech delivered by the main prosecutor is not extant, which has led to
distorted interpretations of supporting speeches. But speeches by sunêgoroi must be
interpreted with the original trial context in mind. To a jury having just heard the opening
                                                 
2 For scholars who emphasize personal enmity as a motivating factor, see, for example, Bruns 1961, 571-2;
Koster 1980, esp. 79; Usher 1999, 234-237 and 287.  But see Wolff (1968), following Wieacker (1965) on
Cicero, who views invective as impersonal and in the interest of one’s clients.
3 Rubinstein (2000, 13-23; 123-84) discusses the numerous roles that synêgoroi can fill in a trial; a single
task cannot be assigned to all of them because it is case and context dependent. One of their main functions
was to offer supplementary evidence, including providing further evidence about a litigant’s character.
Still, Rubinstein rebuts suggestions by other scholars that the synêgoros was a glorified character witness.
Nor was a synêgoros involved solely to show solidarity with the main katêgoros; Diodorus in Ag.
Androtion, for example, makes mention of Euctemon only twice and mostly to outdo him. He is clearly
acting as a sunkatêgoros, with claims separate from Euctemon’s (this could be why he does spend 21
sections on the main charge). The point is that there is considerable room for variation, and it is hard to pin
down any single expectation because the speaker was a synêgoros.
4 Cf. Rhodes 2004, 156. On Dem. 22, see Rubinstein (2000, 135), who points out that Diodorus states this
purpose explicitly in sections 3-4.
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speech, subsequent argumentation such as that in Against Androtion likely would not
have stood out as poorly organized or off topic.
I. Against Androtion (Dem. 22):
Against Androtion was delivered in 355 in a graphê paranomôn (indictment for illegal
proposals) brought against Androtion, a prominent politician and tax-collector, for
proposing to honor the Council of 500 with a crown. The alleged illegality resulted from
the Council’s failure to meet their official obligation of providing ten new triremes during
their term. The prosecution is arguing that Androtion proposed to crown the Council
without the preliminary decree (probouleuma) so that the people could vote on it.  But
they are also attempting to show that Androtion is a prostitute, state-debtor, and tyrant by
nature who willfully disregards procedure (and specifically the people’s role in the
democratic process). This is Demosthenes’ earliest forensic speech on a public matter and
thus is generally considered to mark a beginning point in his political career.
The authenticity of the speech has never been in doubt, but scholars tend to use
Demosthenes’ inexperience as justification for what they see as deficiencies.5
Demosthenes’ use of invective in particular has drawn the harshest criticism. Both
Pearson and Harding, for example, see Demosthenes’ invective as an aggressive and
                                                 
5 Wayte (1882, xxx), for example, approaches invective in this speech (and in general) as follows: “It has
likewise a full share of his [Demosthenes’] faults, which are those of Greek oratory in general, unfairness in
argument and virulence in abuse. In scurrility, indeed, this speech and the Timocratea are left far behind by
the two great speeches against Aeschines. Demosthenes did not, unfortunately, acquire self-respect on this
point, or what would now be called the feelings of a gentleman, as he grew older.”
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diversionary way of compensating for a weak case. 6 Pearson, who is otherwise a
sympathetic critic regarding characterization, considers much of what we see in Against
Androtion to be distasteful and irrelevant:7
 Against Androtion is hardly one of the most admirable of Demosthenes’
speeches, and one need feel little regret that the accusation was
unsuccessful. But, it is a most interesting example of the way in which the
graphê paranomôn was exploited against political rivals. It seems to say,
with quite shameless frankness, to the jury: ‘Here is a legal technicality
which can be used to ruin the defendant’s career; but if you don’t find it a
sufficiently good reason, here are some other details (not actionable, of
course) which you may find more convincing.’8
Harding gives a similar assessment: “Their case was clearly very weak, so Demosthenes
devoted the large part of the speech he wrote for Diodorus to extraneous matters, that is,
                                                 
6 Rhodes (2004, 156) assesses the graphê paranomôn as a type of case that is deliberately broad in regard
to the arguments that can be considered “relevant”. Somewhat misleading is his preliminary claim that
“speeches by synegoroi tend to gravitate toward the irrelevant end of the spectrum (155).” He does then
acknowledge greater freedom of argumentation for sunêgoroi because they “had to approach the case from
another angle”. Rhodes is correct to identify a deliberately broad scope for cases such as Against
Androtion, but he does not investigate how Demosthenes justifies potentially irrelevant arguments.
7 Pearson 1976, 14. To be sure, Pearson sees a greater effort in Demosthenes’ later speeches against
Aeschines to intertwine invective with the legal charge, but still believes that the invective only appears
more relevant, not that it is. Cf. also Yunis (1988, 361-82) who argues convincingly that graphai
paranomôn were comprised of both “legal” and “political” pleas, and that both are relevant to this type of
case, but stops short of accepting character assassination as relevant. The “legal” plea was straightforward
and simply involved showing that the defendant’s decree was contrary to the laws. The “political pleas”
were based on demonstrating that the decree was “inexpedient” (asumphoron) and/or the recipient was
“unworthy” (anaxios). In the case of Androtion, Demosthenes covers all three of these pleas in sections 1-
20. It seems to me untenable to argue that only these sections were relevant to an Athenian jury and that the
next 55 sections of character argumentation was wholly irrelevant. Still, this case was different from OTC
in that Aeschines did not spend time attacking Ctesiphon’s character as the proposer of the decree. The
attack on Demosthenes’ character fell under the political plea that Demosthenes was anaxios and on those
grounds could be considered relevant. As Yunis and others point out tentatively, the fact that Diodorus was
the sunêgoros in this speech certainly allowed him greater freedom of argumentation. But this simply
means that it was easier for him to focus on making his accusations relevant, not that they would have been
irrelevant if the main prosecutor had mounted the same attack.
8 This view of the speech against Androtion is as old as Blass (1893, 258-64) and Wayte 1882 (xxvii, xxx-
xxxi (“The least attractive feature in the present speech is the perpetual straining of unfair points against the
accused.”) and as recent as Harding (a long time champion of Androtion and his policies; see Harding 1976
and 1994a).
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to personal abuse (loidoria), as frankly admitted in section 21.”9 Pace Harding,
Demosthenes (Diodorus) does not admit that his attacks against Androtion’s character are
extraneous; rather, in section 21, he begins his argument against Androtion’s claim that
the accusations by the prosecution are nothing more than slander:
ÖEti to¤nun §pixeire› l°gein per‹ toË tÆw •tair¨sevw nÒmou, …w
Íbr¤zomen ∞me›w ka‹ blasfhm¤aw oÈx‹ proshkoÊsaw katÉ aÈtoË
poioÊmeya. ka‹ fhs‹ de›n ∞mçw, e‡per §pisteÊomen e‰nai taËtÉ élhyÆ,
prÚw toÁw yesmoy°taw épantçn, ·nÉ §ke› per‹ xili«n §kinduneÊomen,
efi kataceudÒmenoi taËtÉ §fainÒmeya: nËn d¢ fenak¤zein afit¤aw ka‹
loidor¤aw kenåw poioum°nouw, ka‹ §noxle›n oÈ dikasta›w toÊtvn
oÔsin Ím›n.
And beyond that, in regard to the law on prostitution, he tries to say that
we are guilty of hubris and insult him with attacks that are out of line
(ouchi prosêkousas). He says that we should meet him at the court of the
Thesmothetai, if in fact we believe that these accusations are true, since
there we would run the risk of the thousand-drachma penalty, if we were
shown to be lying; but that now, we are tricking (phenakizein) you by
making up empty accusations and slander, and also annoying you who are
not judges on these matters.
The fact that the relevance of these claims was apparently challenged does indicate that
the accusations were not obviously connected to the legal charge. But, as we have seen
repeatedly, this contention does not demonstrate irrelevance, it merely shows that some
points had to be made relevant to the audience by a speaker. Our interest, then, is to see
how Demosthenes justifies the relevance of his arguments against Androtion’s character,
not just to assert that they are or are not relevant.10
                                                 
9 Harding 1994b, 212.
10 This also holds true for character argumentation in modern courts. One example should suffice (Couric
1998, 1-17): Fred Bartlit, a famous trial lawyer from Chicago, credits the success of one of his most
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At first glance, many assume that the accusation of prostitution, which occupies
much of the speech, is not relevant since the formal charge is a graphê paranomôn and
not a graphê hetairêseôs. But Demosthenes is careful to draw an explicit connection
between the two charges based on the more general concept of legal eligibility;
Androtion was not only in the wrong when he made illegal proposals, but when he made
any proposal at all since, as a prostitute, he is altogether ineligible (24):
efi m¢n går êllon tinÉ ég«nÉ égvnizom°nou sou taËta
kathgoroËmen, dika¤vw ín ±ganãkteiw: efi dÉ ı m¢n nËn §nesthkƒw
ég√n §sti paranÒmvn, ofl nÒmoi dÉ oÈk §«si l°gein oÈd¢ tå ¶nnoma
toÁw oÏtv bebivkÒtaw, ∞me›w dÉ §pide¤knumen oÈ mÒnon efirhkÒtÉ
aÈtÚn parãnoma, éllå ka‹ bebivkÒta paranÒmvw, p«w oÈx‹
pros¨kei l°gein per‹ toÊtou toË nÒmou, diÉ oÓ taËtÉ §l°gxetai;
If we were making these accusations in some other kind of trial, you could
justifiably get upset; but if the current trial now is about illegal proposals,
then don’t the laws prohibit those who have lived in such a shameful way
from making even lawful proposals? And if we demonstrate that this man
not only made a proposal against the law, but also lived a life that was
against the law, then how is it not appropriate to speak about the law
which proves our point?
Demosthenes’ point here would not have been lost on an Athenian jury; male citizen
prostitutes were in fact barred from all political activity. Insofar as the Athenian people
                                                                                                                                                  
important defense cases (National Business List vs. Dun & Bradstreet) to depicting his own character
witness as a nice person with whom the jury can identify and not a “reprehensible corporate executive”, as
opposed to the main witness for the prosecution whom he represents as a “self-indulgent high flyer” and
not “the poor, suffering small businessman he claimed to be.” Bartlit successfully introduced the attack
against his opponent’s character when the prosecutor introduced his witness’ poor childhood. Bartlit
objected that his background was “irrelevant”, but was overruled. This ruling allowed Bartlit to attack the
witness’ present economic circumstances on cross-examination on the grounds that if his economic status
as a child was relevant, so too was his present status. In this way, Bartlit pointed the finger at his opponent
for making character and background information relevant to the case, and thus justified the relevance of
his own attacks. Although Athenian trials do not include the cross-examination of witnesses, obvious
parallels can be drawn with how Athenian speakers work within their own system to justify the relevance
of character evidence to the charge (as we see here in the case Against Androtion and certainly in OTC).
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were concerned with the private and public character of their political leaders, whether or
not Androtion was a prostitute or a state debtor would be information they would
consider relevant for interpreting his past and future actions. Diodorus’ introduction of
Androtion’s history as a prostitute, and violation of the graphê hetairêseôs by then
involving himself in politics, would thus be seen as providing further context into which
the jury can situate their understanding of the Androtion’s illegal proposal. As Johnstone
argues, we should not approach the laws as authoritative controls or legal argumentation
as “a simple procedure of applying an objective rule”; rather, we should interpret the laws
as texts to which speakers attribute meaning.11 In this case, the graphê hetairêseôs acts as
supportive evidence for the character argument that Diodorus is mounting against
Androtion’s atimia. Also important to Diodorus’ case is Johnstone’s further point that
litigants (usually defendants) often rely on past actions (such as liturgies) as evidence of
the “truth” of their side of the story.12 These erga are presented as extra-rhetorical and
therefore more trustworthy than a speaker’s logoi. In the same way, a person’s phusis is
often presented as extra-rhetorical;13 arguments are untrustworthy, but character is fixed,
so if a person’s character can be “proven”, the jury should see this as a stronger form of
evidence than any rhetorical claim. Particularly in this case, if Androtion were shown to
have prostituted himself, then the jury would see him as already having a permanently
altered character that was unacceptable for involvement in public affairs. As Hubbard has
demonstrated on the basis of 5th and 4th century comedy (citing Clouds in particular), in
                                                 
11 Johnstone 1999, 22-25.
12 Johnstone 1999, 95-97.
13 Cf. Aes. 3.168 (phusis vs. logos); also Hyp. 1.14.
115
the Athenian mind “having been penetrated as a boy changes one’s anatomy (and
character) for life, and that even active pederasts like Better Argument have never really
ceased being “wide-assed” passives.”14 This means that by the time of Androtion’s
proposal, it is too late; Androtion has already been perverted and by default, so now is his
proposal.15
As we saw in chapter one in the trial of OTC, both Aeschines and Demosthenes
mount elaborate arguments to justify a full review of each other’s character. So too with
this case. Although the transitions between arguments are rougher in Dem. 22 than in his
masterpiece OTC (also a synêgoros speech in a graphê paranomôn trial concerning an
honorary crown), there is nonetheless an identifiable similarity of content and
organization. Demosthenes begins the speech with a discussion of the illegal proposal
itself (1-21), then addresses Androtion’s character (accusation of prostitution, 22-45), and
next connects Androtion’s character back to his heritage (his father was a state debtor,
46ff.) in order to create a broad framework for interpreting his status as atimos. In turn,
his atimia affects how the jury views his allegedly illegal proposal.
A close examination of Demosthenes’ portrayal of Androtion shows his deliberate
attempt at connecting Androtion’s character and actions to the fact that his proposal was
supposedly paranomôs. According to Demosthenes’ depiction, Androtion is a brazen,
greedy and tyrannical figure who was corrupted by his early upbringing and therefore has
                                                 
14 Hubbard 2003, 87.
15 Nor should the issue of “truth” regarding the accusations lead us astray. As we saw above, scholars are
adamant that Demosthenes’ allegations—that Androtion’s father was a state debtor and he himself was a
prostitute—are completely unfounded. But whether or not the accusations are true is a separate issue from
whether or not an Athenian jury would consider them relevant. As argued in previous chapters, it is likely
that Demosthenes was working from Androtion’s reputation to some degree, since Demosthenes tailors his
characterization of Androtion to facts that are well known about him.
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no sense of appropriate elite behavior or respect for the dêmos. His portrayal is highly
individualized and tailored to Androtion’s background, but it also draws heavily on
stereotypes. In particular, Demosthenes uses comic mechanisms as structuring devices
and draws on content that is familiar from comic characters. He links his characterization
of Androtion to alazoneia, but more specifically to phenakismos (trickery). Once again,
the concept of comic “imposter,” a man who deceives and cheats the people for his own
gain, proves useful to the orator; this particular stereotype is suited to Androtion, who,
like Aeschines, was a prominent public figure and politician.
Demosthenes first uses the word “phenakizein” (to fool, cheat, deceive) when
putting words in Androtion’s mouth (as cited above, 21). He then turns the tables on
Androtion and uses the notion of ‘trickery’ against him. When arguing that Androtion is
atimos because of his father’s debts, Demosthenes uses a form of phenax three times (32,
34, 35). In the first instance, Demosthenes advocates—as a central tenet of
democracy—the necessity of exposing officials like Androtion, whom he describes as
“bold and clever but full of disgrace and wickedness (31)”. Invoking Solon’s authority,
he argues that such men must be denied a share of council in order to prevent the people
from being fooled into any erroneous action (·na mØ fenakisye‹w ı dÆmow §jamãrtoi
mhd°n)(32). After shifting the burden of proof onto Androtion to demonstrate that his
father was not a state debtor or prison escapee, he warns against Androtion “fooling” the
jurors and leading them astray (ên ti fenak¤zein §gkeirª ka‹ parãgein oÓtow)
regarding the laws that he has discussed (34). Immediately following, he reiterates that
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Androtion has devised other arguments for this same purpose, that is, to “fool” the jurors
(…lÒgoi prÚw tÚ fenak¤zein Ímçw eÔ memhxanhm°noi)(35).
It is no coincidence that he returns to Androtion’s deception when he reaches the
focal point of his argument: Androtion’s tax collection. Before he launches into a long
narrative account, he warns the jurors to stand guard against Androtion’s deceit (46):
“And concerning these affairs—look how he will try to mislead you (parakrouesthai) by
steering you away (apagagôn) from the law…(ka‹ per‹ toÊtvn m°n, ˘n trÒpon Ímçw
épagagƒn épÚ toË nÒmou parakroÊesyai zht¨sei...). Demosthenes then takes issue
with Androtion’s manner of tax collecting since he is proudest about his performance in
this regard (47):
And I will show that he is shameless (anaidê) and bold (thrasun) and a
thief (kleptên) and arrogant (huperêphanon) and suited for anything at all
other than being politically active in a democracy. And first, let us
scrutinize his collection of tax money—which he considers his greatest
achievement—not by paying any attention to his boastful speech
(alazoneia), but rather by examining the deed, as it actually (tê alêtheia)
happened.16
A scene from Acharnians offers a parallel situation in which Dicaeopolis attempts
to expose an upper-class official’s abuse of privilege to the people (61-90). A dialogue
between Dicaeopolis and the Ambassador near the opening of the play sets up and
exposes the latter as an alazôn. As the ambassador, who has just now returned from his
                                                 
16 Demosthenes aligns his description of Androtion as the braggart/deceiver with that of the tyrant. For
example, Androtion drags the eleven into people’s homes and brutalizes lower-class folk. Also,
Demosthenes sneeringly characterizes Androtion as a kalos k’agathos, most likely to try and get the people
hostile toward his aristocratic status. Diodorus, a lesser known political figure, allies himself with the
people against Androtion, the aristocrat, particularly for his involvement in male prostitution and/or
pederasty. For creating democratic hostility toward elite practices (especially in male same-sex sexual
practices), see Hubbard 1998, 48-78.
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embassy to the Persian king, is introduced by the herald, Dikaeopolis responds in disgust:
“What sort of king?! I, myself, am annoyed with ambassadors, and with their peacocks
and braggart ways (alazôneumasin). This response cues the audience to expect all sorts of
puffery on the part of the ambassador, which is precisely what they get; the ambassador
claims that he and his comrades suffered great hardship from sleeping in soft, luxurious
carriages, that they were forced (pros bian) to drink unmixed wine from golden cups, and
when they finally made it to the king (three years later, paid at two drachmae per day),
that the king served them oxen baked whole in the oven. Dikaepolis offers a sarcastic
response to each “hardship” in turn, and to the last one in particular, he counters by
reiterating his preliminary charge, that the ambassador is full of bluster (tôn
alazôneumatôn). In their subsequent interaction, the Ambassador’s alazoneia is
connected more closely with his trickery:
Pr.  ka‹ na‹ må D¤É ˆrnin triplãsion KlevnÊmou par°yhken ∞m›n: ˆnoma dÉ
µn aÈt“ f°naj.
Ambassador: And by God he put before us a bird three-times bigger than
Cleonymus! It’s name was “Fooler” (phenax).
Di.   taËtÉ êrÉ §fenãkizew sÁ dÊo draxmåw f°rvn.
Dicaeopolis: In this way, then, you were fooling us (ephenakizes) and receiving
two drachmae per day in pay.
Hesk points out that the pun on the bird’s name is from eagle (phênê) and the mythical
phoenix.17 By punning on the name, Dicaeopolis exposes the Ambassador’s deceptive
                                                 
17 Hesk 2000, 261.
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speech and actions (alazôneumata; ephenakizes). The audience is directed to laugh at the
exposure of the braggart and thereby condemn his actions of Eastern indulgence at the
expense of the polis. Demosthenes’ characterization of Androtion works similarly;
Androtion is supposedly working for the people by collecting taxes, but instead he is
hoodwinking them and getting rich at their expense.
Androtion the “fooler” is just one dynamic of characterization that Demosthenes
plays up in this speech. Because of Androtion’s particular status and the charges against
him, we also see invective that is similar to Aeschines’ depiction of Timarchus. In both
cases, the prosecution portrays a male public citizen turned prostitute and slave. Both
prosecutors make use of topsy-turviness as a framework for narrating how their opponent
overturns the normative social order.
Throughout the speech, Demosthenes maintains an opposition between
democracy and oligarchy/tyranny and consistently casts Androtion as a tyrant and
subverter of democractic principles. As proof of Androtion’s tyrannical nature,
Demosthenes gives a narrative account of his activities as tax collector and public
official. He frames his narrative in terms of the mundus perversus that Androtion has
created in order to stir up hostility against him.18 A good example of Demosthenes’
deliberate use of comic techniques and scenarios for shaping his characterization can be
seen in sections 52-53. By this point in the speech, Demosthenes has already undermined
Androtion’s status as a citizen. Androtion—now a slave and prostitute—drives other
citizens to servile behavior through his tyrannical deeds:
                                                 
18 For the orator’s stirring up of dikastic anger, see Rubinstein 2004, 187-204.
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But for us, what was the most dreadful time ever in our city? Everyone
would say: “under the Thirty”. At that time, then, so it is reported, no one
was being deprived of salvation, who could hide himself at home; rather,
we were condemning the Thirty because they were arresting men unjustly
by dragging them out of the agora. This man, though, committed an act of
brutality so much more extreme than theirs that he, a political figure in a
democracy, made each man’s private home into a jail by leading the
Eleven into their houses. And yet, men of Athens, what do you think is
happening when a poor man, or even a rich man, who has squandered a lot
of money and in some way perhaps rightly is not rolling in money, either
should climb over his roof to the neighbor’s house, or sneak under his
couch and hide in order not to be seized bodily and dragged off to jail, or
debase himself in some other way—actions fit for slaves, but not free men,
and he is seen doing these things in front of his own wife, whom he
married as a free man and a citizen of this city?! And if Androtion should
be responsible for these things?! A man who is prohibited by his own
actions and way of life from bringing a case on his own behalf, let alone
do anything on behalf of the city!
Commenting on this passage, Harding points out that it “has the air of a scene from New
Comedy.”19 Indeed, scenes with men sneaking around do occur in New Comic plots, but
usually for the sake of a love interest. It should also be noted that some characters from
Old Comedy, such as Strepsiades in Clouds, pass their time attempting to dupe
aggressive bill collectors similar to Androtion. The audience is directed to side with
characters like Strepsiades against belligerent figures like Androtion. Although there is
no exact parallel from comedy, Harding is right to see a connection with comic motifs.
That connection stems primarily from the absurd yet believable story that Demosthenes
narrates here and in the following passages where Androtion brazenly terrorizes two
                                                 
19 Harding 1994b, 213.
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female prostitutes, Sinope and Phanostrate, for allegedly not paying their tax money (56-
58).20
Demosthenes gives a vivid description of Androtion seizing these women’s
property, although they owed no taxes. By using this particular example of Androtion’s
barbaric deeds, he cleverly links Androtion to the lower world of common prostitutes
(pornai) but praises the prostitutes for acting in accordance with legal regulation.
Androtion, on the other hand, a prostitute himself, is acting far below his proper social
station. The contrast between the exemplary pornai and the debauched Androtion plays
out the reversal of societal roles and expectations, not only of citizen to slave (as we saw
in the last passage quoted), but also of male to female. Androtion transgressed boundaries
by acting as a tyrant in a democracy, and by turning himself into a “woman”.
Demosthenes thus creates comic potential by highlighting the incongruity and irony of
Androtion, the debauched male whore, viciously collecting taxes from upstanding female
prostitutes. His witty but aggressive summation highlights the destructive effects of the
mundus perversus on Androtion himself, but also on the wider network of individuals
with whom he has any contact:
For he endured many outrages and attacks when consorting with men who
did not love him, but could pay his price; it would have been fitting for
you to take out your anger from this, not on the next citizen you happened
                                                 
20 Harding (1994b, 214) thinks that the “incongruous absurdity” is fabricated by Demosthenes based on his
assumption that female prostitutes did not owe taxes since they were female and non-citizens. His
assumption cannot be correct. The fact that Demosthenes will supposedly argue for Timarchus’ innocence
based on the fact that he was not enrolled as a prostitute and owed no prostitution tax (1.119) implies that
such a registry and tax in fact existed. We would be left to imagine, by Harding’s reasoning, that only male
citizen prostitutes would be subject to these requirements, but to the Athenians, the male citizen prostitute
was a contradiction in terms and therefore was not sanctioned by the state; cf. DeBrauw and Miner 2004.
For an opposing view on male prostitution, see E. Cohen 2000, 155-92.
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to run into, and not on the whores who share your trade (homotechnous
pornas), but on the father who raised you this way (58).
This type of invective is reminiscent of the ridicule that politicians faced on the comic
stage for their homosexual engagements, often also in connection with prostitution.21 By
the mid 4th century, there was a barrage of insults about pathic sex that were directed at
politicians. These attacks, accompanied by the increased interest in the world of the
prostitute more broadly, are indicative of the appeal that Androtion’s scandalous
background would hold for the jurors as an audience. Demosthenes draws on this
growing interest in the private affairs of its political figures by exposing Androtion’s
illegal sexual activities. He then situates Androtion’s behavior within a comic framework
to steer the jury toward responding with derisive laughter. The trial, like the comic play,
thus reifies community notions about proper behavior on the part of the political elite, a
function that was considered necessary to the preservation of the democracy. By
excluding Androtion (who is depicted as entirely anti-democratic even in his sexual
exploits) the jury can feel confident that they are upholding democratic values.
The methodical characterization of Androtion builds up to Demosthenes’
concluding attack on him for the way he mistreated crowns that commemorated
important events in Athenian history. Again, Demosthenes homes in on Androtion’s
contamination of the noble with the base by picking up on the notion of Androtion
“fooling” the people: “Many of the things he said to fool you (ephenakize), I’ll pass over;
but claiming that the leaves on the crowns were falling off and that they were rotting
                                                 
21 See Henderson (1991, 204-22) and Hubbard (1998 and 2003, 86-117) on the prevalence of male same-
sex ridicule in Old and Middle comedy.
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from age, as if made of violets or roses, and not gold, he persuaded you to melt them
together (70).” Androtion, then, takes symbols of noble public service and irreverently
melts down the crowns and makes them into trinkets.
The goal of these descriptions is to broaden the context in which the jury is asked
to interpret Androtion’s actions. Demosthenes tells the stories back to back in order to
expose Androtion as an alazôn and phenax by revealing his illegitimate appropriation of
power; in other words, he is a slave and whore who deceives (and abuses) the people by
tyrannically wielding power that he should not have. Demosthenes’ decision to end his
speech with a discussion of the “old” crowns is significant; it offers him another venue to
contrast the difference between wealth as a sign of personal greed, versus wealth as a sign
of public glory. Like the Aristophanic ambassadors in Acharnians, Androtion is
motivated by a desire for personal gain. His lack of concern for the state led him to melt
down crowns with noble inscriptions of past glory and reinscribe them with his own
name (ı pÒrnow oÓtow, "ÉAndrot¤vnow §pimeloum°nou" §pig°graptai). Although he
does not make the connection explicit, Demosthenes’ discussion of Androtion’s abuse of
these crowns has clear bearing on the main issue in the trial, namely that he illegally
proposed a crown to an undeserving Council. By ending on this note, the jurors can
reflect on Androtion’s past disrespect for the honor and glory that crowns are meant to
convey. In both instances, Androtion blatantly disrespects that honor and, in turn, the
people who bestow it. For this reason, Androtion’s past actions are reflective of his
character, which is important for interpreting the significance of his illegal proposal.
Demosthenes, writing for Diodorus, thus offers an account of Androtion’s life that would
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provide context for the legal issues in the case, and would offer the jurors pertinent
information for determining a verdict.
Demosthenes’ portrayal thus fits squarely into Lanni’s theory of “highly
individualized and contextualized” presentation of cases.22 At the same time, we can see
that his characterization is also generalized to appeal to as large a crowd as possible. The
orator must walk the line between individualizing his case in order to make it believable,
but also making his depiction resonate with a large audience; comic characterization
plays an important role in this process. Androtion was a member of an elite family, a
politician, and a tax collector; his background lends itself to Demosthenes’
characterization of him as a “tyrant”. His tenure as tax collector, in particular, made him
an easy target since this assignment at Athens practically demanded a bully if he were to
be successful.23 Further, his atimia established him as ineligible for political activity, thus
making him a target for the characterization of pornos, alazôn and phenax—for the same
reasons that Demosthenes was able to draw from Aeschines’ “illegitimate” background to
depict him as alazôn and Aeschines could depict Timarchus as pornos.
What stands in contrast to Demosthenes’ depiction of Aeschines as alazôn (and
Aeschines’ depiction of Timarchus as pornos) is the tone of invective that Demosthenes
takes up against Androtion. Despite the comic moments (discussed above), his portrayal
cannot as easily be shown to aim at invoking laughter from the audience. Instead, his tone
aims primarily at stirring up anger and hostility. The difference in tone can be attributed
                                                 
22 See above, Introduction.
23 Tax collectors would agree to pay upfront a certain amount of the taxes in arrears and then set out to
collect from defaulters; if they were particularly good at their job, they could make a profit.
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to Diodorus’s status; he is a lesser known individual delivering the speech from the
perspective of personal enemy. In light of the rhetorical demand to shape his own
character during the speech, we should not expect Demosthenes to write the speech in
such a way that Diodorus allies himself with audience through laughter in the overt and
self-confident manner which prominent politicians like Aeschines or Demosthenes were
able to achieve.24
The justification that Demosthenes gives for his character assassination in this
speech is also different from his approach in OTC. Since this is a prosecution speech, he
cannot point the finger at his opponent for starting a contest of slander, as he did when
defending himself from Aeschines’ attacks. Instead, Demosthenes justifies his harsh
assault as necessary to the preservation of the democracy. In 22.31-32, Demosthenes
argues that it is an important function of the democratic state to openly publish the
shameful acts of its leaders to prevent them from misleading and corrupting the people.
By comparison, parrêsia does not exist in an oligarchy, which is clearly a detriment to
the people. This justification for invective is not only rhetorically effective here—since if
Androtion argues against it, he only further implicates himself as the “tyrant”
Demosthenes is making him out to be—it explains well the didactic and regulatory nature
of political invective against politicians commonly seen on the comic stage. It shows the
shared purpose of both genres in policing morality within the community as a principle of
democracy. It thus helps explain why the Athenian people were more open to harsh, and
even humorous, language in “serious” settings like the law courts, and why they would
                                                 
24 As we will see more clearly next chapter, lesser known individuals often pursue much subtler strategies
of using humor.
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not see them as “irrelevant”. This is an important point to which I will return in the
epilogue of the dissertation.
II. Against Aristogeiton (Dem. 25):25
Aristogeiton was an orator and politician involved in an endeixis
(information/denouncement) brought by Lycurgus with Demosthenes and other
sunêgoroi chosen by the assembly (25.14). Like Androtion, Aristogeiton was allegedly a
debtor to the state, thus atimos, and yet he continued to act as a rhêtor in the assembly
and prosecutor in the courts. For this trial, it was the prosecution’s duty to demonstrate
that Aristogeiton was, in fact, still in debt to the state and therefore ineligible to enjoy the
rights of a citizen. The prosecution attempts to undermine Aristogeiton’s character, and
therefore his credibility, just as we saw with the prosecution of Androtion.
The main speech delivered by Lycurgus against Aristogeiton is not extant, but
there are two extant speeches attributed to Demosthenes. Against Aristogeiton II (Dem.
26) is a short speech that was almost certainly delivered by someone else, if not written
by someone else as well, but the longer speech, Against Aristogeiton I (Dem. 25), is
probably authentic.26 Still, Dem. 25 has received very little attention from scholars,
presumably because its authorship has been contested since ancient times. Dionysius of
Halicarnassus was allegedly the first to say that Demosthenes was not the author of either
speech in the midst of his discussion on Demosthenes’ style. While responding to
                                                 
25 For other sources on Aristogeiton, see Hansen 1976, 141-42.
26 If we accept that it is a 4th century oration, the likely date is 324 (according to Hansen 1976, 142, with n.
27). Hansen places the date just before the Harpalus Affair, based on a reference in Din. 2.
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criticisms that Aeschines once made of Demosthenes’ proclivity for scurrilous language,
Dionysius mentions the second speech (and possibly both) against Aristogeiton as a
forgery:
tÚ d¢ fãskein fortiko›w ka‹ éhd°si to›w ÙnÒmasin aÈtÚn kexrÆsyai
pÒyen §pÆlyen aÈt“ l°gein, Íp¢r pãnta ¶gvge teyaÊmaka.
(Demosthenes 57.1)
But to claim that he (Demosthenes) used scurrilous and tasteless
terms—from where it came to him (Aeschines) to say this, I am perplexed
by this most of all…
efi m°ntoi tin¢w §n to›w ceudepigrãfoiw efis‹ lÒgoiw éhde›w ka‹
fortika‹ ka‹ êgroikoi kataskeua¤, …w §n tª kat' ÉAristoge¤tonow bÄ
(Demosthenes 57.3)27
If, however, there are some tasteless, scurrilous, and boorish terms in the
imitation speeches, as in the one against Aristogeiton B….
Although Dionysius mentions only the second speech here, it is possible that he considers
both speeches to be forgeries (so says Libanius in his hypothesis). Whether or not
Dionysius meant that both Against Aristogeiton I and II are forgeries, scholars have
subsequently argued against authenticity in part because the speeches contain coarse
language that is uncharacteristic of Demosthenes.28 Recently, however, Rubinstein has
synthesized the debate and, following Hansen and McCabe, offers a compelling argument
in favor of authenticity (at least in regard to Dem. 25).29 It is fitting, then, that this speech
be revisited for its use of invective, particularly because scurrility was identified as a
                                                 
27 According to Blass (1893, 411-12) who emends the text to include both speeches (§n to›w kat'
ÉAristoge¤tonow bÄ).
28 Lipsius 1883; Blass 1893, 411-12; Sealey 1993, 237-39.
29 These scholars in particular believe that the speech is authentic – at least as a 4th century speech and not a
later forgery. Rubinstein (2000, 30-32), for example, answers Sealey’s objections individually. Hansen
(1976, 144-52) argues at length for authenticity. McCabe 1981 argues that the speech cannot be rejected on
grounds of style. So it appears that the debate is shifting in the direction of authenticity.
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defining characteristic of the speech, one that led to its rejection in the past. For our
purposes, it is not of great importance that the speech be attributed to Demosthenes, but I
intend to show that many aspects, including the use of invective, are in line with his other
works. Thus, a better understanding of invective in this speech provides further support
for the view that this speech is authentic.
The unrelenting character assassination in Dem. 25 focuses on a few aspects of
Aristogeiton’s nature: ponêria (wickedness), aponoia (insanity), thêriotês
(inhumanity/beast-like brutality). Demosthenes exploits Aristogeiton’s nickname “The
Dog” (kuôn) to emphasize all three of these characteristics. He draws on a variety of
animal imagery to illuminate Aristogeiton’s complete lack of civility, and recasts him as
the antithesis of an elite politician and orator. Further, the description of his insanity
(aponoia) portrays something more than simple craziness; it implies specific
characteristics associated with this behavior. As we shall see, Aristogeiton’s aponoia
shares numerous similarities with (and thus marks him as) a character type known to us
from Theophrastus: ho aponenoêmenos (The Man Who Has Lost His Senses). Despite
the speaker’s need to create a highly individualized account, drawing on stock characters
can be very useful to the orator. This speech provides further evidence of how the orator
can create a plausible scenario that is tailored to an individual yet still depict his opponent
as a stereotype well known to a large audience. As we have seen, these features often
comprise the “literary” or “dramatic” elements of a speech, and should not be seen as
indications of a forgery or rhetorical exercise that was not delivered in court.
129
It should be remembered that the type of case (endeixis) is important for our
understanding of what the dêmos would consider relevant argumentation. Much like the
dokimasia (as we saw in the speech Against Timarchus), the endeixis in this trial allowed
for a full scrutiny of the defendant’s past. Unlike the dokimasia, an endeixis typically
concerns a specific crime. But since that crime is Aristogeiton’s atimia as a result of
being in debt to the state, there is greater room for attacking Aristogeiton’s character
more extensively to show that he is the kind of man whom the jury would expect to be
atimos. For this reason, and because the speech was delivered by a synêgoros, the scope
of relevance is predictably broad, since it would have been easier for the jury to recognize
a connection between character evidence, and even character assassination, to the legal
charge. Still, Demosthenes has to manipulate his audience carefully (often by getting
them to collude or approve) when introducing harsh attacks in order to be confident that
his arguments will not backfire. In this speech, he moves quickly past the legal charge
and warns the jurors outright that he will deal primarily with Aristogeiton’s character.
Before stating this purpose, however, Demosthenes is sure to remind the jury that
Lycurgus handled the legal aspects of the case already and produced witnesses of
Aristogeiton’s ponêria (13-14). He then expresses serious vexation at being nominated as
prosecutor (±xyÒmhn ka‹ må tÚn D¤a ka‹ pãntaw y°ouw oÈk §boulÒmhn) and justifies
his concern by pointing out that those who prosecute too often inevitably fare poorly.
Although vague, it appears that Demosthenes is attempting to protect himself from any
accusation of sycophancy. He claims that he is prosecuting because he “felt compelled
(énagka›on) to obey your wishes (pe¤yesyai to›w Ímet°roiw boul¨masi).” He draws
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the jurors into the picture not only here, but also by claiming that he will speak “with all
familiarity (metå pãshw ofikeiÒthtow),” by which he means, “openly” as if he were
close friends with them. His appeal to the dêmos functions as the standard rhetorical ploy
to gain their trust (captatio benevolentiae), but he is also prefacing the tone and language
he will use to prosecute Aristogeiton.
This apologia is similar to Demosthenes’ justification for using harsh language
when handling Aeschines in OTC. There, Demosthenes excuses himself by claiming that
Aeschines forced him to use invective since he started the contest in a highly abusive
tone. Here, Demosthenes is not attacked personally by Aristogeiton, so his justification is
different; he points the finger at the people instead of Aristogeiton, but he still justifies
his response in terms of compulsion (anankaion). In both cases, then, Demosthenes does
not take full responsibility for his involvement and the manner in which he approaches it.
Rather, he is sure to highlight the jurors’ participation both times (and his opponent’s to
the extent possible). At the end of his introduction in section 14, Demosthenes returns to
this point, when he asks for pardon from the jurors for his manner of speech in
approaching the case:30
ë d¢ ka‹ log¤zesyai toÁw Íp¢r pÒlevw ka‹ nÒmvn bouleuom°nouw
pros¨kei ka‹ skope›syai de›, taËta prohroÊmhn efipe›n, ka‹ nËn §p‹
taËta poreÊsomai. dÒte d' Œ êndrew ÉAyhna›oi dÒte ka‹
sugxvr¨sate moi prÚw DiÒw, …w p°fuka ka‹ pro∑rhmai, per‹
toÊtvn dialexyÆnai prÚw Ímçw: ka‹ går oÈd' ín êllvw duna¤mhn.
                                                 
30 Cf. the opening of Plato’s Apology, which might shed some light on this rather vague passage. There,
“Socrates” gives a similar prologue in which he claims that he will speak with unaffected language,
completely free from rhetorically fancy words and arguments. Perhaps this is a similar claim that he will
speak in plain speech, that is, “you can trust me.”
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Whatever is fitting and necessary for those who take council about the city
and the laws, these are the things I have chosen to tell you, and I will
proceed now to these points. Grant, men of Athens, grant and pardon me,
by God, for speaking about these things to you as is natural for me and as I
prefer to do; for I could not do otherwise.
Although he does not state explicitly the points he will cover, Demosthenes’ subsequent
discussion of the laws in relation to character makes clear what he considers to be matters
of import to the city. He argues that mens’ lives are governed both by laws and by nature;
the former is universal to all men, the latter is peculiar to each one. Though nature
(phusis) is unpredictable in this way, it is fixed within each person so that an evil man
will necessarily do petty things (∞ m¢n fÊsiw, ín ¬ ponhrã, pollãkiw faËla
boÊletai). Demosthenes thus invokes a notion of fixed character, which he will rely on
as justification for his discussion of Aristogeiton’s nature. His point recalls the opening of
his speech, where he attempts to make this case one based on the people’s attitudes
toward wickedness, rather than one about arguments (1-2). From the very start, he homes
in on ponêria as the main issue: “The strength of our case does not lie in the arguments
either Lycurgus made or I will make, but rather on the disposition of the dêmos toward
wickedness (ponêria), namely whether they abhor or condone it (1).” He thus openly
declares his intention to devote himself solely to demonstrating that Aristogeiton is
ponêros.
Demosthenes, as synêgoros, is not responsible for arguing the legal case in a strict
sense. He reminds the jurors that this was the job of Lycurgus, whereas the job of the
supporting speaker is to offer supplementary evidence, which he accomplishes by
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deliberately focusing on character.31 As a rhetor, Aristogeiton advises the people, makes
proposals in the Assembly, and involves himself in court trials. The Athenians were
clearly concerned with the character of public officials and policed it far more closely
than that of private citizens. Since this trial, like that against Androtion, is specifically
about political eligibility, and since Demosthenes is offering supporting evidence, the
character portrayal he provides would undoubtedly be considered relevant information to
the Athenian dêmos. Demosthenes still makes every effort to show how and why
Aristogeiton’s character in particular is related to his atimia.
Demosthenes creates the image of a man who is so ruthless that he is barely
human. Repeatedly he calls him a beast (thêrion), specifically one that is polluted or
wicked (miaros, ponêros). In two instances, he describes him as a snake or scorpion (51-
52; 96), and twice puns on his nickname, “The Dog” (kuôn). It is likely, in fact, that this
nickname, by which he was known to the community, opens the door for Demosthenes to
pursue a line of animal imagery throughout the speech. Moreover, he is capitalizing on a
very long tradition of dog imagery and metaphor that reaches back to Homeric times (see
below). In section 40, Demosthenes first draws attention to his status as the “Dog of the
people”:
t¤ oÔn oÓtÒw §sti; kÊvn nØ D¤a, fas¤ tinew, toË d¨mou. podapÒw;
oÂow oÓw m¢n afitiçtai lÊknouw e‰nai mØ dãknein, ì d° fhsi fulãttein
prÒbat' aÈtÚw katesy¤ein. t¤na går t«n =htÒrvn oÓtow e‡rgasta¤
                                                 
31 Particularly illuminating here is a comparison with Cicero’s Pro Caelio, since Caelius was indicted on
five counts of vis, and only the last included Clodia. Crassus is the main prosecutor and deals with the first
four “legal” charges, while Cicero deliberately concentrates on Clodia’s character and constructs an
elaborate comic narrative to frame his case. What Riggsby 2004 demonstrates for character evidence in the
Roman courts holds true for Athens too: that the Athenians thought that character could be used
secondarily, i.e. directly as supporting evidence (whereas modern systems only recognize it as tertiary).
133
ti kakÚn tosoËton, ∞l¤kon toÁw fidi√taw, per‹ œn chf¤smata
grãcaw •ãlv; t¤na dÉ, §j oÓ nËn pãlin l°gei, k°kriken =¨tora;
oÈd°na. éll' fidi√taw polloÊw, oÓw sukofant«n peri°rxetai. éllå
mØn toÁw geuom°nouw kÊnaw t«n probãtvn katakÒptein fas‹ de›n,
ÀstÉ oÈk ín fyãnoi katakoptÒmenow.
What then is this man? A Dog, by god, as some say, the Dog of the
people. But what sort of dog? One that doesn’t bite the wolves that he
accuses, but rather devours the sheep that he claims to protect. For, which
orator has this man wronged to the same extent as the private citizens
against whom he drafted illegal proposals, an act for which he was
convicted? Which one of the orators whom I just now mentioned has he
brought to trial? Not one. And yet there were many private citizens he
went around troubling with nuisance suits. And since they say that it is
necessary to chop up the dogs that have tasted sheep, he certainly could
not be chopped up too soon.
Demosthenes extends the animal comparison to Aristogeiton’s behavior toward the
citizens in a way that likely subverts the original meaning of the name; instead of the
watchdog of the people, he is the vicious dog that attacks them.32 Clearly Demosthenes
wishes to draw out the negative connotations of the term, which hold particular
significance to an Athenian audience.33 In a study of these terms in Homeric Epic, Graver
concludes that “metaphors drawn from the kÊvn group are a rather harsh form of abuse,
one which labels its object as greedy and potentially cannibalistic in the domain of
material goods, or of fighting, sexuality, or speech.”34 As we shall see, Demosthenes is
invoking precisely these attributes to characterize Aristogeiton, and so his nickname
becomes a convenient point of departure and reference for his other attacks. The way in
which he twists the meaning of a name recalls his conversion of Aeschines’ father,
                                                 
32 Cf. Eubulus (85 K-A), where kuôn is used in a list of insults. From Homer on, “dog” remains a term of
abuse and can therefore easily be twisted and used against him.
33 Cf. the trial scene in Wasps, where Cleon is depicted as a greedy kuôn.
34 Graver 1995, 53.
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Atrometus (“The Untrembling”), to “Tromes” (“The Trembler”). In both instances,
Demosthenes shifts the sense from positive to negative.
Demosthenes expands his linguistic possibilities in court by putting insults in the
mouth of his opponent first, in order to make himself look milder by comparison. This
strategy was a key part of his success against Aechines in OTC. The same tactic can be
seen at work in section 45 of this speech where Demosthenes supposedly turns his attack
on Philocrates, a follower and teacher of Aristogeiton.35 Demosthenes compares
Philocrates to Aristogeiton for the main purposed of attacking Aristogeiton indirectly; if
Aristogeiton were only a pikros and ponêros sukophantês, then it makes sense for
Philocrates to follow him because he is cut from the same cloth; but if Aristogeiton is a
kapêlos ponêrias (a peddler of wickedness), palinkapêlos (a huckster) and metaboleus
(trader, trafficker), then Philocrates should distance himself.  The triad of creative insults
recalls the language Demosthenes uses frequently against Aeschines, although these
specific terms are not used in OTC, rather they are tailored to Aristogeiton. To justify his
own language further, Demosthenes tells us of a verbal attack that Aristogeiton made
against the people and the generals of the city:
˘w efiw toËyÉ ¥kei ponhr¤aw, ÀstÉ §ndedeigm°now ±dh bo«n,
sukofant«n, épeil«n oÈk §paÊeto, oÂw m¢n Íme›w tå m°gistÉ
§nexeir¤zete strathgo›w, [˜ti aÈt“ érgÊrion afitoËnti oÈk ¶dosan,]
oÈd¢ t«n kopr√nvn ín §pistãtaw •l°syai fãskvn, oÈk §ke¤nouw
Íbr¤zvn, ,,,,,,éllå tØn Ímet°ran xeiroton¤an prophlak¤zvn ka‹ tÆw
aÍtou ponhr¤aw §p¤deijin poioÊmenow.......
And he reached such a point of wickedness (ponêria) that, even though the
endeixis had already been laid against him, he did not cease from shouting,
prosecuting maliciously, and threatening those generals whom you
                                                 
35 This is the same Philocrates who was convicted of bribery after the Harpalus affair.
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entrusted with the most important affairs, [since they wouldn’t give him
the money he was after] claiming that he wouldn’t have even put them in
charge of the latrines (koprônôn)—not outraging those men by saying this,
but flinging mud at how you voted and making a display of his own
malevolence (ponêria)….
Here, Demosthenes does not shy away from using the Aristophanic term koprôn,
since any offense resulting from impropriety would fall on Aristogeiton’s head, not his
own. The anecdote serves to illustrate Aristogeiton’s intemperance of speech, one way in
which he is “dog-like”.36 Demosthenes cleverly steals Aristogeiton’s sarcastic remark and
uses it against him by emphasizing how Aristogeiton actually attacked the people for
their role in choosing incompetent men as generals, rather than the incompetent men
themselves.37 Further, he connects his point about intemperance directly with the formal
charge of endeixis, thus undermining Aristogeiton’s public claims against others since he
had no right to speak in public to begin with. Moreover, Demosthenes points to
Aristogeiton’s ponêria as the cause of his intemperate speech. Thus, character is used as
evidence in specific connection with the legal charge to explain anti-democratic behavior.
As we saw in Androtion above, it is a fundamental principle of democracy to criticize
public figures openly and harshly. Somewhat ironically, that is just what Aristogeiton
was attempting to do when he criticized the generals in the first place—but, in order to
                                                 
36 Interestingly, the inability to restrain oneself verbally and sexually is gendered primarily female in the
Homeric context, whereas grasping behavior, or other forms of intemperance related to actions are
gendered male. Aristogeiton is described as guilty of both types of transgressions, but he is not accused of
being a “woman” like Timarchus, who engages in sexual immoderation. In both cases, however,
immoderation excludes them from proper manly behavior and, therefore, from political involvement
(atimia).
37 A contextual difference is that Demosthenes is not under direct attack from Aristogeiton as he was from
Aeschines in OTC. Thus, as he made clear in his apologia, he does not deal with Aristogeiton as a personal
enemy, but as an opponent of the people; the jurors become a part of the dialogue here rather than
spectators of it.
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perform the duty of a public citizen, one must be a citizen and not a disenfranchised
beast.
Aristogeiton’s inability to control his language, as demonstrated by the anecdote
above, provides support for Demosthenes’ description of his character. He thus reinforces
his characterization of Aristogeiton as a greedy and vicious “Dog”, which makes his
subsequent claims about Aristogeiton’s inhumanity more plausible. In two separate
passages, Demosthenes compares him with other types of aggressive creatures:
oÈx‹ t«n politik«n égay«n §p' oÈden‹ tª cuxª diatr¤bei…….éllå
poreÊetai diå tÆw égorçw, Àsper ¶xiw µ skorp¤ow ±rkƒw tÚ
k°ntron, õttvn deËro kéke›se, skop«n t¤ni sumforån µ
blasfhm¤an µ kakÒn ti prostricãmenow ka‹ katast¨saw efiw fÒbon,
érgÊrion prãjetai (51-52).
He has not engaged in any noble political endeavor in his life……rather,
he moves across the agora like a viper or a scorpion raising up his stinger,
darting here and there, keeping an eye out for someone he can inflict with
misfortune, slander or some other evil, for any man he can terrify in order
to make money.
…d‹ går ırçte. oÈd°na p√potÉ ‡svw Ím«n ¶xiw ¶dakÉ oÈd¢
falãggion, mhd¢ dãkoi: éllÉ ˜mvw pãnta tå toiaËta §pån ‡dhtÉ,
eÈyÁw époktene›te. tÚn aÈtÚn to¤nun trÒpon Œ êndrew ÉAyhna›oi,
ka‹ ˜tan sukofãnthn ka‹ pikrÚn ka‹ ¶xin tØn fÊsin ênyrvpon ‡dhte,
mØ pÒyÉ ßkaston Ím«n d¨jetai perim°nete, éllÉ ı prostuxƒn ée‹
timvrhsãsyv (96).
Look at it this way; perhaps none of you has ever been bitten by a snake or
a poisonous spider, and I hope it never happens, but nonetheless,
whenever you do see anything of this sort, immediately you kill it. In the
same way then, men of Athens, whenever you see a sycophant, who is
spiteful and like a viper in nature, do not wait around until he bites you,
rather always let anyone happening upon him take vengeance.
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The comparison of humans to animals goes back to Homer, but emerges as a primarily
comic phenomenon in the 5th and 4th centuries. Aristophanes’ Wasps is an obvious
example, where an entire group of jurors is described as biting or stinging insects (cf. also
Birds and Frogs). The point of these comparisons is to reveal Aristogeiton’s beast-like
nature, to depict him as inhuman and therefore untrustworthy. The colorful descriptions
of Aristogeiton’s nature also provide background explanations for his actions; his
representation of “The Dog” as “attack dog gone mad” helps explain his vicious deeds in
the past. In turn, his stories about Aristogeiton’s actions reinforce these descriptions of
his character.
In support of his claims about Aristogeiton’s character, Demothenes addresses
how Aristogeiton treats his family, his close associates, strangers and, vicariously, the
people at large. He left his father in jail and failed to bury him after his death, he
prosecuted his “friends” who collected an eranos as security for his debts, he sold his
own sister into slavery and tried to do the same to a generous metic named Zobia, who
hid him from the police and then provided him with clothes and money for his escape to
Megara. The culmination of his outrages, and what makes him a particularly potent threat
to the community, is how he treated a total stranger in jail (60-62):
Before he got out of prison, he kept approaching and chatting (lalôn) with
a man from Tanagra (who was incarcerated until he could make bail) in
order to snatch away his document (grammateion).38 After the Tanagrian
                                                 
38 That Aristogeiton wanted the man’s document (grammateion) is puzzling. Demosthenes is possibly
implying that Aristogeiton is attempting to add it to a collection of documents that he sneaks into the courts
for the purpose of corrupting trials. This assessment makes sense in light of the similar, but more detailed,
accusation against one of Theophrastus’ characters (see below).
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accused him and complained that no one else could have taken it,
Aristogeiton got so violent that he tried to strike this man. But since the
Tanagrian was a fresh-caught fish (neal¨w), he ran circles around
Aristogeiton, who by this time was pickled (tetarixeum°nou) from being
incarcerated for so long. So when it got to this point, Aristogeiton bit off
the man’s nose! And then, the man who had been involved in such
misfortune gave up his search for the document. Later, though, they found
the document in a chest for which this man Aristogeiton had the key. And
afterward, the men in the jail took a vote neither to share any of their fire,
light, drink, or food with him, nor to receive anything from him, nor to
give anything to him. And that I speak the truth, summon for me the man
whose nose this defiled wretch bit off and swallowed.
Demosthenes introduces this story as the very last point he will make about
Aristogeiton’s private affairs, thus giving its placement added importance. The story
itself sounds almost absurd; the jurors are invited to visualize a scene in jail of the feisty
Tanagrian outmaneuvering the practically embalmed Aristogeiton, who reacts out of
frustration by attacking the man like an animal and biting off his nose.39 Far from being
all bark and no bite, Aristogeiton “The Dog” is all bite.
The details of the physical violence are meant to disgust but also to entertain.40
One point that needs to be mentioned is that the orator is highly conscious of language,
both high and low, and it is safe to claim that a “descent” into harsher language and abuse
is just as conscious a rhetorical maneuver as the decision to quote from a tragic poet.
What concerns us here is that the story is not told in a manner of solemnity, designed to
                                                 
39 Cf. Mike Tyson, who bit off Evander Holyfield’s ear in a professional fight (June 28, 1997). The event
itself may not have been funny, but the retelling of the event was universally treated as comic. There are
numerous “top ten” lists of jokes, and at least 20 legitimate newspapers made jokes out of their headlines.
Even in a fight scenario, there are rules governing behavior; in both the Tyson incident and here, the
aggressors shirked normal regulations, but also normal human behavior.
40 The Greeks enjoyed violent one-on-one competition, such as in the pankration. Cf. the discussion by
Axer (1989).
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invoke pity at a man’s misfortune as with Oedipus when he loses his eyes (although the
audience is meant to side with him and pity him), rather the terminology used to describe
the scene invites the listener to enter a comic mindset. It is clear from the way in which
Demosthenes frames the story that he is intending primarily to evoke the jurors’ scorn, or
pthonos, against Aristogeiton. He consciously frames his tale in a comic manner by his
use of words like lalôn and daknôn, that is, the Aristophanic terms for “chatting” and
“biting”.41 The story directs the dêmos to side with the Tanagrian against Aristogeiton,
and as spectators of the scene, they are directed to laugh down at Aristogeiton for his
behavior. The fact that Demosthenes calls the Tanagrian as a witness would provide
direct visual proof of the “truth” of the story, in the event that the jurors, only hearing it
secondhand, found it too absurd.
This story entertains, but it also functions as evidence for his claims about the
unpredictable and aggressive acts of which Aristogeiton is capable. It supports his
previous characterization of Aristogeiton as “the Dog” (i.e. cannibalistic, aggressive,
greedy and snatching) or even snake, scorpion, and particularly his claim that
Aristogeiton is aponoia.
Aristogeiton’s behavior, as described throughout the speech, can be linked back to
his aponoia (“loss of sense”).42 Early on, Demosthenes uses this term (or a related one)
four times (32-33) as a key concept for prefacing his extended depiction of Aristogeiton’s
beastlike character:
                                                 
41 For a discussion of fish as a prominent feature of Middle Comedy, see Nesselrath 1997, 277-283.
42 See Diggle 2004 ad loc., who points out the distinction between aponoia and anoia; the former means
“loss of sense” and the latter, “lack of sense”. Demosthenes is depicting a man who has gone mad, not
someone who was always insane; there were specific associations with the former that the latter term did
not connote.
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Don’t you see that neither rationality (logismos) nor any sense of shame
(aidôs) govern his nature (phuseôs) or civic life (politeias), but rather a
loss of sense (aponoia)? Or, should I say, this man’s entire civic life is a
loss of sense (aponoia), a thing that is the greatest evil to the man
possessing it, dreadful and hard to deal with for everyone else, and
unbearable for the city. For, the man who has lost his mind (ho
aponenoêmenos) has entirely abandoned both himself and the salvation
that reason would have given him. Instead, if he is by chance saved, it is
by something paradoxical or unexpected. What wise man would ever
attach his own affairs or those of the country with this trait?…A loss of
sense (aponoias), Men of Athens, is not the trait that the our nation’s
councilors should seek to have in common with someone, but rather, sense
(nou), noble thoughts (phrenôn), and great foresight (pronoias) (32-33).
His use of the term aponoia so frequently and prominently in short space is pointed. In
conjunction with the numerous other descriptive characteristics attributed to Aristogeiton,
the term aponoia makes it clear that Demosthenes is deliberately depicting Aristogeiton
as a character type: ho aponenoêmenos (“The Man Who Lost His Senses”). This
character is known to us as one of Theophrastus’ thirty extant character portraits and
shares numerous similarities with the description given by Demosthenes. Like
Aristogeiton, Theophrastus’ character is intemperate of speech (and actions) in public
places; abuses his own family, friends, and strangers; spends a lot of time in jail; and
involves himself excessively in political and judicial activities. Although Theophrastus’
summations do not reflect particular scoundrels from the streets of Athens, they are
meant to provide a general portrait that would be recognizable and realistic to his readers.
And although they are not in and of themselves comic, there is a clear connection
between his sketches and character types of New Comedy.43 It is likely, then, that a man
who is aponoia was already a well-known figure to the people at this time. Thus, when
                                                 
43 Cf. Webster 1959, 127-34, esp. 133-34.
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the orator gives the dêmos a short description of Aristogeiton as aponoia, it is presumably
with the understanding that they know what he means and will draw further inferences
about him. He is someone they are familiar with from their daily lives, but their
impressions of him are also shaped and hardened by dramatic representations.
Since the two share many features in common, it is worth examining
Demosthenes’ Aristogeiton against Theophrastus’ character. But first we must
acknowledge that the date is uncertain for either work. This does not negate the more
important fact that both were likely composed within the same decade, if not within a few
years of each other.44 One could almost as easily claim that Demosthenes was using
Theophrastus as inspiration as the opposite. Again, which of the two came first is not that
important considering that, by the late 4th century, characterization had developed to the
point where stock character types were now what an audience expected to see on the
comic stage. More important, then, is that we are on firm ground to claim that
Demosthenes was basing his portrayal on a character type and one that was specifically
linked to the low and vulgar world that comedy shared. Consider the following
description from the first few lines (2-6) of Theophrastus’ man who has lost his senses:
The man who has lost his mind (ho aponenoêmenos) is the sort of man
who would swear an oath quickly, who is able to be spoken of badly and
also to rail against others, someone vulgar (agoraios) in character, and
obscene (anasesurmenos), and capable of anything and everything
(pantopoios); certainly he is capable of dancing the cordax in the comic
chorus—sober and without a mask.45
                                                 
44 Dem. 25 probably dates to 324 and Characters to 322, or possibly 330. See the introduction to Diggle
2004.
45 Diggle (2004, 20) claims the opening and closing lines are later additions, and in general, we have to be
careful with what we claim is original to Theophrastus: “Our printed texts are nothing more than the best
that editors have been able to make of what is probably the corruptest [sic] manuscript tradition in all of
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Theophrastus immediately connects this man with the comic, and specifically the more
vulgar and obscene aspects of comedy. It is well attested that “dancing the cordax” was
particularly obscene and thus was only excusable when performed while intoxicated.46
This man is not even ashamed for people to know his identity. Demosthenes, of course,
does not claim that Aristogeiton ever “danced the cordax” specifically, but his
presentation of Aristogeiton’s shamelessness is comparable.
Specific aspects of Aristogeiton’s character do overlap with Theophrastus’
portrayal as well, such as neglect of parents. Aristogeiton is accused of leaving his father
in jail and then not burying him after death, whereas Theophrastus’ character lets his
mother starve (10-11). Not only was Aristogeiton’s father in jail, but Aristogeiton himself
spent so much time there (as his escapades discussed above indicate) that he is
specifically described as “pickled/embalmed” from being there for so long. By
comparison, Theophrastus claims that his character “has spent more time in jail than in
his own house (11-12)”. More broadly, Aristogeiton is accused throughout the speech of
being engaged constantly in court cases (which the historical record supports, see
Hansen), and of being a loud and obnoxious public speaker. Theophrastus’ man is
similarly called a haranguer of crowds (14-18) and avid litigant, both as prosecutor and
                                                                                                                                                  
Greek literature.” If we follow Diggle (who is the most recent and by far most conservative commentator),
he claims in his introductory note to this sketch (p. 250) that we can still say the following:  “If we ignore
the interpolations and an uncured corruption, this (in bald summary) is how the man behaves: he dances an
obscene dance while sober (3), demands an entrance fee from ticket-holders (4), engages in opprobrious
trades (5), leaves his mother uncared for, is arrested for theft and spends much of his time in gaol (6), is
constantly in court as defendant or plaintiff (8), and sets himself up as a patron of low tradesmen, whom he
funds at exorbitant interest (9).”  For a less conservative approach to the text, see Ussher 1960.
46 See Diggle (2004 ad loc.) who cites Clouds 555; Dem. 2.18; cf Hyp. Phil. 7, among others, all of whom
mention that the performer was drunk.
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defendant (19). In particular, according to Theophrastus, “he shows up in court with a jar
(echinos) in his cloak and clusters of little documents (grammatidiôn) in his hands (20-
21),” whereas Aristogeiton was accused specifically of stealing the Tanagrian man’s
grammateion while in jail [perhaps for his own collection?].
Nor does the overlap end there: ho aponenoêmenos does not consider it beneath
him to become the general of the agora peddlers (kapêlôn agoraiôn) (21-22), and
Aristogeiton is called not only a kapêlos ponêrias (a peddler of wickedness), but also
palinkapêlos (a huckster) and metaboleus (trader, trafficker) in section 45. Theophrastus’
man is further connected with markets through his association with collecting interest
from cooks and fishsellers, both of fresh fish and pickled fish (ichthuopôlia,
tarichopôlia). It is therefore more than a coincidence that Demosthenes describes
Aristogeiton as a pickled fish “tetarichomenos” in jail as juxtaposed to a fresh catch
“nealês”.
With this speech in particular, the characterization of Aristogeiton is “highly
individualized” since we get such a detailed account of Aristogeiton’s character. We see
how Demosthenes draws on the stereotype of ho aponenoêmenos to create a striking
picture of Aristogeiton as a crazed beast. This stereotype is particularly suited for
incorporating details and images based on his nickname “The Dog”. Demosthenes thus
mediates between the rhetorical demand for depicting him plausibly as a madman but still
making his character accessible to a large and anonymous jury.
Since the sustained focus on attacking his character can be attributed to
sunêgoria, and since the speech itself is an endeixis relating to his atimia, a full review of
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Aristogeiton’s character is perfectly within Athenian expectations of relevant
argumentation. Thus, we cannot dismiss this speech as “too scurrilous” or
“undemosthenic”. As we have seen, the trajectory of the speech, and many of the details
and strategies of invective that Demosthenes employs, fall right in line with his other,
similar, works (i.e. Against Androtion and OTC). It is important, then, particularly in the
case of speeches delivered by sunêgoroi, that we look at the context of each case when
assessing relevance. In the case of Against Aristogeiton, our understanding of relevance
affects our interpretation of invective, which—as the age-old scholarly debate makes
clear—affects whether or not we can get beyond the issue of authenticity.
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Chapter 4:
 Laughing with Low Profile Litigants
In the last three chapters, I have addressed forensic court cases that are primarily
political in nature and involve high profile members of the Athenian community. In this
chapter, I examine some cases dealing with private (i.e. low profile), rather than public
(i.e. high profile), citizens. I argue that the status of the individual delivering the speech
affects the degree to which comic invective is employed against an opponent. This is not
to say that cases involving private citizens avoid the use of comedy or humor altogether.
In fact, comic framing was just as effective, and perhaps even more useful, for the little-
known litigant in Athens as for the well-known. But when a private man steps up to the
bema, the risk he runs by using invective increases. It is standard rhetorical practice for
the private citizen to cast himself as humble and goodhearted, since it would be
inappropriate for a man of his status to attack an opponent directly. 1 The deliberate
avoidance of invective helps create the character of one who keeps to himself and
remains deferential towards the dêmos, rather than one who asserts his intelligence and
authority through aggressive wit. As a result, we can see a tangible difference in both the
type and the quantity of attacks from speakers who are not major players on the political
scene. The difference, however, is one of degree and not kind. Whereas politicians use
comic elements to provoke open laughter from the jury at their opponents, private men
tend to use them primarily to shape the character of an opponent. If they do wish to get
                                                 
1 One way around the problem is to have a synêgoros, who could use invective more freely without
jeopardizing the humble character of the litigant; see Rubinstein 2000, 123-84.
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the jury to laugh at an opponent, they must take a less direct path towards that end, as we
shall see.
This chapter draws from a selection of private speeches written by Demosthenes
(Dem. 36, 37, 45, 54), all of which exhibit some use of comic characterization. I have
chosen these speeches in particular as the most illustrative for addressing the role of
status in connection with humor, comedy, and invective. Status, for our purposes, will
refer to primarily to stature/notoriety, within the community, but it cannot be entirely
dissociated from social rank. I will therefore speak of citizens as high or low profile, but
at Athens, slaves too could be high profile. The intersection of social rank and stature, as
is the case with Apollodorus (see below), provides interesting insight into the ways in
which both categories combine to affect a speaker’s use of invective. By tracking the
variations in use of comic motifs, invective, humor and laughter, we can highlight the
complexities that are specific to orations delivered by low profile speakers. Ultimately,
the findings in cases involving private citizens have much to say about cases involving
public politicians as well.
I. For Phormio (Dem. 36) and Against Stephanus ([Dem.] 45):
I begin with Dem. 36 and 45, two speeches from related trials about an
inheritance dispute between Apollodorus and Phormio, the former being the son of the
famous (freedman) banker Pasion, and the latter, Pasion’s slave. Apollodorus’ original
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case was probably a suit for capital (dikê aphormês)2 against Phormio, who was in charge
of his father’s bank. Apollodorus accused Phormio of forging Pasion’s will and
appropriating inheritance funds that rightly belonged to Apollodorus and his brother
Pasicles. Phormio responded by bringing a paragraphê (counter-indictment), a
preemptive suit that allowed Phormio to speak first.3 His goal was to demonstrate that
Apollodorus’ case was inadmissible (ouk eisagôgimos) on the grounds that Apollodorus
had previously granted him a release and discharge (aphesis kai apallagê). For Phormio
(Dem. 36) was delivered by an unknown speaker on behalf of Phormio, a naturalized
citizen at the time of the trial, against Apollodorus, also a naturalized citizen (the famed
eleventh Attic orator). Dem. 45, in turn, is a response to Dem. 36, delivered by
Apollodorus against one of Phormio’s main witnesses, Stephanus. These speeches are
most often cited in debates on authenticity and ethics, since, if Demosthenes were in fact
the author of both speeches, he would have worked for opposing sides in the same case.4
For our purposes, however, they offer a unique glimpse into the role that status plays in
the use of comic elements; because Apollodorus was gaining notoriety at the time of the
speech (around 351 BC), whereas Phormio himself remained a relatively obscure figure
in Athenian public life, these speeches allow us to see the differences in the interaction
                                                 
2 According to the writer of the argument (Libanius) for Dem. 36. The phrase dikên enkalein does appear in
36.12, but it is not made clear by the speaker that the case was in fact a dikê aphormês.
3 Scholars disagree about which speaker had the advantage. I follow Johnstone’s approach of viewing the
speeches as narratives and counternarratives where it is the job of the prosecutor to create the most
believable and persuasive account possible and the job of the defendant to appropriate or subvert his
opponent’s claims in order to make his own account more plausible (1999, 46-69). In the case of Dem. 36
specifically, however, there was a distinct advantage for Phormio to speak first since he was able to bias the
jury enough against Stephanus that he was not even allowed to reply. Thus, the paragraphê in particular
was a suit in which one gained a distinct advantage by speaking first.
4 On this debate, see Wolff (1968) with citations; also Trevett (1992).
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between a high-profile and low-profile speaker. Further, social rank affects each
speaker’s strategy for vilification of his opponent, as well as his own self-fashioning.
For Phormio is considered by scholars to be one of Demosthenes’ best speeches.
It is a concise speech that avoids getting bogged down in details in favor of creating a
clear, simple argument primarily based on juxtaposing the good character of Phormio
(chrêsimos, chrêstos) with the despicable one of Apollodorus (sukophantês). Indeed it
was so effective that at the opening of Against Stephanus, Apollodorus claims that the
jurors shouted him down when he tried to give a rebuttal—a result of the jury’s
overwhelming support for Phormio’s side of the story.5 Although they take up opposing
strategies, both Phormio and Apollodorus rely heavily on character argumentation.
Character, in fact, plays a primary role in For Phormio.6 Witnesses attest to the
character of each man and then use an eikos argument to show that Phormio is virtually
incapable of wronging Apollodorus whereas Apollodorus is well schooled in this regard.
The emphasis on characterization begins with the first sentence, where we learn that
Phormio is not a regular litigant in court. This aspect of his character serves as a sharp
contrast to his opponent, who, upon introduction, is twice accused of sycophancy (36.3).
Demosthenes’ second reference to sukophantia is linked directly with the legal claim that
Apollodorus’ case is not admissible. Apollodorus’ allegedly aggressive pursuit of
frivolous cases underlies Demosthenes’ arguments throughout the speech and lays the
foundation for his attack on Apollodorus’ character near its end. Throughout the body of
                                                 
5 Apollodorus may be misrepresenting the situation, however, when he claims that he was not allowed to
speak at all. It is possible, for instance, that he met with thorubos, but delivered his speech, or that he
simply lost his case and is now claiming an injustice by depicting it as an unfair hearing.
6 See my Intoducation, where I discuss the explicit connection that Demosthenes makes between character
and eikos arguments in this speech.
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the speech, technical arguments are the focus, but Apollodorus’ past actions (such as
choosing the factory over the bank, and releasing Phormio from all charges but then
bringing a suit against him twenty years later) are meant to demonstrate his self-
interested nature.
This depiction sets up the concerted assault on Apollodorus’ character beginning
at section 41. Here, Demosthenes presumes Apollodorus will justify his pursuit of
Phormio’s share of the inheritance money by arguing that he spent his own portion on
liturgies. Demosthenes preempts this defense by characterizing Apollodorus’ claims as
alazoneia: “…and the amount he spent you have heard—not even a tiny fraction of the
income, much less the capital, on liturgies—nonetheless, he’ll boast (alazôneusetai) and
talk about trierarchies and choregiae”. Whereas Apollodorus brags at length about all his
contributions to the city, he in fact has done almost nothing to benefit the public because
he squanders all his wealth on himself.7 On the contrary, it is Phormio who is quiet, but
generous. By calling on the jurors’ knowledge of braggarts, Demosthenes is coloring
their opinion of Apollodorus as a man who stops at nothing to get what he wants. Further,
portraying him as an alazôn complements the accusation of sukophantês—a term
Demosthenes uses six times in sections 52-62—since both “types” deceive the public for
their own benefit. A sycophant pretends to police transgressions against the state but in
fact abuses the public court system to make personal gains. Similarly, an alazôn boasts of
his greater good to the community as a cover for his self-obsessed and self-interested
pursuits. According to the speaker, Apollodorus will boast and rely on specious
                                                 
7 His specific points are grounded in logos vs. ergon (cf. Johnstone 1999, 93-108).
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arguments in his effort to trick the jurors into siding with him. His trickery is further
borne out by his attempts at invoking pathos (tragic acting). At the close (61),
Demosthenes urges the jurors not to be deceived (exapatêsê) by his bawling (krauge; cf.
odureitai in 36) and his shamelessness.8 In fact, Apollodorus has abused his parents and
the city (47), and he has shown no modesty in his appearance or practices (he wears
expensive cloaks, involves himself with hetairai, and walks around with three attendants
[45]).9 The accusation of alazoneia, as we have seen, is used almost exclusively against
wealthy politicians in the court. It is useful because it presents a high-profile opponent as
exploiting the system for individual profit, just as we saw in Aristophanes’ depiction of
the ambassadors in Acharnians (see ch. 3). Phormio advises the jurors to avoid being
duped by Apollodorus’ trickery by deflating him with their vote.
Although Apollodorus’ character comes under attack, this speech is relatively
restrained on the whole. Demosthenes draws from character types that are familiar to the
jurors, but he does not engage in invective per se, nor do his arguments aim at humor.
Thus, he uses comic characterization for descriptive ends, rather than to evoke derisive
laughter from the audience. This strategy is best suited for maintaining the consistent
depiction of Phormio’s character as the humble and appreciative slave-turned-citizen.10
Apollodorus’ response, on the other hand, makes use of comic characterization
and invective. As a better-known figure in the community, he enters into this case well
                                                 
8 Cf. Hall 1995 on kraugê and braggarts.
9 As Whitman (1964) demonstrates, an alazôn’s success relies primarily on trickery and persuasive speech,
aspects of Apollodorus’ character that Demosthenes warns the jurors about most.
10 As we shall see in Dem. 37, also a paragraphê, the speaker Nicobulus likewise concentrates on
defending his own character rather than attacking his opponent’s, but to an even greater degree than
Phormio.
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aware of the jurors’ pre-existing expectations about his persona. This is not to say,
however, that his notoriety gave him an advantage over Phormio. It is possible, and even
likely, that the Athenian jury viewed him suspiciously from the start, because he was
involved in the banking business.11 His higher profile status, in conjunction with his need
to re-define himself in relation to Phormio and within the community, sets the stage for a
much more aggressive response.
Apollodorus answered his defeat in the counter-indictment with a dikê
pseudomarturiôn against one of Phormio’s witnesses, Stephanus ([Dem.] 45). Against
Stephanus, like Dem. 36, focuses on the legal points for most of the speech, but ends with
particularly harsh character defamation, first against Stephanus, and finally against
Phormio, thus revealing his real target. 12 It is not until sections 63-70 that Apollodorus
mounts a concerted attack on Stephanus’ character. In these sections, he makes clear that
character is just as important to his argument as it was to Phormio’s. He argues that,
although Stephanus would justly be punished based on all of the preceding arguments, he
is even more deserving of the jurors’ anger for how he has lived his life.13 To support this
                                                 
11 Cf. Dem. 37 where Nicobulus mentions his own disadvantage in this regard, namely that Pantaenetus will
claim that the Athenians hate moneylenders outright. His response, that he too does not particularly like
them, gives credence to the negative stereotype.
12 In his opening section, in fact, he accuses Phormio of ponêria and aischrokerdeia; Phormio accused him
of these same behaviors first. Unlike Demosthenes’ concise speech, however, the majority of Apollodorus’
speech is fraught with intricate and sometimes baffling argumentation. Thür 2005, 160-69 cites this as an
example of oratorical hairsplitting, cf. Pearson 1969, 18-26.
13 This (highly rhetorical) assertion provides a good explanation of location of this type of argument, an
extended character attack, at the end of the speech. Apollodorus, at least, thought it would have particular
persuasive force with the jurors and not that it was expendable if he ran out of time. After all, the strategy
of casting an opponent as untrustworthy to his very core is what resulted in his own initial defeat.
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claim, he gives a rather detailed depiction of Stephanus as a kolax (flatterer), a familiar
character in comedy.14
According to Apollodorus, Stephanus followed the banker Aristolochus around,
walking in stride with him and bowing down (hypopeptôkôs) to him, but only so long as
Aristolochus was wealthy. Once Aristolochus was financially ruined (because of men like
Stephanus), Stephanus had no use for him. Apollodorus’ depiction of Stephanus bears
resemblance to comic kolakes when we compare evidence from Middle Comedy and
Theophrastus’ second character sketch.15
According to Theophrastus’ depiction, the kolax follows one man exclusively and
flatters him excessively through actions and words. Theophrastus lists numerous
examples of his behavior, such as praising his patron publicly, laughing at his jokes,
removing crumbs from his beard and even taking the pillows away from a slave at the
theater to put them under his patron himself. Theophrastus, though, does not tell us any
motive for these actions of the kolax. Aristotle’s discussion of philia sheds some light on
the issue of motivation.16 According to Aristotle, both the kolax and the areskos
(obsequious man) represent excessive philia. The difference between them is that the
kolax is motivated by self-interest, whereas the areskos has no ulterior motive.
Theophrastus also makes a distinction between these two characters; the kolax pursues
one man in particular, whereas the areskos fawns indiscriminately.17 Although
                                                 
14 The fact that the Old Comic poet Eupolis had a play entitled Kolakes indicates that this figure was
established as comic well before this speech was written. Menander too wrote a Kolax, which shows that he
remained a figure of interest throughout the 4th century. Cf. Duncan 2006, 102-19.
15 See Diggle 2004, 68-71 and 181-82.
16 Aristotle NE 1108, 26-30.
17 For Theophrastus’ Areskos, see Diggle 2004, 78-81 and 222-49.
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Theophrastus does not explicitly attribute self-interest to the kolax as his motivation in
the way that Aristotle does, the fact that the kolax singles out someone in particular and
speaks and acts in a contrived manner implies this sort of motivation. This is especially
clear when juxtaposed with the areskos, since the areskos is characterized as obsequious
by nature and not by contrivance.
A closer parallel to Apollodorus’ depiction of Stephanus as kolax can be found in
a fragment attributed to Anaxilas (Incertae 32 K-A):18
ofl kÒlak°w efisi t«n §xÒntvn oÈs¤aw
sk√lhkew. efiw oÔn êkakon ényr√pou trÒpon
efisdÁw ßkastow §sy¤ei kay¨menow,
ßvw ín Àsper purÚn épode¤jhi kenÒn.
¶peiy' ı m¢n l°mmÉ §st¤n, ı dÉ ßteron dãknei.
Flatterers are infesting worms of those with property. Each one
eats his way into the goodwill of a man and settles in there, until he
shows himself to be like an empty wheat shaft. Then, that man’s
left behind, and he (the flatterer) bites at another.
In just this way, so Apollodorus states, Stephanus left behind the ruined Aristolochus to
become close with Phormio. Apollodorus’ first example not only characterizes
Stephanus’ relationship with Phormio, which he relates at length, but also demonstrates a
continuity of shameless behavior on Stephanus’ part. He gives the jurors the impression
that Stephanus is a parasite and has virtually made a career out of fawning on selected
individuals. Another fragment from Middle Comedy where the speaker is a (somewhat
proud and happy) Kolax shows that by the time of Antiphanes, whose first play was
                                                 
18 Source is Athenaeus 6.254c.
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staged around 385, men with such behavior were characters on the comic stage in their
own right. The following fragment comes from his Women of Lemnos (142 K-A):
e‰tÉ §stin µ g°noitÉ ín ∞d¤vn t°xnh
µ prÒsodow êllh toË kolakeÊein eÈfu«w;
ı zvgrãfow [---------------------------]
[---------] §n ˜soiw §st‹ kindÊnoiw pãlin˚
prÒsesti pçsin §pim°leia ka‹ pÒnow.
∞m›n d¢ metå g°lvtow ı b¤ow ka‹ trufÆw˚
oÓ går tÚ m°giston ¶rgon §st‹ paidiã,
èdrÚn gelãsai, sk«ca¤ tinÉ, §mpie›n polÊn,
oÈx ∞dÊ; §mo‹ m¢n metå tÚ ploute›n deÊteron.
Kolax: ‘Could there be any trade (technê) more pleasing than the
way of clever flattery (kolakeuein euphuôs)?19 A painter [suffers
and is hated, a farmer]20 also has just as many dangers; there’s
toiling and distress for all of these men. But for us, life is jovial
and luxurious (gelôtos, truphês), the hardest task is play (paidia):
is it not sweet to laugh heartily (gelasai), to crack a joke (skôpsai),
to drink to excess? For me, it’s second only to getting rich (to
ploutein)!’21
Although fragmentary, these passages reveal that comic kolakes were greedy, selfish men
who used others for their own benefit and pleasure.22 The last line of Antiphanes is
particularly interesting because it points to ‘getting rich’ as the main (if not attainable)
goal of a kolax. Apollodorus will take his argument in this same direction after discussing
Stephanus’ efforts on Phormio’s behalf. This passage is worth quoting at length:
                                                 
19 On kolakeia as a technê that requires no effort to learn, see Ribbeck 1883, 66.
20 Supplied by Edmonds, vol. II (Antiphanes frag. 144).
21 Note here the terminology of laughter and jesting (gelotos, paidia, gelasai, skôpsai). These are terms that
Halliwell (1991, 284-88) discusses in association with ‘playful’ (and therefore innocent) laughter (see
below on Dem. 54 for fuller discussion). They add to the light-hearted tone of the passage, implying that
the kolax (in this particular passage) is not a threat, but a jovial character engaging in innocent fun. Thus,
the audience is invited to laugh with him, and not at him. For a list of all comic plays in which a kolax
appears, see Ribbeck 1883, 30-31.
22 See Ribbeck 1883, 9: “In Athen scheint der Name kÒlaj nicht lange vor der Zeit des Aristophanes
eingeführt zu sein, und von Anfang an hatte er eine gemeine Färbung, so dass er vom höheren Stil in Poesie
und Prosa so gut wie ausgeschlossen war.”
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A man who is a flatterer (kolax) of the wealthy, but is then a traitor
to them if they suffer misfortune, and who interacts as an equal
with not a single one of the many other respectable citizens, but
willingly bows down (hypopiptei) to them, and who does not care
if he wrongs one of his own associates, nor does he care if ruins his
reputation by his actions, or about anything else for that matter,
except his own greedy gain (pleon hexei); isn’t it fitting to hate this
man as the common enemy of all of mankind? I should say so (65-
66).
There is an important difference in perspective between the two fragments quoted
above. In comedies, the kolax could be portrayed negatively as a threat to an individual or
community (as in the Anaxilas fragment), or, he could be a somewhat likeable character
(as in Antiphanes’ Lemniai). As we saw in the Lemniai, by hearing the kolax describe
himself in his own words, the audience is directed to sympathize with his desire for
attaining easy wealth and joy in life, and to relish his brazen pursuit of things that most
people covet. However, the destructive potential and the pitfalls of dependence particular
to the kolax are still there, even in comedy.23 The difference between the kolax in a
comedy and in the courtroom is that, on the comic stage he can be likeable, but in real
life he cannot.
Apollodorus thus creates a scenario similar to the passage in Anaxilas where he
asks the jurors to sympathize with himself as a character like Aristolochus, the one
shamelessly duped by Stephanus’ maneuvers. Although the audience is not affected
directly by this relationship, Apollodorus goes on to argue that they are indirect victims;
                                                 
23 The complexity and nuance of the kolax-parasitus figure is present already in Greek comedy, but can
best be seen in the fully developed parasites of Plautine comedy. See Damon 1997, 23-36 and Ribbeck
1883, 76ff.
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Stephanus, the kolax, keeps everything he wrongfully gets and then evades all duties to
the state, never serving as choregus or trierarch, nor performing any other liturgy (66).
Whereas a kolax who proclaims his life to be more enjoyable than most may be a likeable
character on stage, in the real life of the courtroom, he must be hated as the ‘common
enemy of all of mankind.’ In this way, the orator benefits from comic characterization by
framing his opponent in terms recognizable from the comic stage, while simultaneously
demanding the jurors to view him from their ‘serious judgmental set’ and not their
‘playful judgmental set’ as they generally would in the theater (see Introduction).
Just as Demosthenes accused Apollodorus of being shamelessly and deceitfully
selfish by associating alazoneia with sycophancy, here Apollodorus achieves a similar
effect by associating flattery with perjury. Since the jurors would have no prior
knowledge of who Stephanus was,24 Apollodorus characterizes him as a flatterer, best
known from the comic stage, as a way of blackening his character. This depiction gives
the jurors a plausible reason why he would be willing to commit perjury for Phormio.
Someone who would be willing to use his own friends to benefit himself monetarily
cannot be trusted. Thus, both Apollodorus and Phormio use comic characterization to
underline serious offenses.
Apollodorus’ characterization of Stephanus as a self-serving flatterer thus makes
sense in the context of the legal charge; Stephanus is being charged for false witness and
a flatterer is just the type to perjure himself, if it is for gain. Apollodorus also makes the
direct connection between flattery and false testimony (pseudomarturion) (just as
                                                 
24 See Hesk (2000) and Ober (1989) who both argue that the juries would not be familiar with any litigant
short of high-profile politicians.
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Demosthenes did between sycophancy and admissibility [eisagôgimos]) when he claims:
‘it would be better by far to be proven a man seeking honor and acting generously toward
the state than a flatterer (kolakeuonta) and bearer of false witness (ta pseudê
marturounta)! But this man would do anything for gain (kerdainein) (66).’
In sections 68-70, Apollodorus builds on his previous accusations, but shifts his
focus to Stephanus’ appearance and deportment.25 We now get a second view of
Stephanus, not as kolax, but as dyskolos. Apollodorus claims that Stephanus ‘skulks
along the walls’ (tous toichous houtos eskuthrôpakôs), not because he is temperate, but
because he is misanthropic. He avoids walking naturally and being cheerful because he
has determined that those types of people invite requests from others, whereas acting
sullenly drives them away (68-69).26 Stephanus’ mean-spiritedness is not, however,
ascribed to his nature, but rather, portrayed as masking his real character (problêma tou
tropou to schema tout’ esti) (69).27 Apollodorus accuses him twice of counterfeit
behavior (peplastai, peplasmenois), which he attributes to a fierce and bitter mind. At
first, the description of Stephanus as misanthrope appears to be at odds with the man
whom we just saw fawning on others and doing whatever they asked without question,
and in fact, Apollodorus does not overtly integrate the two types of behavior. Rather, he
                                                 
25 In section 77, Apollodorus also discusses perceptions of how he carries himself (i.e. he walks quickly and
talks loudly), but discusses them as natural and not feigned. The same characteristics are used to describe
Nicobulus in Dem. 37.52; see below for a detailed discussion of both passages.
26 Stephanus’ insincerity stands out all the more if we compare him with comedy’s most famous dyskolos,
Knemon, from Menander’s Dyskolos, who hates and avoids people only because he has been repeatedly
disappointed by them in the past. Stephanus is untrustworthy because he only pretends to hate people, not
because he is actually dyskolos by nature.
27 Cf. Goldhill 1999.
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links both facets of Stephanus’ ability to take on different characterizations (i.e. to act)
with his overall insincerity and untrustworthiness.28
Apollodorus thus attacks Stephanus’ performance of character as deliberately
fashioned (peplastai) in order to expose Stephanus’ true character. Hesk provides a useful
discussion of this depiction of Stephanus in terms of Athenian ‘folk’ physiognomy. The
general perception of Stephanus’ deportment would be one of temperance and moral
decency.29 His interpretation of this strategy is, however, somewhat misleading: “There
is, Apollodorus implies, no need for name-calling (‘sycophant’, ‘sophist’ and so on)
which juries hear every day, and such name-calling would fail to capture the
extraordinary truth of Stephanus’ life of deception. Apollodorus’ physiognomics of deceit
attempts to authorise its truth-status by virtue of its distinctive distance from the standard
topoi of invective used against ‘dishonest’ opponents.”30 For Hesk, Apollodorus’ attempt
to decode Stephanus’ appearance is an alternate approach to revealing Stephanus’ deceit,
rather than the standard use of invective. His assessment, however, does not take account
of the fact, recognized by most commentators, that this speech resorts to truly ferocious
invective.31 While Hesk is right to say that Stephanus is not attacked as a ‘sycophant’ and
                                                 
28 Here it is worth noting that Apollodorus’ portrayal of Stephanus, although complicated, does not conflict
with the general belief in fixity of character. Apollodorus does not claim that Stephanus has undergone any
change of character over time, but rather that he is has different ways of concealing his one (devious)
character. This is typical of the kolax; cf. Ribbeck 1883, 69: “Der kÒlaj hat die Natur des Polypen, der die
Farbe des Felsens annimmt, an dem er gerade haftet, und sie mit dem Ort wechselt; er ist also ein echter
Hellene, der nach der alten Regel lebt, die in demselben Sinne gleicht er dem Chamäleon: wie dieses alle
Farben annimmt, ausgenommen die weisse, so vermag er sich Allem anzupassen, nur nicht dem
Ernsthaften und Guten.”
29 Hesk 2000, 222-24, citing North 1966, 85-149.
30 Hesk 2000, 227.
31 See, for example, Paley & Sandys 1979, xxxiv-xxxv.
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‘sophist’, the reason for this is simply that those particular roles were not suited to the
charge in the case.
As I hope to have shown, Stephanus is attacked as a kolax (flatterer) and dyskolos
(misanthrope) because these depictions better support Apollodorus’ accusations of
perjury; Stephanus’ relationship with Phormio paved the way for his giving false
testimony on Phormio’s behalf. ‘Sycophant’, although widely used in oratory, is
nonetheless employed for the most part where it fits, namely against the opponent who
brought the case to trial. Thus, we see this term used against Phormio by Apollodorus,
and against Apollodorus by Phormio, but predictably not against a witness like
Stephanus. For these reasons, Apollodorus’ physiognomics can more accurately be
viewed as a part of his “rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” (to use Hesk’s phrase), and as working
in collaboration with his invective to expose the ‘real’ Stephanus, rather than as a
replacement for it.
Although the majority of the speech is directed at Stephanus, it is Phormio who is
the real object of Apollodorus’ attack. Apollodorus spends less time on character
arguments about Phormio and more on specific accusations against him (71-82). Phormio
is charged with ponêria and anaideia repeatedly, but his character is never shaped with
the extent of detail that we see in Apollodorus’ treatment of Stephanus. Apollodorus’
account here remains strongly rooted in comic principles nonetheless; in particular, he
shapes Phormio according to a kind of status inversion.32 Phormio, according to
                                                 
32 As we have seen in previous chapters, topsi-turviness is a comic theme—prevalent from the time of
Aristophanes on—that the orators exploit for the purpose of creating a bold picture of the extreme damage
that their opponent has brought about. Topsi-turviness can be fun in comedy, but destructive in reality;
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Apollodorus’ account, is not just ponêros, but is actively calculating and scheming, as the
repeated use of forms of logizetai indicate. Further, Apollodorus frames his entire
predicament in terms of the mundus perversus into which Phormio has thrust him.33 The
force of Apollodorus’ argument rests on the comic reversal of roles between slave and
master, but as we have seen, each man’s status is not that clear cut. Here I wish to
emphasize that, by use of the term “comic”, I do not mean to imply “humorous”;
Apollodorus’ account is clearly hostile in tone, which is not per se mutually exclusive
with humor, but there is no indication in the text that he was attempting to evoke
laughter. Still, it is comic in the sense that he deliberately chooses to frame his narrative
along a comic plot line by casting Phormio as a slave cleverly outdoing his master.
Phormio was indeed a slave at one point in time. According to Apollodorus, he
attained citizenship, but only because Apollodorus’ family was kind. He subsequently
attained wealth, but only because Apollodorus’ father, Pasion, was a banker. Phormio’s
marriage to Pasion’s wife Archippê, a metic, is described as an absurdity (by Phormio’s
account, Pasion agreed to the marriage in his will; by Apollodorus’ account, Phormio
forged the will to get her and her property for himself). Even more absurd for
Apollodorus is that Phormio’s sons could end up marrying Apollodorus’ own daughters
in the event of his death (75): hoi tou doulou tôn despotou (those of the slave [would
marry] those of the master)! But most absurd of all  (atopôtaton) is Phormio’s subjection
of Apollodorus to legal scrutiny:
                                                                                                                                                  
again we are seeing ways in which the “real life” setting of the courtroom affects the jurors’ mindset
toward the same scenarios they would find amusing on the comic stage.
33 Koster (1980, 76-77) holds that ponêros is too generic and therefore can be overlooked in a discussion on
invective. Although it is a generic term, because it is a defining feature of the Aristophanic hero (cf.
Whitman 1964), it should not be passed over when looking at comic invective.
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And this is the most absurd of all; he has never been willing to provide an
account of the money that he has ripped away from us, but instead he
lodges a paragraphê on the grounds that my case is not admissible. He
includes in the calculation (logizetai) the things that I was apportioned
from my father’s estate. Anyone might see other slaves being subject to
scrutiny (exetazomenos) by their masters, but this man does the exact
opposite—he, a slave (ho doulos), scrutinizes (exetazei) his master (ton
despotên)! So clearly does he reveal himself to be villainous (ponêron)
and dissolute (asôton) by these actions (76).
Apollodorus therefore creates a hierarchy of offenses, all of which revolve around
Phormio’s status as ‘slave’, and the worst of them his bringing a case against his
‘master’. Nor does Phormio’s perversion of the natural order stop here. According to
Apollodorus, Phormio reversed the proper roles in his sexual conduct as well. In a flurry
of rhetorical questions, Apollodorus accuses him of hiring a citizen for prostitution,
thereby debauching him and depriving him of free speech. Whereas citizens regularly
hired slaves or metics as prostitutes, slaves did not do the hiring. Phormio, therefore,
overstepped his bounds by making a citizen his sexual object.34 This line of
argumentation culminates in the accusation that Phormio was decent by day, but
abominable by night (80):35
By day you are moderate (sôphron), but by night, you commit acts for
which the penalty is death. Wicked (ponêros), men of Athens, this man
has been wicked (ponêros) and unjust (adikos) from the time he left the
temple of Castor and Pollux!
                                                 
34 His other sexual transgressions, which reveal his destructive appropriation of citizen status, include the
corruption of many citizens’ wives, first and foremost his master’s wife, Archippê. And when he set up a
monument at her tomb, he did not succeed in the honorable goal of memorializing the tomb itself, but the
exact opposite—he memorialized the disgraceful acts she committed with him against her husband.
35 The license of darkness is a trope common to both Greek and Roman culture; cf. description of Conon’s
witnesses in Dem. 54 below.
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Here, when we are told that Phormio behaved in two totally separate ways, we are also
reminded of Stephanus’ two-faced personality. Since Demosthenes’ depiction of Phormio
as an honest banker in Dem. 36 was overwhelmingly successful, we see Apollodorus try
to undermine his reputation by claiming that he acted disgracefully in private.
Apollodorus attributes this double life to his ponêria, which gives him the capability of
tricking others into thinking he is reputable.36 Apollodorus thus relies on the Greek belief
in the fixity of character; since one cannot be dishonest is one sphere only, the only
explanation is that Phormio is disguising his corruption.
Apollodorus’ summation integrates his denunciation of slaves who outdo their
masters in a mundus perversus with his specific arguments about the forgery of his
father’s will and the false testimony given against him. He tries to bring the jurors over to
his side by claiming that they are masters just like him. They need only imagine that they
were wronged by their own slaves, just as he was by Phormio, in order to pass correct
judgment. Here again it becomes clear that, on the comic stage (and even during the
speech), this kind of topsy-turviness can be fun, but in the real life of the court, it is
destructive if the situation is not returned to its normative state by the jurors’ vote.37
Apollodorus returns to the theme of kolakeia in his epilogue (85): “I ask and beg
and entreat you not to overlook my daughters and me in a time of need, so that I become
an object of malignant joy to my slaves (doulois) and his flatterers (kolaxin).” The
excessively deferential language that he chooses to employ here is telling, since it is in
                                                 
36 See, for example, Whitman 1964 on the comic hero.
37 See Segal (1987, 7-14) who argues that the comic world too must return to normal.
163
contrast to his typically aggressive diction. By beseeching the people in this way, he is
attempting to demonstrate gratitude toward them for the station that he and his family has
achieved. His deference makes sense, particularly in light of the fact that he accuses
Phormio of not showing adequate appreciation, either to Apollodorus and his family or to
the city. His final appeal for the jurors to restrain his opponents from their excessive
fawning (tês agan kolakeias), is a further nod toward the jurors’ position of authority, and
toward ending his own case on topic. It was Stephanus whom he characterized primarily
as a flatterer, and it is against Stephanus that his case is technically proceeding. His
mention of kolakeia here highlights the important role it played in his argument and
returns the jurors to the points he previously made about the connection between flattery
and perjury. Further, it is key toward his conscious effort to situate himself firmly below
the jurors and above Phormio in terms of his social status.
This interpretation of status as it relates Apollodorus’ strategy in the speech calls
for a reevaluation of his use of invective. Phormio was a slave later freed by Pasion, and
although Apollodorus was a citizen, he could not escape his background (Pasion himself
was once a slave). As Trevett has argued convincingly, the extant speeches delivered by
Apollodorus reveal an obsession with his own status.38 The ferocity of Apollodorus’
invective against Phormio and Stephanus is therefore as much about Apollodorus
attempting to define himself and assert his own status within the Athenian community as
it is an attempt to debase his opponents. Yet scholars have misinterpreted Apollodorus’
                                                 
38 See Trevett 1992, 170-75. In particular, Trevett points out how Apollodorus puts greater emphasis on the
selflessness and generosity of his gifts to the city and his friends, and calls for the torturing of slaves under
oath with unparalleled frequency. The former attempts to associate him more closely with elite citizens and
the latter serves to distance himself from slaves.
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invective against Phormio as unconvincing and even mean-spirited, opining that it does
not do much more than draw attention to Apollodorus’ insecurity about his own status.39
Apollodorus, to a degree, was both high and low status, and was therefore concerned with
distancing himself from his family’s past. We must keep in mind that Apollodorus was
attempting to define himself as an educated man worthy of political involvement when
evaluating the role of invective in his speeches. First, it is hard to imagine that
Demosthenes would have chosen this plan of attack for Apollodorus if it were likely to
annoy, rather than persuade, an Athenian jury. Further, in the hands of well-known
politicians like Aeschines and Demosthenes, we have seen that invective has the ability to
arouse enjoyment and laughter from the jury. It is likely, then, that the jury would not be
outraged by Apollodorus’ claims, if he could in fact distance himself successfully from
Phormio in order to show that Phormio was out of line with his own status, whereas
Apollodorus was perfectly in line with his.40 One reason why Apollodorus’ speech comes
across to modern scholars as tactless is the imbalance of status between the litigants in
these speeches that we do not see elsewhere. Phormio’s speech was very successful, and
he achieved this goal by portraying himself as humble and honest. Although scholars
might wish that Apollodorus had responded in kind, such a response would not have been
sufficient. Apollodorus trusts instead that the jurors will see his forceful response as
necessary for maintaining control over his own familial affairs, a perceived prerequisite
                                                 
39 See, for example, Trevett 1992, 174 and Pearson 1969.
40 And in fact, the speech is quite similar to the case Aeschines brings against Timarchus in this way. There,
Aeschines attempts to distance himself from Timarchus by appealing to his own chaste love of boys in
contrast to Timarchus, whom he is at pains to depict as a pornos. It was essential to his speech to get the
jury to see as great a gap as possible between the two men, which is also Apollodorus’ goal. Similarly, both
emphasize that their opponents are acting out of line with their proper station (for which purpose, the
mundus perversus model is very effective).
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for a successful politician. In this way, Apollodorus does not come across as gratuitously
nasty, but rather as putting a grasping and unappreciative freedman in his place. Thus,
each speaker made use of comic characterization or comic strategies, but in a way that
best suited his particular status.
II. Against Pantaenetus (Dem. 37):
The case Against Pantaenetus provides a useful comparison to For Phormio since
it is also a counter-indictment (paragraphê), in which the cause of the dispute is
financial. In this case, however, both litigants are low profile. Nicobulus brought the
paragraphê in response to Pantaenetus’ suit against him for damages in a mining case
(dikê metallikê). It is a complicated disagreement over a transaction that involved
Pantaenetus’ rental of a silver ore workshop from Nicobulus and his business partner
Euergus.41 For our purposes, it is enough to know that Pantaenetus had already won a
similar case against Euergus and now Nicobulus is arguing for exemption from
prosecution because Pantaenetus has granted him a release and discharge (aphesis kai
apallagê), essentially freeing him from all responsibility to Pantaenetus as his lessor after
he and Euergus sold the workshop. Nicobulus’ tone, Like Phormio’s, is rather hostile
throughout but his speech by and large avoids invective.42 Nor does it contain any
extended narrative on Pantaenetus’ character (aside from his deceptive behavior in the
                                                 
41 The speech is firmly dated to 346 based on evidence in the text. For a more detailed introduction and
analysis of the case, see MacDowell 2004, 173-77.
42 Except for one occasion (30) where he calls him the “pettiest of men” (phaulotatos anthrôpôn).
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case against Euergus). It does, however, give us a glimpse of Pantaenetus’ alleged attacks
on Nicobulus’ character.43
As I discussed in the Introduction, it is a feature of these more specific types of
cases (dikê metallikê) to limit discussion of character and past actions, and to focus
instead on the specifics of the dispute. Nicobulus, therefore, is relatively quiet about
Pantaenetus the man. It is significant, however, that Nicobulus does defend his own
character. This is predictable for two reasons; although the paragraphê allows him to
speak first, he is still a defendant in the case, and (more importantly) he is a moneylender.
In section 52, he sarcastically claims that Pantaenetus will have nothing more than the
following to use as evidence against him: “The Athenians hate moneylenders; Nicobulus
is detestable (epiphthonos), and he’s a fast walker, and he’s a loud talker, and he carries a
walking-stick.” Carey and Reid argue that Nicobulus’ mention of these traits is less
motivated by knowledge of what Pantaenetus will argue, than from Nicobulus’ own
awareness of general disdain for moneylenders. Nicobulus, then, would be exposing a
stereotype he could disarm.44 Just as we saw with Stephanus, Nicobulus confronts ‘folk’
physiognomic assumptions about his deportment. Apollodorus also brings up the same
concerns about perceptions of himself, that he walks quickly and talks loudly (§gƒ d' Œ
êndrew ÉAyhna›oi tÆw m¢n ˆcevw tÆi fÊsei ka‹ t“ tax°vw bad¤zein ka‹ lale›n
                                                 
43 Further, it gives us detailed information about how a formal aspect of legal procedure, the enklêma, was
used for including potentially irrelevant material. The enklêma was the indictment in private suits (dikai)
that was comprised of a list of the charges against the defendant and read out at the beginning of the trial;
see above Introduction.
44 I agree, but in this case, it is also possible that Pantaenetus did intend to use this argument against
Nicobulus. Nicobulus would have better knowledge of Pantaenetus’ arguments because of the parallel case
he brought against Euergus. Although he does not mention explicitly that Pantaenetus accused Euergus of
these traits, Nicobulus does refer to the case against Euergus repeatedly throughout the speech for the types
of arguments he expects to face if the case goes to trial.
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m°ga, oÈ t«n eÈtux«w pefukÒtvn §mautÚn kr¤nv), although Phormio never made
this kind of argument against him in the paragraphê. Both Nicobulus and Apollodorus
acknowledge that these are negative traits but attribute them to nature (phusis). There is
no consensus on what, in fact, walking fast and talking loudly connoted to the average
Athenian, but it seems that deception and intemperance are most likely at work, since
there is a clear connection with acting.45
Nicobulus reverts to the same topic as he begins the close of his speech (55).
Here, he directly opposes himself with Pantaenetus for the first and only time: “I’m the
kind of guy who walks fast (ho tachu badizôn), Pantaenetus, but you’re the kind who
stands still (ho atremas)!” Presumably this is a slight against Pantaenetus implying that
he is useless—a rather harsh criticism since proving one’s “usefulness” to the city is
essential for each litigant, if he hopes to gain or retain the goodwill of the jury. This type
of mocking opposition recalls Demosthenes’ treatment of Aeschines in OTC, particularly
where he appropriates Aeschines’ mockery of him as “Batalus” (anus, lisper), by
claiming that a Batalus who served his city in a time of need is better than a useless bad
actor (180). In both cases, Demosthenes, as the speechwriter, recognized it to be a better
strategy to accept the criticism (even if untrue) and then outdo an opponent with this
                                                 
45 Contra Carey & Reid (1985, 155-56), who believe it may refer to “rude, unpolished” behavior (on
evidence for walking out of rhythm in Alexis and Aristophanes). Since, as they point out, the main
objection to moneylenders in Greek culture is that they benefit off of someone else’s misfortune (see
Millett, P. 1983, 43) it seems that “rude” behavior is not as likely to come into play as the ability to deceive
and swindle by quick, loud movements (cf. used car salesmen today). Further, Antiphanes 33 associates
philosophers with baktêriai, and in Aristophanes, it is a sign of Spartanizing if the man is not old or
crippled. The stick, then, could signify sophistry and thus deception; in Dem. 54.34, Conon’s witnesses are
accused of Spartanizing by day, as a deceptive cover for their real characters which are revealed in private
(see below for discussion of this passage). Note especially a passage in Theophrastus’ character, the
mikrophilotimos, connecting the use of the baktêria with being clever at acquisition (deinos ktêsesthai).
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information, rather than try to refute the criticism itself.46 It is noticeable that this tactic
was used by Demosthenes in the middle of his lengthy speech, but was by no means the
culmination. In Dem. 37, on the other hand, it is the finale.  Thus, we see a clear instance
of Nicobulus working up to a witty attack based on character, but nothing comparable to
what we have seen from politicians.
Dem. 37 illustrates well the use of a formal legal procedure for broadening the
scope of a dikê.47  What it tells us explicitly is useful for interpreting other cases in which
the charges are not confronted directly. Perhaps it helps explain the late introduction of
an attack against Olympiodorus (Dem. 48) for wasting family money on a hetaira.
Although scholars generally have considered this last-minute attack irrelevant, it is not
inconceivable that the speaker formally included it (especially considering Ariston’s
claims that Euergus’ alleged injustices against heiresses particularly stirred the jury’s
anger). And in Dem. 54, as we shall see presently, the speaker Ariston begins by arguing
that he could have brought a graphê hubreôs or apagogê, instead of a dikê aikeias. It is
likely that he included these charges in the enklêma, just as Pantaenetus included dikê
aikeias, graphê hubreôs, biaiôn, and pros epiklêrous in his.
                                                 
46 This rule of invective—to take away an opponent’s attack by using it first—still exists today.
47 The discussion of enklêma in Dem. 37 also sheds light on the role of the graphê in public suits. Recall
that the last charge in Aeschines’ graphê paranomôn against Ctesiphon performed the same function;
Aeschines accused Ctesiphon of illegally proposing that “Demosthenes always spoke and acted in Athens’
best interest.” He thereby legitimately opened up the case to a full scrutiny of Demosthenes’ life (and
character), which resulted in a full scrutiny of his own life, by the rules of the game. This charge, then,
acted as an umbrella for all of their harshest attacks against each other, much to the jury’s delight rather
than disgust. It is useful to compare this strategy with Cicero’s Pro Caelio, where Caelius was charged with
five counts of vis (political violence). It was the fifth and final charge that included the attempt to poison
Clodia, and thus formed the basis of Cicero’s speech (as synêgoros) against her character and in defense of
Caelius’ (cf. 56-8).
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III. Against Conon (Dem. 54):
The speeches discussed thus far make strategic use of physiognomy, comic
characterization, status inappropriate behavior, and topsi-turviness for framing arguments
against opponents. As we shall see, Demosthenes’ speech Against Conon (Dem. 54) also
includes these elements, but goes further by incorporating most of the features that were
useful among high profile litigants: nicknames, comparisons with animals, age-
inappropriate behavior, and laughter. Since both speakers in this case are low profile, this
speech is particularly useful for exploring the difference in roles that elements of
invective play in private versus public disputes.
Dem. 54 is a case for battery (dikê aikeias) that is famed for its vivid descriptions
of drunken, abusive assault.48 It is a speech that stands out among Demosthenes’ works
because it relies so heavily on narrative for creating a persuasive argument.49 From the
beginning, there is an emphasis on the beating that the speaker received and the generally
obnoxious behavior of Conon and his gang. Commentators have not failed to notice the
pointed use of hubristheis as the opening word in order to set the tone for the description
                                                 
48 The exact date of the speech is unknown, but most scholars agree that the trial occurred in the mid-fourth
century; see Carey and Reid (1985, 69), who discuss the evidence for dating the speech to 353 or 341.
49 In discussing models available to Demosthenes for this type of speech, Usher (1999) mentions Lysias 3
(Against Simon) and quotes Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dem. 11-12), who claimed that it would be easy to
confuse which of the two orators authored which speech if we did not already know. Usher’s point was to
argue that there is not much new or distinctive stylistically in Dem. 54, but by his comparison of
Demosthenes with Lysias, Dionysius’ remark also highlights the deployment of narrative in Against Conon
to a degree that is greater than generally considered standard for Demosthenes. As I have argued in the
introduction, narrative is the primary vehicle for an orator to create dramatic scenes and dialogue, since the
context permits only one speaker and not three or four actors, as in a play. This speech is exemplary for its
use of narrative for such dramatic effect.
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of Conon’s actions throughout.50 Further, this choice of words lends weight to the
speaker’s claim in the proem that he could have brought a graphê hubreôs instead of a
dikê aikeias. It is the first indication of Demosthenes’ attempt to broaden the case beyond
the narrow legal issue of which man struck the first blow in the fight.51
Strictly speaking, a dikê aikeias is narrower in scope than a graphê hubreôs would
have been. The decision to emphasize hubris allows Demosthenes to focus on anti-
democratic social violations, a much more interesting route than discussing the
mechanics of a fight, and also one that will resonate with the jury.52 To support his
accusations, Ariston focuses on the nature and extremity of the attack, along with the
social standing of the defendants. But the relevance of his arguments about hubris is
questionable. Wolff sees Demosthenes’ approach as one that compensates cleverly for a
lack of strict evidence, just as we would expect from any lawyer today.53 And Cohen uses
this case to support his theory that Athenian law was about people, not acts, with the law
courts being arenas for social competition between individuals, rather than places to
judge different versions of past events.54 It seems unlikely that Demosthenes could get
away with constructing an entire case around the character and behavior of the
individuals involved if it were considered irrelevant information to the jury. Nonetheless,
                                                 
50 Carey and Reid 1985, 74-6; Usher 1999, 246. Cf. also Cohen (1995, 120) who makes this point and
discusses the similarity of strategy to Dem. 21. Halliwell (1991) does even better to identify the crucial
combination of hubris with aselgeia—“a term that has unmistakable links with mockery and insult (287)”.
51 Ariston mentions that Conon struck first, but does not try to prove it. Cf. Wolff (1968, 23), who points
out that Ariston never addresses this legal question, and in fact, actively avoids it. See also Phillips 2000,
193ff. for other aikeia cases that do address “unjust hands” as legal issue.
52 For a fuller discussion of the connections between aikeia and hubris in this and other court cases, see
Phillips 2000, 178-249.
53 Wolff 1968, 17-18.
54 Cohen 1995, 122.
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Cohen’s theory does not seem adequate when we consider the lengths to which litigants
go to make their procedural choices relevant to the jury. This is one reason why Ariston
spends so much time on the laws and the types of charges available to him. His conscious
effort to demonstrate that the case could also have been brought as a graphê hubreôs
reveals that the jury would have had some expectations of judging the violation against
the case actually brought.55 Certainly the hubristic behavior of Conon and his gang would
provide primary evidence in a graphê hubreôs. By arguing that a graphê hubreôs was
just as possible as a dikê aikeias, the arguments about hubris are made relevant, and this
in turn prepares the jurors to accept as relevant any discussion about character and
behavior. Ariston also makes a specific argument about the relevance of character and
background information, when he defends himself preemptively from similar accusations
by Conon that he himself is prone to getting drunk and starting fights (14-16). He argues
that he has never been seen in public doing such things, whereas Conon and his sons
have, as Ariston’s first story and witness testimony demonstrate.
Ariston uses his decision to bring a dikê aikeias as evidence of his self-knowledge
and restraint. His choice of suit is key to his own self-presentation, but by bringing
graphê hubreôs into the picture, he gives himself greater leeway to shape Conon’s
character. Within ten sections, Ariston describes two scenes of assault carried out by
Conon and his sons; the first was directed against Ariston and his slaves at an army camp
two years prior, and the second occurred in Athens and allegedly almost killed him. He
gives far more detail of the first account: Conon and his drunken gang beat up Ariston’s
                                                 
55 Cf. the same phenomenon (discussed above in ch. 3) in Against Androtion where the trial is a graphê
paranomôn, but Diodorus claims he could have brought a graphê hetairêseôs.
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slaves, dump chamber pots on them, urinate on them directly, and engage in every kind
of hubristic behavior (4).56 His inclusion of the first account serves primarily as
background information for the second, marking the beginning of Conon’s antagonism
toward him and establishing continuity of hostility and aggressive drunken behavior on
the part of the defendants. The details of the first fight invite the jurors to infer what
Conon might have done against Ariston in the second fight when Ariston resists giving
specifics. Part of his strategy is to keep his language vague at key points so that the
details he does choose to tell must be used to fill in the gaps. This approach is possible
because the charge of hubris is itself vague.
It is in connection with his emphasis on hubris (and aselgeia) that aspects of
humor become important in the speech. Laughter plays a key role throughout, but it is
much more complicated in this speech than most, since Ariston is not positioning himself
as the confident prosecutor who tries to elicit laughter and direct it against his opponents.
Rather, he argues that it is Conon who will attempt to evoke the audience’s laughter
about the whole affair in order to calm the jury’s anger by giving the impression that
these were harmless pranks. Thus, although he is the prosecutor, Ariston becomes the
defendant against the laughter that Conon will allegedly arouse: “I want to tell you in
advance that I have learned he is prepared to turn the issue away from the assault and the
deeds that were done and try to reduce it to laughter and ridicule (gelôta kai skômmata).”
                                                 
56 Cohen (1995) and Bers (2003, 66) believe that Ariston is here implying anal rape, and therefore possibly
against Ariston too in the second fight. Although it is never explicitly mentioned in the speech, Ariston
does create the impression that either his slaves, or himself, or both were victims of sexual assault. He does
so through ambiguous descriptions in conjunction with the claim he later makes that the Ithyphalloi initiate
each other with penetration (see below).
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According to Ariston, then, whose presentation of his opponent’s strategy is admittedly
slanted, Conon will play down the importance of the case in the hopes that the jury will
laugh at the whole affair (including Ariston) and then acquit Conon.
This scenario provides a striking parallel with what Philocleon in Wasps argues is
a regular practice among defendants, namely to tell jokes and funny stories in order to
quell the jurors’ wrath:
ofl d¢ l°gousin mÊyouw ∞m›n, ofl dÉ Afis√pou ti g°loion: ofl d¢
sk√ptousÉ, flnÉ §gƒ gelãsv ka‹ tÚn yumÚn katay«mai (Wasps, 566-
67)
Some [defendants] tell us stories; others something funny (geloion) of
Aesop’s; others again make jokes (skôptousi) so that I’ll laugh (gelasô)
and subdue my anger.
Philocleon’s claim presents this use of laughter as something typical of defendants in the
law courts, and Ariston’s fear of just this lends further support to the claim that this tactic
was not a rare occurrence. However, we cannot be certain that Philocleon is describing
the same phenomenon as Ariston; Ariston speaks specifically of turning one’s own case
into a laughing matter, whereas Philocleon might mean nothing more than cracking jokes
here and there that are not directly related to the case. Not that this is very likely. The fact
that Ariston and Philocleon use the same terminology (gelota, geloion, gelasô; skômmata,
skôptousi) to describe the jesting in which defendants tend to engage gives us some
indication that they are discussing the same practice. Halliwell discusses these same
words in connection with “playful” laughter, as opposed to “consequential” laughter.
Playful laughter is associated with youths and thus has a certain innocence about it. It is
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not surprising, then, that defendants would use this approach. In Veatchian terms, the
defendants are attempting to weaken the commitment on the part of the jury toward
misbehavior. In this way, the jury will view the defendants’ behavioral violation as
youthful fun, rather than find it offensive and therefore not at all amusing. For this
reason, the stress must fall on Conon rather than his sons, a point to which I will return
shortly.
Demosthenes recognizes that the laughter could be directed at Ariston, insofar as
the assault could be painted as harmless drunken burlesque. 57 But it is striking that
Demosthenes does not see it as a successful maneuver to arouse derisive laughter directly
against Conon for his behavior in the same way that Aeschines did against Timarchus, or
Demosthenes did against Androtion, where they too were constructing a case around elite
excess and outrage. In those instances, the speakers were high profile politicians. Here,
however, Ariston is virtually anonymous to the jurors and hopes to maintain the persona
of a mild-mannered youth. For this reason, he cannot simply turn the tables on Conon and
aggressively attack his character with humorous invective. Ariston, in essence, is not
asking the jurors to join him in asserting superiority over Conon. Rather, he is attempting
to prevent Conon from doing so. Just as Conon will allegedly attempt to weaken the
audience’s commitment, Ariston takes up the opposite strategy of getting the audience
                                                 
57 As mentioned above, Halliwell (1991) interprets ancient Greek laughter in terms of an opposition
between ‘playful’ and ‘consequential’. Playful laughter is innocent through its association with youth.
Consequential laughter, on the other hand, is intimately connected with the shame culture of the adult
Greek world in which laughter is used as a force to debase the status of enemies. He applies his model
specifically to Dem. 54 as a test case by looking briefly at the scene of Conon’s victorious cock
impersonation and concludes that the case ultimately revolves around whether the jurors interpret the attack
and aftermath as playful or consequential laughter on Conon’s part (287). It is tempting to  see
consequential laughter as a strategy of  prosecution and playful laughter as one of defense.
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committed enough that they find Conon’s behavior offensive and unfunny. Ariston can
and does try to get the audience to laugh at Conon (as we shall see), but he must keep in
mind his deferential posture vis-à-vis the jury, which necessitates the use of tactics that
are subtler than open ridicule. Because the act of beating can evoke laughter at the
recipient if he appears deserving (as we know from Thersites; cf. also the opening of
Wealth where a beating is threatened, and Thesmophoriazusae), and because youthful
brawling is not necessarily unacceptable in Athenian culture,58 Demosthenes focuses the
prosecution on Conon, an older man engaging in age-inappropriate behavior.
Although many men are involved in the beating, he singles out Conon as a
ringleader because the jurors would have less tolerance for this behavior coming from an
older man.59 He makes this explicit in section 22 where he brings up Conon’s age
directly: “Whoever is over fifty years old and hangs around with younger men, including
his own sons, not so that he can prevent them or steer them away from such behavior, but
so that he can be the leader and catalyst and most disgusting of all, what penalty could he
ever endure that is worthy of his actions?”60 Demosthenes knows that Conon’s sons could
expect leniency from the jurors because they are boys.61 But Conon is far too old to be
                                                 
58 The speaker in Lysias 3 and Ariston in this case both indicate that they tried to keep their quarrels over
love affairs out of the court. They create the impression that these were common occurrences and therefore
only actionable if taken too far. See Krauss (2004, 88-182, esp. 133-152 and 175-179) on age-inappropriate
behavior in Plautine comedy.
59 Cf. Lysias 3, where the case is based on the same premises: speaker is worried about his age because of
love affairs and beatings that result from them.
60 Here also, cf. Hypereides’ comment that a man does not become an adulterer after 50; he either is or is
not at that point; the belief in continuity of character would imply that Conon has a long history of this type
of behavior, or at least that he is by nature prone to this in past and present, likely then in the future if he is
not stopped.
61 Ariston does claim that Conon will use the “boys will be boys” defense (taËt' e‰nai n°vn ényr√pvn)
(14). Cf. Pro Caelio here, where Cicero successfully plays up Caelius’ young age to explain away mistakes
he has made.
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running around with youths and getting into drunken brawls. This element would spark
the desire to reproach him for social transgression even if Ariston, a youth, did strike
first.
As I mentioned above, this speech does not include invective per se and, in fact,
makes a point of evading abusive language altogether, even if spoken by his opponent:
“They said foul things that I shrink from repeating in front of you (8-9).” It is obvious
that this claim is a rhetorical tactic intending to reinforce his self-characterization as a
respectful and temperate youth. But, it is striking that he does not go on to repeat that
very foul language he is supposedly avoiding (in true paraleipsis fashion). Aeschines,
e.g., uses a similar tactic in 1.54, but precisely for the purpose of verbally attacking
Timarchus as an indiscriminate pornos, rather than avoiding harsh language. Instead,
Ariston plays up humorous aspects of the story, perhaps to steal Conon’s thunder and
evoke the laughter himself. A primary example is the famous scenario of Conon’s
triumphal cock impersonation after finishing his assault on Ariston:
Lying there, I heard them saying many horrible things. Most of it was
blasphemous and I shrink from giving specifics among you, but the I’ll tell
you an example that will suffice as a sign (sêmeion) of this man’s outrage
(hubreôs) and evidence (tekmêrion) of how the whole affair came to pass
at his hands: Conon mimicked victorious roosters after a cock-fight, while
his friends encouraged him to strike his elbows against his sides, as if
flapping his wings.
First, it is important to note that Ariston’s verbal restraint is borne out by his
decision to give only one example, and that he connects this directly with the charge of
hubris. Ariston’s restraint, however, also acts as a clever build-up to this one act, putting
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greater emphasis on it for the listener (and reader) than if he simply mentioned it among a
string of Conon’s other alleged obscenities and violations. But why home in on this one
act in particular? MacDowell points out that it is Conon’s delight in his victory that
makes the attack an act of hubris and not just battery.62 He is correct to see a connection
between this anecdote and the legal charge, but additionally, I would argue that Ariston is
trying to expose Conon’s act of impersonation as ludicrous and thus gain control of the
laughter. This raises the question: would Ariston have expected an Athenian jury to
laugh? Modern readers have found this scene entertaining, but it is even more likely that
an Athenian audience would have responded with laughter.63 To be sure, Ariston invites
us to imagine Conon engaging in the behavior of an animal that is particularly known for
its brazen arrogance and aggressiveness. At the same time, the very act of a human
impersonating an animal was funny to Athenians, as McDermott has shown in great
detail.64 In particular, we know that bird behavior was considered humorous, since
Aristophanes won second place for his play Birds in 414, which included an extremely
wide array of types of birds and their antics.65 Furthermore, as we have seen in previous
chapters, comparisons with animals are prevalent as a way of debasing an opponent.66
Ariston’s hope is that the jurors will find the scene itself funny, but that they will laugh at
                                                 
62 MacDowell 1978, 132.
63 This is not to say that Ariston would have wanted the jury to laugh at himself, but at this visual image of
Conon.
64 For a good discussion of the humor involved in blurring the lines between human and animal
(particularly, apes), see McDermott (1935), 165-176.
65 Ortwin Knorr has well illustrated the visual nature of bird humor in his talk “Silly Birds: Ornithological
Humor in Aristophanes’ Birds,” at the 2004 APA in San Francisco. See also Anaxandrides Tereus (46 K-
A).
66 This a part of the Greek invective tradition going back to Homer and Semonides, whose vitriolic poem
(7) compares women to eight different types of animals, only one of which is positive.
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Conon—a fifty-year old man—for engaging in this behavior and not with him for his
antics. He tells the story precisely so that he can expose and disarm the kind of laughter
that Conon is allegedly hoping to elicit. If Conon were able to show that he and his sons
were just fooling around and did not even strike the first blow, Ariston would likely come
across as a weakling and whiner, who dragged his private business into the public realm
unnecessarily.
In addition to emphasizing age-inappropriate behavior, Ariston attempts to stir up
hostilities based on class. While discussing what Conon will allegedly claim in his own
defense, Ariston first mentions the defendants as kaloi k’agathoi. It is in association with
this status that the defendants will supposedly acknowledge their nicknames for the
groups to which they belong, the ithuphalloi (The Erections) and the autolêkuthoi (The
Jug-Holders).67 It is certainly striking that a form of ithuphallos appears four times from
section 14 to 20. It is hard to tell whether or not Conon would have mentioned these
groups, as Ariston implies, in order to get a laugh, or, if Ariston is fabricating this
possibility so that he can discuss it without hesitation. Perhaps both. We can be certain,
though, that the mention of these groups was supposed to make the audience laugh, since
Ariston says so explicitly in his final mention of ithuphalloi (20): “If Conon should say,
                                                 
67 The “Ithyphalloi” club has clearer meaning; “The word thus has connotations of sexual potency, of
unrestrained language and behaviour, and perhaps verbal abuse such as we often find in fertility ritual
(Carey and Reid 1985, 86).” I follow Henderson (1991, 120 n. 70) who argues that “Autolekythoi” is not
phallic in connotation, but refers instead to men carrying their own oil jars, which a slave would normally
do (cf. Henderson 1972 and Paley & Sandys (1979, 239-41) who come to the same conclusion; see also
Carey and Reid 1985, 87 who point out that all 4th century uses refer to poverty). This would imply lower
class behavior, perhaps Saturnalian style behavior, and makes the most sense of why Ariston does not
repeat it as much in connection with his claims about love affairs. The mention of it would thus support
another aspect of his characterization of Conon that is consistent with his description of him; he is not just
overly aggressive, drunk, abusive and excessively masculine (hence Ithyphalloi), he also engages in
behavior that does not suit his upper-class station (hence Autolekythoi). It makes particular sense when we
recall that he names this group right after mentioning their status as kaloi k’agathoi.
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‘Some of us are involved in the Ithuphalloi club, and we hit and choke whomever we
want because of our love affairs,’ are you going to laugh and then let him go? I, for sure,
don’t think so.”68 Ariston feigns concern here that the jury will find it funny, and must
press them instead to find it offensive.69 He seeks to make their commitment to the
phenomenon of drunken abuse stronger by bringing them into the picture, instead of
letting them think about it in the abstract (“None of you would have laughed if you were
there when I was beaten, abused, and had my cloak stolen”).70 Nor should it be surprising
that the mention of the “Erect Penis” club would make the jurors laugh. The erect penis
was a staple prop for Aristophanic comedy that emerged from ritual festivities and was
used by Aristophanes to expose something private for the sake of producing laughter (cf.
aischrologia). Ariston’s goal is, once again, to turn potential inclusionary laughter
(laughter that brings us together) into exclusionary laughter by inviting the jurors, if they
are to laugh, to laugh derisively by acknowledging what the Ithuphalloi actually
represent. When Ariston states, “These men initiate each other with the erect penis and
they do things of a sort that are disgraceful to even mention—certainly no restrained men
                                                 
68 The theme of lovers getting out of hand is a comic motif, lending support to Ariston’s concern that the
jury will find this behavior humorous; cf. Dyskolos 58-61, where Chaireas, the parasite, proclaims that he
gets drunk and burns down doors to snatch away a hetaira if his friend is in love with her.
69 Ariston, no doubt, is misrepresenting Conon’s words and arguments, but there is good reason to believe
that he is not making up Conon’s strategy altogether. It is customary for prosecutors to preempt the
defendants’ arguments, but it is anomalous that Ariston returns to this theme of laughter repeatedly. In no
other speech, as far as I know, does a litigant mention this potential response repeatedly and design his own
case around it. This, to me, is a strong indication that Ariston/Demosthenes did expect that Conon would
pursue this line of argument, even if Ariston is clearly distorting the actual phrasing or specific arguments
that Conon will use. After all, if Ariston’s speech pre-empts this strategy, then it deters Conon from using it
(or at least makes it harder for him to use it successfully), quite possibly the most effective defense.
70 Similarly, we often laugh at situations today that we would find upsetting if we, or someone we knew,
were directly involved.
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would actually do them,” he endeavors to stir up pthonos on the part of the jury, thus
bringing himself and the jurors together at the expense of Conon.
The aggressive, over-masculinized Conon, as indicated by the name of his gang,
Ithuphalloi, his cock impersonation, and the hints at his anal aggression,71 recalls the
Aristophanic character of Euripides’ Father-in-law in Thesmophoriazusae. In an early
scene where the Father-in-law and the effeminate tragedian Agathon interact, he picks up
on Agathon’s incongruities of gender, his effeminacy, and his wide-assedness
(euruprôktia), and offers to penetrate him (line 157). Henderson describes the Father-in
law as a bômolochos, a boorish sort who wore an erect phallus, spoke with crude
language, and was responsible for jesting in an attempt to gain audience goodwill.72 This
type of behavior is similar to what Ariston imputes to Conon, only it takes on an even
greater sense of impropriety insofar as Conon is supposedly upper-class. Just as we saw
with Timarchus, an elite citizen turned shameless pornos, Conon here drops from elite
male to aggressive, rustic buffoon. And like the stock character, Conon will also
supposedly try to make the audience laugh. Bômolochia, furthermore, is considered a
form of age-inappropriate buffoonery.73 Here again we are reminded by Ariston’s
representation that a character like Conon might be funny on the comic stage, but must be
viewed as insidious in the real life of the courtroom.
                                                 
71 See Cohen (1991) and Bers (2003); there is a cumulative effect from the language Ariston employs and
the details he chooses to give. Whether or not Conon actually committed anal rape, Ariston’s story (in my
opinion) consciously implies that he did. See also D. Phillip’s (2002) discussion of sexual aggression in the
speech.
72 Henderson 1991, 89.
73 Cf. Halliwell 1991, 284.
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Halliwell’s model of playful versus consequential laughter can be connected more
closely with the issues of age (and status) that permeate the speech. Ariston tries to
exclude the possibility that what occurred was only playful laughter by emphasizing
Conon’s age. At fifty years old, Conon should long ago have ceased behavior that is
characteristic of youth. That he and his older friends do not respect the social values and
expectations placed on men their age is further ridiculed by Ariston near the end of the
speech where he accuses Conon’s witnesses of perjury:
But many of you, I suspect, know Diotimus, and Archebiades, and this
grey-haired man here Chairetius (ton epipolion toutoni), men who skulk
around during the day (eskuthrôpakasin) and claim that they are like the
Spartans and wear short tunics and thin-soled sandals.74 But whenever they
gather and are with each other, they do not refrain from any act of
wickedness or disgrace. And this is their brilliant and youthful talk (ta
lampra kai neanika), “We’re not going to testify against each other, are
we? That’s not the way of hetairoi or friends, is it? What is this dreadful
charge that’s being brought against you? Some are saying that they saw
him getting beaten up? We’ll testify that he was not even touched! That he
was stripped of his cloak? We’ll testify that those other men did this much
earlier! That his lip was stitched up? We’ll say that your head or some
other part was busted open!
Demosthenes makes a point of calling attention to Chairetius’ graying hair (epipolion) as
a deliberate contrast to the men’s youthful talk (neanika). Halliwell points out that
neanikos and its cognates refer to unconstrained laughter, particularly associated with
irreverence towards authorities including parents. Thus, we see a multiplicity of
subversive behaviors from Conon’s witnesses encapsulated in the contrast between old
and young. They too engage in age-inappropriate behavior, acting the part of youth by
                                                 
74 See above for a discussion of similar behavior in Dem. 45.
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flouting authority (here, the laws and courts). Appropriate to their age, they appear to be
the most self-restrained and minimalist of men in Spartan fashion by day, but by night
they engage in filthy and indulgent acts entirely incongruous with their daytime image
and their actual age.75 In Wasps, as an old man, Philocleon carries out a similar comic
age-reversal when he acts like an uproarious youth (neanikôs) at a dinner party (1305-
7).76 That the same term is used to describe Philocleon’s son’s behavior later on reminds
us of the filial connection and implications; what may be considered youthful fun sets a
bad example to the young when carried out by old men because age itself should act as a
control to keep this type of behavior in check.
This scenario, in conjunction with the two previous scenes of drunken violence, is
designed to instruct the jurors on the far-reaching effects that Conon’s behavior has on
the city. It is not just a matter of him and his friends flouting authority, but of raising his
own sons in the same culture of disrespect toward the city and other citizens. Since, at
Conon’s age, there is no longer such a thing as youthful pranks, whether or not he views
himself as engaging in some harmless fun (and presents it that way to the court), the jury
should nonetheless interpret it as harmful. In this way, Demosthenes uses the comic
principle of incongruity to perform a highly persuasive function. Moreover, this approach
would not be considered irrelevant to the legal case, since the laughter Ariston seeks to
take away from Conon and then uses against him serves the important function of social
                                                 
75 Cf. Apollodorus’ attack on Stephanus and Phormio (cited above); there too we see an attempt to
undermine public reputation with the day vs. night contrast. The emphasis on age that we see here does not
come into play in Apollodorus’ account, however. Thus, Ariston’s attempt here to play up this theme of
age-inappropriate behavior is highlighted as a conscious maneuver.
76 As cited by Halliwell 1991, 285,
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control in a way that is coherent with normative Athenian values. That these issues were
of increasing interest and importance to Athenian juries reflects the growing concern in
4th century Athens with policing morality.77 Nonetheless, Demosthenes’ concerted effort
at making the graphê hubreôs relevant to Ariston’s case reminds us that, strictly
speaking, a dikê aikeias would not cover issues of immorality on its own. As we have
seen, it was normal forensic practice to expand the case to include character and context,
and it was likewise relevant to discuss what other legal options were available (cf. Dem.
37 above). The only restraints, as far as courtroom procedure was concerned, were the
threat of thorubos and a possible rebuttal by his opponent that he should have brought a
graphê hubreôs. In terms of risk and reward, Demosthenes no doubt knew that the jury
would find Conon’s complaint about the wrong case being brought as a niggling
argument if he could not refute Ariston’s accusations of hubris.
                                                 
77 As the case Against Timarchus also indicates; a thorough diachronic analysis is still needed, but the cases
occurring mid to late 4th century appear to show greater concern with immorality than those from the 5th and
first half of the 4th. This is one significant area in which the goal of comedy and oratory at the time overlap.
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Epilogue
In the Athenian popular courts, invective was not irrelevant. It was a form of
character argumentation that offered the jury valid evidence for assessing the guilt of a
litigant. Numerous complexities affected a speaker’s use of invective: the type of case,
the social status of the speaker, sunêgoria, and the speaker’s fame within the community.
By looking at these factors, this dissertation has attempted to reveal those complexities,
not simplify them. Skilled politicians like Demosthenes and Aeschines were able to push
the limits of humorous attacks. Lesser-known individuals steered clear of invective in
order to create a more humble persona. This reveals that the use of invective reflects on
both the person speaking and the person attacked.  But beyond the circumstances of
individual use, the prevalence of invective against immoral behavior at the end of the 4th-
century, both in comedy and oratory, can be linked to broader democratic concerns.
Freedom of speech was a founding principle of the Athenian democratic process.1
Connecting invective (in the form of parrêsia) with democracy (Dem. 22.31-32) was
therefore not a mere rhetorical trick; speakers expected the jury to find these types of
argument persuasive. Nor was it only in the courts where the dêmos was exposed to
democratic invective. Throughout the fourth century Athenian comedy continued to stage
and scrutinize the behaviors of its own leaders. The license that comic poets had for
lampooning officials—and the audience’s laughter at them—was a key part of the
democratic process. Invective used against offenders in court can be interpreted similarly.
                                                 
1 See Raaflaub 2004.
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Even if one man used the courts to attack another as a part of a zero-sum game,
democratic values and normative behavior were reified in the process. The Athenian jury
saw their role as a way to serve democracy; they were concerned with upholding the laws
and decrees of the people. From their perspective, invective was more than entertainment,
it was an obvious reminder of the system they were trying to sustain.
Perhaps, then, it is not a coincidence that both comedy and oratory drastically
changed nature with the rise of Macedon and the end of democracy in 322.  Comedy lost
its overt interest in personal and political invective.  What happens to oratory is more
complicated. Although we know that the law courts continued to exist under Demetrius
of Phalerum, the political context in which they existed had changed.2  Invective may
have continued to play a role in the courts, but we have no evidence for what it looked
like or how it functioned.  What happened after 322 requires a study of its own, but it
does not discount the parallel development of invective in comedy and oratory in the
fourth century.  It will be sufficient to have shown the importance of comedy for a study
of invective in 4th-century oratory, since invective reifies and reflects democratic parrêsia
in its appeal to members of the dêmos, both as audience and as jury.
                                                 
2 Cf. Gagarin 1999 and Boegehold 1995, 41-42.
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